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Part I: Theory 
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The bravest men, who were always willing to 
come to the front in war, and who freely 
risked their lives for others, would, on an av-
erage, perish in larger number than other 
men. Therefore it seems scarcely possible (...) 
that the number of men gifted with such vir-
tues, or that the standard of their excellence, 
could be increased through natural selection, 
that is, by the survival of the fittest.  
 
(Charles Darwin, 1871, p.163) 
 
1. An introduction to the paradox of human al-
truism 
In his intriguing publication “The Descent of Man,” Charles Darwin 
(1871) was concerned that his entire theory of evolution by natural 
selection might be negated by a single phenomenon prevalent in a 
variety of species including humans; namely altruism. If natural 
selection really favored the survival of the fittest, how could individu-
als survive who are willing to bear costs for the sake of the well-being 
of others? 
Today, Darwin’s hypotheses on evolution by natural selection have 
long been supported empirically. Genetics has disclosed the physical 
basis and processes of heredity and it is known that traits, like pro-
sociality, are passed directly from parents to offspring via genetic 
transmission. However, despite the triumph of Darwin’s theory, his 
early and prudent considerations of the “paradox of altruism,“ explic-
itly that any strategy so irrational as to sacrifice oneself for unrelated 
others should die out, has bothered researchers to this day.  
A number of scientists have contributed valuable theories to elucidate 
the paradox of altruism since the time of Darwin. For example, Ham-
ilton (1964), in his theory of kin altruism, explained that people be-
have prosocially towards those who are related by blood because 
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such behavior serves to carry one’s own genes into the next genera-
tion, not by the production of their own descendants but by aiding 
the reproduction of nondescendant relatives. A few years later, Triv-
ers (1971) argued that prosocial behavior by a donor toward a benefi-
ciary is adaptive if it is reciprocated by the beneficiary at a later time. 
The list of scientific insights concerning the evolution of altruism is 
extensive, because as of today a variety of explanations have been 
made out, each of them adding an important piece to solve the puzzle 
of human altruistic nature. However, in spite of the merits of these 
theories, there is still dissension about the origins of some particular 
oddities in the altruistic tendencies of humans, namely why humans 
act selflessly even when they are unobserved and when they are 
benefiting a stranger whom they will never meet again. 
In everyday life, such behavior can be frequently observed. People 
return lost wallets to their owners with the cash intact, they give 
money to beggars, and tip waiters on the road in restaurants they will 
not visit for a second time. People are willing to contribute to the 
public good, they donate anonymously to charity, and they risk their 
lives to save strangers in need. All of these manners are socially 
desirable as they aid the functioning of our society, but displaying 
them implies the acceptance of harm to oneself. People neither pro-
mote their own genes by giving money to strangers, nor may they 
expect that the unknown beggar will recompensate them if they ever 
become needy themselves. So how could cooperation, especially 
cooperation in large and anonymous groups, survive the pressures of 
natural selection? 
The present doctoral thesis sheds light on answers to this question. 
Chapter 2 sets the basis for the analysis; the subject-matter will be 
precisely defined and some preliminary remarks will be made. Chap-
ters 3 to 6 provide a review of both prominent and less recognized 
theories on the evolution of altruism, with the different concepts 
compared to one another and discussed in-depth. Based on an inte-
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grative overview, I will analyze how much of the puzzle has been 
solved yet and which specific phenomena are still open to conjecture. 
Chapter 7 calls for an integration of present theories as a way to 
come closer to a solution of the human altruism paradox. With the 
aim of adding new insights to the issue, Chapter 8, 9, and 10, which 
form the centerpiece of this work, present three empirical studies that 
investigate in how far prosociality might have been favored by proc-
esses of assortation. Assortation denotes the selective association of 
individuals; in the context of this specific work, the grouping of pro-
social persons. Indeed, assortation may be invoked as an explanation 
for the evolution of altruism, if the selfish advantage of egoistic indi-
viduals is out-competed by benefits of mutually cooperating altruists. 
However, to make assortation work as a driver of the evolution of 
altruism, two prerequisites have to be fulfilled: first, individuals have 
to be able to distinguish altruists from egoists, and second, altruists 
should, because of their perception, elect like-minded individuals for 
mutual cooperation in order to reap synergetic extra benefits.  
The first study presented in Chapter 8 investigates whether humans 
are really able to identify altruists based on first impression. To test 
this, the so-called ‘thin slices paradigm’ (Ambady, Bernieri, & Riche-
son, 2000) was adopted. This paradigm has been used to show that 
people are able to identify other people’s permanent characteristics 
such intelligence, sociosexuality, or personality disorders by watching 
short videotapes of target persons. In the study presented here, 
judges watched 20-second silent video clips of unknown target per-
sons and were asked to estimate the behavior of these target persons 
in a dictator game, which measures prosociality. Estimates were 
significantly better than chance indicating that humans can identify 
the altruistic dispositions of unknown persons.  
However, people should not only be able to assess the character of 
strangers; people should at least be equally capable of distinguishing 
the good people from bad people when screening their pool of daily 
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interaction partners. In addition, they should draw consequences 
from their insights by carefully choosing the right lovers, friends, and 
allies, and avoiding the villains.  
The second study presented in Chapter 9 investigates whether indi-
viduals, in genuine groups, can identify the altruistic tendencies of 
their interactants. It further examines whether prosociality influences 
the formation of friendships in such that individuals assort them-
selves along the dimension of altruism. Students of six secondary 
school classes played an anonymous dictator game that functioned 
as a measure of altruism. Afterwards and unannounced, the students 
had to estimate their classmates’ decisions and did so better than 
chance. Sociometry revealed that altruists were friends with more 
altruistic persons than were egoists.  
Although the theory of assortation may explain the evolution of altru-
ism in general, it does not explain the occurrence of inter-individual 
differences in altruism. However, the third study presented in Chap-
ter 10 deals exactly with this matter. It investigates whether different 
levels of prosociality might have evolved as a result of different mating 
strategies, namely inter-individual variations in the propensity to 
engage in either short-term mating or long-term mating. Specifically, 
it assumes that prosociality is a necessity for acquiring a long-term 
partner, especially if an individual has to compensate for deficits in 
physical attractiveness. To find out whether this idea is true, the 
study tested whether individuals look out for different levels of proso-
ciality depending on whether they are searching for a short-term 
mate or a long-term mate. Judges watched short video-clips of target 
persons and received additional information on the targets’ prosocial-
ity. Judges were then asked to rate each of the target persons with 
regard to their desirability as a short-term and long-term mate. While 
prosociality was a significant predictor for long-term desirability, it 
was irrelevant when subjects chose a short-term mate. The results 
suggest that although altruism is costly, at least for some individuals 
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it might be a wretched necessity to obtain access to mates and to 
reproduce.  
The results of all three studies will be consolidated in Chapter 11. 
Conclusions will be drawn as to the consequences of these findings 
for the study of human altruism. Finally, directions for future re-
search will be presented. 
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2. Specification of the subject matter 
2.1. Levels of explanation: proximate versus ultimate 
causation 
As mentioned above, the paradox of altruism is why should an indi-
vidual carry out an act that is costly to perform and benefits another 
individual? At first sight, such behavior seems self-destructive and 
when focused on its direct consequences only, it has to be judged as 
irrational. Nevertheless, evolutionary theory suggests that there may 
be multiple reasons why people behave the way they do. Following 
the Nobel laureate Nikolas Tinbergen (1963), these reasons may be 
based on different levels of explanation: proximate and ultimate 
causes of behavior. 
Proximate causation explains an individual's behavior based on 
trigger stimuli and internal mechanisms. It determines how a behav-
ior occurs by analyzing physiological processes (e.g., hormones and 
neurons), psychological processes (e.g., motivations and learning), 
and developmental processes (e.g., gene-environment interactions). 
For example, it could be that prosocial behavior is due to the release 
of oxytocin, a hormone which is known to affect parts of the brain 
that trigger empathy, feelings of trust, and bonding. However, proso-
cial behavior could also be explained by learning; parents, by mecha-
nisms of reward and punishment, have taught their children good 
manners, which include acts of sharing. Another possibility could be 
due to developmental processes such that people behave prosocially 
in particular domains like parenting because they carry certain genes 
that, over the course of development, endow them with the psy-
chological machinery needed to care for potential offspring (Gaulin & 
McBurney, 2004). 
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In contrast to proximate causation, ultimate causation focuses on the 
evolution of the trait and its adaptive value. It asks why a behavior 
occurred the way it did (e.g., which problems altruism solved). An 
example of ultimate causation could be that over evolutionary time, 
altruistic individuals integrated better in social communities than 
egoistic individuals. If they received more support and shelter from 
other community members, they would have had better chances of 
survival and altruism could have survived the pressures of natural 
selection.  
Indeed, the analysis of proximate causes of behavior is typically the 
domain of psychologists, while the analysis of ultimate causes is the 
domain of biologists (de Waal, 2008). However, which level of analysis 
is primarily relevant to this work? As previously mentioned, the pres-
ent work takes an evolutionary viewpoint, a biological viewpoint, 
which focuses on ultimate causation and attempts to determine 
adaptiveness. For a trait to be adaptive, it has to increase an individ-
ual’s fitness. According to life history theory (Stearns, 1989), this can 
be achieved through one of three possible goals: (1) developing to 
reproductive age, (2) reproducing successfully, and (3) rearing off-
spring to reproductive age.  
The definition of these three ultimate goals is central to the present 
work. The stated aim is to shed light on the puzzle of human altru-
ism. Therefore, the crucial question for the following analysis is “How 
far does altruism increase the fitness of individuals, that is, their 
survival odds and/or reproductive success?” 
2.2. A definition of “altruism” 
Different scientists have used the term “altruism” for distinct types of 
behavior (for an extensive review of social semantics see West, Griffin, 
and Gardner, 2007). Before starting to review theories about the 
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evolution of altruism, the term altruism will be defined in the context 
of this work to avoid confusion. 
Hamilton (1964, 1970) classified social behaviors depending on 
whether their consequences were beneficial or costly to the actor and 
the recipient. According to his definition, a behavior that is beneficial 
to the actor and costly to the recipient (+/-) is selfish, and a behavior 
that is costly to both persons (-/-) is spiteful. In contrast, a behavior 
that is costly to the actor and beneficial to the recipient (-/+) is altru-
istic. Finally, a behavior that is beneficial to both persons (+/+) is 
mutualistic. According to West et al. (2007), whether a behavior is 
beneficial or costly depends on its lifetime consequences for an indi-
vidual. This definition implies that behavior can only be termed altru-
istic (-/+) if actors are never ever rewarded for their prosocial behav-
ior. However, from an evolutionary perspective, any behavior that was 
favored by natural selection should have served the ultimate goal of 
increasing an individual’s fitness (Tinbergen, 1963). Therefore, altru-
istic behavior in the strict sense that the donor suffers a net loss even 
in the long run should not exist, or, if it does, it has to be judged a 
maladaptation.  
In contrast to West et al. (2007), Sober and Wilson (1998) use a less 
strict definition of altruism. They term a behavior altruistic if it is 
costly to perform, if it benefits another individual, and—the central 
concept—if the donor does not expect any payoff. Sober and Wilson 
thus allow for unexpected fitness benefits. The definition of altruism 
which is fundamental to this work, follows the idea of Sober and 
Wilson (1998) in that prosocial behavior that leads to an unintended 
and unexpected reward in the long run will nevertheless be termed 
“altruism.” The words “prosociality” and “cooperation” will be used 
synonymously.  
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2.3. Individual-level versus group-level explanations  
In recent years two camps have arisen trying to explain human altru-
ism on different grounds: the individual-level adaptationist camp and 
the group-level adaptationist camp (Johnson, Prize, & Takezawa, 
2008).  
Advocates of individual-level theories assume that, at first sight, 
altruism is self-detrimental to the individual. However, when consid-
ering indirect and long-term consequences, there are several reasons 
why individuals benefit from displaying altruistic acts. Because these 
individual fitness benefits exist, altruism can evolve.  
In contrast, the group-level adaptationist camp assumes that indi-
vidual fitness benefits alone cannot explain the variety of altruistic 
behavior. In their view, there are several events in which altruistic 
individuals benefit the group but harm themselves and are never 
directly or indirectly rewarded. As these individuals are supposed to 
lose out in the evolutionary game when sticking to individual-level 
rationales, followers of this camp argue that higher-level rationales 
have to be considered. The central idea is that because altruism is 
good for the group, group-level mechanisms should develop which 
prevent altruism from extinction.  
Both types of theories will be discussed in the following chapters. 
First, I will focus on a variety of individual-level theories in Chapter 3, 
with group-level theories investigated in Chapter 4.  
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3. Individual-level explanations for the evolution 
of altruism 
3.1. Kin selection theory 
Elucidating how altruism could evolve, Hamilton, in his seminal 1964 
publication, explained that helping behavior towards related indi-
viduals (i.e., kin altruism) is beneficial to the individual who performs 
the altruistic act. To elaborate, Hamilton argued that because close 
relatives are likely to carry copies of an individual’s own genes, pro-
moting the survival and reproduction of one’s relatives is a means to 
support the survival and reproduction of one’s own genes in an indi-
rect way. Thus, the theory of kin selection investigates altruism from 
the point of view of the gene, not the individual (Dawkins, 1976). For 
the gene, it does not matter which copy of itself—the own one or a 
copy of a copy—is passed on, it simply matters that as many copies 
as possible are passed on to the next generation. So taking this per-
spective, altruistic behavior towards relatives can actually be selfish, 
because it may help to carry the gene into the next generation. There-
fore, kin altruism is adaptive. 
The concept of kin altruism is encapsulated in a formula, which is 
known as “Hamilton’s Rule”: b > c/r. Here, b denotes the benefit of 
the recipient, c denotes the cost of the donor, and r denotes the de-
gree of genetic relatedness between the recipient and the donor. The 
formula predicts that altruism is promoted if the cost for the donor is 
low, and if the benefit for the recipient and the relatedness between 
the individuals are high. If individuals display altruism only when 
this formula is met though, how do they assure that the relatedness 
with the beneficent is satisfactory? Hamilton proposed two mecha-
nisms for this to work: limited dispersal and kin discrimination.  
Limited dispersal (Hamilton, 1964, 1971), or population viscosity as it 
is also known, keeps related individuals together. The principle thus 
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reflects living conditions in our evolutionary past, where families lived 
together in tribes. It has been suggested that altruism, which is 
directed indiscriminately to all neighbors, will be favored because 
neighbors are relatives. West, Pen, and Griffin (2002) assumed lim-
ited dispersal to be an important force to encourage high relatedness 
and thus cooperation through kin selection in a wide range of cases 
from bacteria to humans. Empirical evidence is difficult to find 
though; as Griffin & West (2002) stated, it is often hard to rule out 
alternative explanations (i.e., cooperation could be due to other 
mechanisms than limited dispersal). The most tangible evidence for 
the existence of limited dispersal stems from an experimental evolu-
tion study in bacteria. Griffin, West, and Buckling (2004) showed that 
siderophore production, which is costly to the individual bacterium 
that produces them but provides a reproductive benefit to neighbors, 
is higher in cultures of high relatedness than in cultures of lower 
relatedness.  
The second mechanism that could lead to kin selection for altruism is 
kin discrimination (Hamilton, 1964). Kin discrimination predicts that 
altruistic behavior is preferentially directed to those individuals who 
are perceived as close kin. The phenomenon has been well docu-
mented in many vertebrate species (Griffin & West, 2003, Komdeur & 
Hatchwell, 1999). One of the best-studied cases is the long-tailed tit, 
a species in which individuals who failed to reproduce themselves 
selectively help the nest of closer relatives (Russell & Hatchwell, 
2001; Sharp, McGowan, Wood, & Hatchwell, 2005). It has been 
shown that long-tailed tits discriminate between kin and non-kin 
based on vocal contact cues, which are learned from adults in the 
nesting period. Following these cues, long-tailed tits tend to promote 
relatives with whom they have been associated during the nestling 
phase. 
However, do humans discriminate kin from non-kin, as well? A num-
ber of studies have investigated whether humans are able to identify 
13 
other people’s level of relatedness, and if they do, whether they adjust 
their behavior accordingly (West, Gardner, & Griffin, 2008). Central 
areas of interest have been mother-baby interactions and mate 
choice. As mating with related individuals leads to offspring with 
homozygous recessive mutations, the discrimination of kin from non-
kin would be highly adaptive. Indeed, studies on incest have shown 
that individuals try to avoid marrying or mating with close relatives. 
Lieberman, Tooby, and Cosmides (2003) found that, as in the case of 
the long-tailed tit, the underlying cue that humans use to assess 
relatedness is repeated interactions during the time of co-residence 
during infancy.  
Going beyond kin discrimination because of repeated interactions, 
there is a line of work that additionally assumes a direct kin recogni-
tion mechanism such that individuals may assess relatedness based 
on genetic odor cues. For example, the major histocompatibility 
complex, the densest gene region of the human genome, influences 
body odors and it has been shown that these odor cues are linked to 
human mate choice preferences (for a review see Brown & Eklund, 
1994). However, the general idea in regards to kin recognition in 
humans is that it usually works through learning mechanisms. 
But how far has empirical research investigated the central postulate 
of kin selection, which states that helping relatives is beneficial and 
that the degree of helping should increase with relatedness? In fact, 
several studies have proven that humans are more inclined to pro-
mote relatives than unrelated individuals (see Barrett, Dunbar & 
Lycett, 2002). Some studies let predictions derived from kin selection 
compete against predictions based on social norms and rules for 
helping; for example, Burnstein, Crandall, and Kitayama (1994) 
found, consistent with kin selection theory but in contrast to the 
norm of social responsibility, that both Americans and Japanese 
report that in a “life-or-death” situation (e.g., saving someone from a 
fire) they would be more prone to help healthy relatives (who were 
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presumably more likely to produce offspring) than nonhealthy rela-
tives. Thus, in this study participants helped their relatives in a way 
that maximized their own inclusive fitness. Making even more sophis-
ticated predictions on how helping of relatives would affect inclusive 
fitness, Euler and Weitzel (1996) found that a higher level of paternal 
certainty (the probability that a putative descendant is truly related) 
caused maternal grandparents to invest significantly more than pa-
ternal ones in their grandchildren. Webster (2003) replicated this 
result, but also showed that the effects of paternal certainty were 
strongest for benefactors with limited resources.  
Summarizing the empirical investigations of kin selection theory, it 
can be concluded that consanguinity is an important predictor of 
helping behavior in humans. However, humans also cooperate with 
unrelated individuals, thus kin altruism cannot explain the whole 
story. But perhaps, selective interactions with individuals who are 
similar, though not related, could be likewise beneficial. This idea is 
considered in the next section. 
3.2. Assortation: a broader concept of kin selection  
3.2.1. Kin selection versus inclusive fitness 
The theory of Hamilton described above is referred to in different 
ways. Maynard Smith (1964) called the phenomenon “kin selection,” 
the expression most often used. However, Hamilton himself coined 
the term “inclusive fitness” referring to the notion that individuals 
increase their fitness by helping relatives. Inclusive fitness can be 
divided into two components: direct and indirect fitness benefits. 
While direct fitness benefits denotes the component of fitness in 
which individuals gain through the production of their own offspring, 
indirect fitness benefits denotes the component of fitness in which 
individuals gain by helping the reproduction of related individuals 
(Brown & Brown, 1981). 
15 
In 1975 Hamilton pointed out that the concept of inclusive fitness is 
more general than that of kin selection. While kin selection is gener-
ally understood with respect to interactions between individuals who 
share alleles by common descent, inclusive fitness denotes the life-
time benefit from helping behavior directed towards any individual 
who is genetically similar, regardless of whether this similarity is due 
to genes shared by common ancestry and thus extending over most of 
the genome, or whether it is due to some other mechanism and con-
cerns only a particular genetic locus for the behavior in question 
(West et al., 2007). Therefore, two possibilities exist on how to reach 
indirect fitness benefits: one is by helping relatives, whose genes are 
identical by descent (i.e., kin selection), the other is by helping those 
who are not related by blood but nevertheless share the same altruis-
tic gene.  
Grafen (1985) formalized the idea of consanguinity-detached related-
ness by stating that the coefficient of relatedness r in Hamilton’s 
Rule, is a regression coefficient, which describes how similar two 
individuals are over and above the average similarity of all individuals 
in the population. The average relatedness between two individuals 
who are picked randomly from the population should by definition be 
zero; nevertheless, there should be individuals who are more similar 
than average and other individuals who are less similar than average 
(West et al., 2008). From the viewpoint of a selfish altruistic gene, 
cooperation with an individual who is more similar than average, 
regardless of the fact that he or she does not “share blood” with the 
actor, can thus be beneficial. 
3.2.2. The green-beard mechanism 
The cooperation of individuals who share similar genes, though not 
being related by blood, has been termed assortative interaction or 
assortation. The central idea of the concept is close to kin selection, in 
that it is suggested that the promotion of the survival and reproduc-
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tion of individuals with similar genes is a means to support the sur-
vival and reproduction of one’s own genes in an indirect way. 
Assortation mechanisms based on genes require three prerequisites: 
(1) the existence of a single gene, or a number of genes, which cause 
the behavior in question; (2) an observable mark which signals the 
presence of the gene(s); and (3) the preferential cooperation with 
those persons who carry the mark, and consequently the gene. The 
idea of the above-characterized gene was proposed by Hamilton 
(1964). However, it was Dawkins (1976) who introduced the term 
“green-beard gene” to associate the idea that a gene for altruism 
could be signaled through a well-recognizable mark like a green 
beard.  
The concept of green-beard altruism implies that individuals who 
carry a gene for altruism can easily identify one another. Conse-
quently, altruists are able to exclusively choose other altruists for 
mutual cooperation, leaving free riders no chance but to stay among 
themselves. As altruists may reach extraordinary benefits through 
mutualism, which out-competes the advantage of selfish free riders, 
green-beard altruism may increase the presence of altruists in a 
population even if genes are promoting other genes that are not exact 
copies of themselves in a molecular sense. In 1998, a “green-beard 
gene” was found in nature in the red imported fire ant (Keller & Ross, 
1998); however, in humans, a green-beard gene has not yet been 
discovered. 
3.2.3. The commitment-model 
Although the existence of green-beard genes in humans is currently 
hypothetical, the economist Frank (1988, 2008) explained the evolu-
tion of altruism in humans on the basis of the green-beard concept 
(Dawkins, 1976). In his so-called “commitment model,” he assumed 
that altruistic individuals carry a genetically coded observable mark 
which differentiates them from egoists: emotional commitment. Frank 
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proposed that altruists have proximate mechanisms favoring coop-
eration in such that they cannot but feel ashamed if they deceive 
others. As they are inclined to avoid emotions of shame and guilt, 
they are made to behave righteously. Showing positive emotions like 
sympathy and responsibility, humans with an altruistic disposition 
naturally signal their good intentions and others are able to observe 
them directly. Therefore egoists can be distinguished from altruists. 
Because humans are free to choose their interaction partners in most 
situations, Frank assumed that altruists will be preferred for mutual 
cooperation. As altruists themselves do not want to be exploited by 
others, they will conditionally cooperate with other altruists only and 
reject egoists who lack emotional commitment. Consequently, altru-
ism can become an advantageous strategy. Based on these considera-
tions, Frank (1988) suggested that altruism evolved as a result of an 
autonomous motive system designed to retain cooperative interaction 
partners. 
The commitment-model, as any theory of assortation, is valuable 
because it can explain the continuing variation in altruistic tenden-
cies among humans (Frank, 1988). Consider a population in which 
there is a high proportion of altruists. In this case, altruists only face 
a small risk of being exploited and will be highly trusting. As altruists 
will naively interact with almost everybody, it will be adaptive to 
behave selfishly and exploit the altruists. Consequently, the number 
of egoists will rise; but then the altruists will become more careful 
and choose their interaction partners wisely. Therefore, altruism will 
come into favor again and the proportion of altruists will increase. 
This mechanism leads to frequency dependent selection and to an 
equilibrium of altruists and non-altruists existing side by side. 
However, there is one obvious criticism of the arguments made by 
Dawkins (1976) and Frank (1988) that altruists could survive by 
signaling their good intentions and choosing one another for mutually 
beneficial cooperation; the appearance of cheaters could endanger the 
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adequate assortation of individuals and lead to the extinction of 
altruists. To elaborate this idea, imagine a mutant who, by accident, 
possesses a green beard but is nevertheless selfish. As the property of 
a green beard enables an individual to obtain prosocial interaction 
partners, natural selection will favor selfish mutants with green 
beards who exploit others. These green-bearded free riders will 
quickly invade the population of green-bearded altruists and lead to 
their extinction. Transferring this argument on the commitment-
model of Frank (1988), people, when being observed, can be assumed 
to display socially favorable emotions and conceal unfavorable ones. 
They should disguise their true character to exploit others, thereby 
reaping the benefits of an altruist without paying the cost of altruistic 
behavior (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005).  
Theoretically, the criticism has been fended off. Frank (2005) noted if 
natural selection is good enough to create a deceptive copy of an 
altruistic signal, it should also be in the position to modulate the 
original signal in order to prevent mimicry. In other words, an arms 
race between the true and the faked signal should arise. As long as 
the true signal is modulated before altruists are extinct, this arms 
race should continue indefinitely. 
Nevertheless, although the commitment model may theoretically 
explain much about the evolution of altruism, it has attracted only 
little attention so far. Why is this? Johnson et al. (2008, p. 338) argue 
that “[t]he rejection of positive assortation as an evolutionary explan-
ation of collective action has been based mainly on casually formu-
lated and informally defended assumptions about the abilities of 
cooperators to identify one another and to ostracize free-riders.” 
Therefore, many older models of cooperation assumed random en-
counters between individuals. However, this assumption is wobbly for 
two reasons.  
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First, it is indisputable that spatial and group structural features 
influence human cooperation (Johnson et al., 2008). For example, 
humans are more likely to interact with neighbours, individuals of 
the same social level, or individuals with similar hobbies than with 
individuals who live far away, belong to a different hierarchical level, 
and have divergent interests. It seems feasible to assume at least that 
people with similar interests have similar capabilities and might also 
be more similar with regard to their genetic material than individuals 
chosen randomly from the population are. Therefore, some research-
ers have started to develop models that capture such effects. For 
example, it has been shown that non-random encounters due to 
space influence the adaptiveness of cooperative strategies (Aktipis, 
2004; Brauchli, Killingback, & Doebli, 1999; Killingback & Doebli, 
1996). 
The second reason why the assumption of non-random encounters in 
models of cooperation is doubtful, is, that it may be that humans are 
really equipped with a kind of “personality judgment instinct” (Hasel-
ton & Funder, 2006), which allows them to distinguish altruists from 
egoists. As mentioned at the beginning of this work, the empirical 
studies that are going to be presented here were designed to test this 
hypothesis. When examining these studies in Chapter 8 and 9, fur-
ther empirical results will be reviewed which indeed have already 
given first hints to the existence of a limited personality judgment 
instinct (Sheldon, Sheldon, & Osbaldiston, 2000; Brown, Palameta, & 
Moore, 2003; Verplaetse, Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007). 
In summary, kin selection has been shown to explain cooperation 
between relatives. The broader application of the concept, positive 
assortation, may even explain cooperation between individuals who 
are unrelated in terms of genetical descent, but similar with regard to 
their innate altruistic tendencies. However, the relevance of assorta-
tion processes has been most widely ignored by empirical science 
until now. 
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3.3. Reciprocal altruism 
3.3.1. Direct reciprocity 
In 1971, only a few years after Hamilton published his theory on 
inclusive fitness, Trivers showed that altruism could evolve if the 
beneficiary rewards the beneficial act of the donor at a later time. 
This phenomenon is called reciprocal altruism, and in contrast to kin 
selection, reciprocal altruism is free of genetic self-favoritism such 
that it is not restricted to kin, but may account for altruism between 
unrelated individuals. There are several prerequisites for the occur-
rence of reciprocal altruism. The costs of the altruistic act for the 
donor have to be lower than the benefit for the recipient. Moreover, 
the altruist and the recipient must know each other and the interac-
tion has to occur repeatedly. In other words, the interaction partners 
must have the possibility to exchange roles at a later time.  
However, a rational recipient should follow the rule “Take the benefits 
and run!”—so why do cheaters not invade a population of reciprocal 
altruists over evolutionary time? Trivers solved this problem by stat-
ing that reciprocal altruism only pays off if individuals display altru-
ism on a conditional basis, individuals should behave altruistically 
towards other altruists, but they should withhold altruism from 
cheaters because, if altruists are not paid back regularly, they end up 
with higher costs than benefits and this would lead to their extinc-
tion. The conditionality of altruism may, in turn, limit the occurrence 
of cheating behavior for the following reason; if individuals cheat in 
that they refrain from reciprocation, they have to anticipate that the 
donor will withhold help on the next encounter. Therefore, if indi-
viduals may expect to meet their interaction partner again, and if 
they may expect high costs from withheld help, they should definitely 
cooperate as long as costs of cooperation are low. In this sense, Ax-
elrod and Dion (1988, p. 1387) noted that individuals should be 
inclined to reciprocate if the “shadow of the future” is long enough. 
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Reciprocal altruism follows the “tit-for-tat” principle (i.e., cooperation 
is responded to by cooperation, and non-cooperation is responded to 
by non-cooperation). In 1981, Axelrod and Hamilton formally sup-
ported the effective operation of reciprocal strategies by showing that 
people who respond according to their partner’s choice in the previ-
ous interaction gain higher payoffs than individuals who follow any 
other strategy. However, tit-for-tat strategies are vulnerable. First, to 
establish tit-for-tat, one interaction partner has to start cooperation. 
Second, already short disruptions of cooperation may lead to a com-
plete collapse of the cooperative system. In small groups, a sudden 
withdrawal of cooperation is unlikely, because interactants consider 
the high probability of meeting again; thus Boyd and Richerson 
(1988) remarked that reciprocity may promote altruism in small 
groups. However, they particularly noted that reciprocity is an inade-
quate explanation for large-scale cooperation. As Johnson et al. 
(2008) noted, Boyd and Richerson’s 1988 conclusion was a promi-
nent “fork in the road” which led many researchers to turn away from 
individual-level theories. However, the model that Boyd and Richer-
son studied was based on a disputable assumption, namely that 
humans execute a binary reciprocal strategy, i.e., that they either 
cooperate at full tilt (1.0) or not at all (0.0). Twenty years later, John-
son et al. (2008) noted that a more realistic assumption is that hu-
mans adjust their degree of cooperation steadily. Accordingly, the 
authors created a model in which cooperation varied continuously 
between 0.0 and 1.0. This slight adjustment of Boyd and Richerson’s 
(1988) original model—changing the strategy of reciprocity from 
binary to continuous—led to a result which makes it much more 
probable that reciprocity, besides influencing cooperation in small 
groups, also functioned as a driver of large-scale cooperation. 
3.3.2. Indirect reciprocity  
Alexander (1987) later extended the idea of Trivers’ (1971) theory of 
reciprocal altruism by stating that altruistic behavior advertises a 
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tendency to cooperate and, by a process of indirect reciprocity, may 
attract cooperation from third parties in the future. Cooperation 
through indirect reciprocity can thus be summarized by the phrase “I 
help you, someone else helps me.” 
Alexander pointed out that third parties may acquire information 
about a person’s prosociality in two ways: by carefully observing a 
person, or by obtaining information about an individual’s past behav-
ior from someone else. Referring to this idea, Nowak & Sigmund 
(2005) identified two prerequisites that have to be fulfilled to render 
indirect reciprocity possible. First, individuals have to develop reputa-
tions that have to be communicated among the larger group. Second, 
individuals have to be equipped with cognitive abilities to identify and 
remember cooperative individuals beyond those with whom they have 
cooperated themselves—an ability that is required for direct reciproc-
ity. A long line of empirical research shows that these premises are 
given facts, communities carefully observe their members and form a 
set of beliefs, perceptions and evaluations about each individual (for a 
review on the social psychology of reputation see Emler, 1990). Due 
to the human tendency to gossip, this reputation information is 
passed from one person to another and is often used when selecting 
business associates, friends, or romantic partners (Granovetter, 
1985; Tinsley, O’Connor, & Sullivan, 2002). 
Formal models and computer simulations support the theory of 
indirect reciprocity (e.g., Lotem, Fishman, & Stone, 1999; Panchana-
than & Boyd, 2004). In one of these models Nowak & Sigmund (1998) 
showed that for the evolutionary stability of indirect reciprocity, the 
probability of knowing the “image score” of the recipient (i.e., his or 
her reputation and status) has to exceed the cost-benefit-ratio of the 
altruistic act. Extending insights from simulations, experimental 
evidence showed that the reputation of being an altruist leads to 
status, acceptance, and willing exchange partners (Hardy & van Vugt, 
2006). Obviously, people anticipate these effects, as it has been 
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shown that opportunities for reputation formation promote altruistic 
behavior in such that people cooperate more when their interaction 
history is made public (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Wedekind & Milin-
ski, 2000). 
Summarizing the ideas of reciprocity, it was shown that altruism can 
also be beneficial if it is directed to non-kin. Unrelated individuals 
have a propensity to cooperate whenever they may expect to be re-
warded at a later time—either by the beneficiary himself or by third 
parties. Extracting the central idea of reciprocal strategies, it can be 
argued that individuals should be willing to cooperate whenever their 
actions are public, because their actions may then positively influ-
ence their reputation and increase future rewards. 
3.4. Costly signaling & sexual selection 
The theories of direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) and indirect reciproc-
ity (Alexander, 1987) both focus on what kind of benefits individuals 
might retain as a reward for their prosocial behavior. In both cases, 
the general idea is that cooperative acts are rewarded by other coop-
erative acts. Amotz Zahavi (1975, 1995), however, remarked that 
cooperativeness does not have to be rewarded by other people’s coop-
erativeness per se, but that there may be other rewards. It could be 
that cooperative behavior simply serves as a “costly signal” to adver-
tise genetic quality such that only individuals who are particularly 
high in fitness may incur the cost of helping others on top of the 
demands of their own survival. Displaying such a costly signal could 
be rewarded by benefits like increased mating opportunities (Gintis, 
Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Zahavi, 1995). 
The above thought is known as the “handicap principle” (Zahavi, 
1975; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997) and the general idea is that reliable 
signals must be costly to the signaler of a desirable trait, such that 
an individual with less of that trait could not afford to display the 
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signal. This theory was developed in the field of behavioral ecology, 
although it has several parallels to classic social theories tracing back 
to Thorstein Veblen (1899/1994) and Marcel Mauss (1924). Costly 
signaling theory has gained much empirical support in studies of 
both animal signaling and anthropology (Gurven, Allen-Arave, Hill, & 
Hurtado, 2000; Lotem, Fishman, & Stone, 2002; Smith & Bird, 2000; 
Sosis, 2000); with regard to sexual selection it advocates that indi-
viduals of greater biological fitness signal their status through a 
handicapping behavior (e.g., altruism, conspicuous consumption, 
etc.) or a handicapping morphology (e.g., the peacock’s flamboyant 
train).  
If displaying altruism—as a handicap— indeed had positive effects on 
mating opportunities, it could be that individuals simply behave 
altruistically as a means to acquire sexual partners. If individuals 
differ in their opportunities to acquire a partner, they differ in their 
opportunities to transfer their genes into the next generation. Darwin 
(1871) termed this principle “sexual selection” (i.e., selection based on 
differential access to mates) and sharply distinguished this process 
from natural selection (i.e., selection based on differential survival); in 
fact, Darwin (1871) assumed that the evolution of many moral virtues 
might be explained by their sexual attractiveness. Miller (2000, 2007) 
extensively elaborated on the idea by stating that prosocial traits may 
have two kinds of signaling values for mate choice, one regarding 
genetic quality and another regarding a person’s partnership or par-
enting abilities. 
In regard to genetic quality, Miller (2007) argued that moral virtues, 
like altruism, are difficult to display if one has a high mutation load 
that impairs the precision of body and brain development. For exam-
ple, people burdened with mutations associated with psychological 
disorders like autism, schizophrenia, or mental retardation tend to 
develop limited Theories of Mind. They consequently show deficits 
with regard to empathy and prosocial behaviors. Turning the argu-
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ment the other way around, prosociality may therefore serve as a 
kind of neurogenetic warranty when judging a potential mate. 
In regard to partnership or parenting abilities, the relevance of the 
argument is even more obvious because altruism, in addition to being 
a good signal of genetic qualities, is an attractive feature in its own 
right and individuals who display altruistic acts now are likely to care 
for their partner’s and children’s well-being at a later time (Miller, 
2000; 2007). Establishing a long-term relationship with a prosocial 
individual can be extremely profitable as it may increase survival 
odds and reproductive success. Therefore, individuals who are in 
search of a partner should be especially open to altruistic men and 
women. There is empirical support for the theoretical idea that indi-
viduals who want to establish a sexual relationship look out for po-
tential partners with prosocial traits (Buss, Shackelford, Kirkpatrick, 
& Larsen, 2001). Therefore, mate preferences for prosociality, 
whether as good genes or good partner and parent indicators, may 
have indeed shaped the evolution of human altruism. 
However, does sexual selection explain the display of altruism in any 
situation? Certainly, no; altruism may indeed function as a costly 
signal, but natural selection should favor individuals who display this 
costly signal primarily in circumstances in which mating goals are 
prominent, that is, in situations in which potential mating partners 
are present. Recently, Griskevicius et al. (2007) showed that humans 
indeed have adaptations to adjust their behavior according to the 
activation of mating goals. In four experiments, the authors investi-
gated how the triggering of mating goals increases the display of 
benevolence, and they showed that mating goals raise public, but not 
private, helping in women. In men, mating goals increase helpfulness 
whenever this may express heroism or dominance. These results 
indicate that altruism, as a costly signal, is displayed in a strategic 
manner. 
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To summarize, it has been argued that the theory of inclusive fitness 
may explain altruism towards related individuals. The theories of 
direct and indirect reciprocity may explain altruism in repeated inter-
actions, which entail the chance of rewards. Moreover, according to 
the costly signaling theory, altruism is sexually attractive and helps 
to acquire sexual partners. It thus explains altruistic behavior in 
situations when potential mating partners are present. However, 
there is evidence for the existence of specific forms of altruism that 
these theories cannot explain: people cooperating with unrelated 
individuals in non-repeated interactions when potential mating part-
ners are absent, such as returning lost wallets or making anonymous 
donations. As individual-level theories are insufficient to explain 
these phenomena, a second group of theories, group-level explana-
tions, will be introduced to find out whether these theories may shed 
more light on the subject. 
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Although a high standard of morality gives 
but a slight or no advantage to each individ-
ual man and his children over the other men 
of the same tribe (…) an advancement in the 
standard of morality will certainly give an 
immense advantage to one tribe over another.
  
 
(Charles Darwin, 1871) 
 
4. Group-level explanations for the evolution of 
altruism 
As extensively debated in the preceding chapters, individuals who 
behave altruistically put themselves into a fitness disadvantage. So 
how could altruism evolve? Individual-level theories may only explain 
parts of this paradox. Already Charles Darwin believed that a possible 
solution to the puzzle might be that altruistic behavior occurs be-
cause it is advantageous at the group-level, and several scientists 
have seized on this idea. The details of their theories will be outlined 
in the following sections. 
4.1.  “Old” group selection  
In 1962, two years before Hamilton published his seminal work about 
inclusive fitness, Wynne-Edwards proposed that traits could evolve 
through what he called “group selection.” Group selection is defined 
as the evolution of traits due to their positive impact on the survival 
odds of a population, rather than the survival odds of an individual, 
as is proposed for individual selection. 
Wynne-Edwards (1962) thought that, through group selection, traits 
that were bad for the survival of a population would lead to its extinc-
tion, so that the only populations to survive would be populations of 
individuals who did not necessarily have traits that were best for 
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their own survival and reproduction, but that were good for the sur-
vival and reproduction of the group. In more concrete terms, Wynne-
Edwards thought that groups with selfless individuals would out-
compete groups with selfish individuals. Wynne-Edwards described a 
number of traits for which it seemed that individuals strive for the 
conservation of their species in that they do things that decrease 
their own fitness but increase the population’s chance of survival. 
Two of these traits are: decreased reproduction and altruism. 
With regard to decreased reproduction, Wynne-Edwards (1962) noted 
that individuals of many species do not produce as many offspring at 
a time as they physiologically can, for example, birds are physiologi-
cally able to produce more eggs than they normally lay in a nest. 
Wynne-Edwards pointed out that this limited reproduction is not 
predicted by individual-level selection, as an individual’s fitness 
increases with the reproduction rate, but that it is predicted by group 
selection. He argued that populations of individuals who produce too 
much offspring will overpopulate their habitats, use up their re-
sources, and die out. Therefore, he concluded, individuals produce 
fewer offspring than physiologically possible in order to save the 
viability of the group. 
With regard to altruism, Wynne-Edwards (1962) noted that there are 
many species where some individuals do not reproduce, but rather 
assist the breeding of other individuals. For example, worker bees do 
not procreate, but rather care for the offspring of the queen bee so 
that her reproduction rate is much higher than it could be otherwise. 
Wynne-Edwards argued that this kind of altruistic behavior de-
creases the fitness of the individual, but that it serves the group in 
such that individuals who help the reproduction of group members 
help the group to survive. 
The ideas of Wynne-Edwards (1962) are similar to those of Lorenz 
(1973) who thought that the only meaning of life for any individual is 
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in the conservation of the own species. But, bearing the principles of 
natural selection in mind, why should individuals—whether bird, bee 
or human—willingly make martyrs of themselves and does this make 
sense? Indeed, the theory of old group selection was often criticized 
later to commit a naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 1903/2008) such that 
Wynne-Edwards (1962) evaluated cooperative behavior on the level of 
the group as “good” or “desired” and concluded that thus it had to 
evolve. The naturalistic fallacy is related to the is-ought problem de-
scribed by Hume (1739/2006) which states that many scientists 
make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about 
what is. 
Going beyond global critics, empirical findings hardened the skepti-
cism about Wynne-Edwards’ idea. For example, it was shown that 
reproductive constraint, in the way Wynne-Edwards proposed as a 
sacrifice to the group, does not exist. Rather, it turned out that indi-
viduals, who reproduce less than the physiological maximum at each 
point of reproduction, have a selfish reason to do so; reproduction 
and nurturing of offspring takes time and energy. If individuals had a 
large number of offspring at a time, it was likely that they might not 
have time to care for them. Consequently, not all of the progeny 
would survive. Moreover, caring for a great number of offspring de-
creases energy for survival and future reproduction and limited re-
production can thereby be advantageous in its own right. Note that 
the phenomenon of limited reproduction does not consequently need 
group selection for justification, but rather is explained by an indi-
vidual’s pursuit of economizing his or her energy. As several scholars 
have shown, this way of prudent reproduction indeed maximizes an 
individual’s lifetime reproductive success (Lack, 1966; Krebs & Da-
vies, 1993).  
Now, since altruism—just like limited reproduction—should neither 
be accepted as a purposeful sacrificial act, could it nevertheless have 
evolved through group selection? As many biologists (e.g., Maynard 
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Smith, 1964; Williams, 1972) soon noted, this is unlikely. Even if a 
group with altruistic mutants existed, altruism could hardly prevail 
against selfishness for the following reason: group selection occurs 
slowly. Its effects can be seen only when groups of cooperative indi-
viduals have out-competed groups of selfish individuals such that the 
latter have gone extinct. This process is called “between-group selec-
tion.” However, between-group selection takes time, during which 
inside of the groups traits can evolve through a process called 
“within-group selection” (i.e., individual selection). This process im-
plies that selfish individuals out-compete altruistic individuals. Un-
der normal conditions, the process of within-group selection for self-
ishness occurs much faster than between-group selection for 
altruism. Therefore, group selection is unlikely to prevail. Indeed, it 
only works under extremely restricted conditions, namely in small 
isolated groups. To illustrate this, Maynard Smith (1976) showed that 
group selection would fail as soon as one successful migrant existed. 
A migrant is an individual who disperses and reproduces in a foreign 
group and if this individual is selfish and disperses into an altruistic 
group, his or her selfish descendants can soon out-compete a whole 
group of altruistic individuals due to individual selection. Therefore, 
most biologists harshly rejected the idea of group selection in the 
1960’s and 1970’s and the idea became a pariah concept, taught as 
an example of how not to think (Wilson, Van Vugt, & O’Gorman, in 
press). 
4.2.  “New” group selection or multilevel selection  
In 1994, Wilson and Sober argued that the universal case against 
group selection, as it was originally formulated by Wynne-Edwards, 
had been overstated and was based on a misplaced emphasis on 
genes as replicators. The authors again theorized that social groups 
and other higher-level units may indeed function as “vehicles of 
selection” such that groups can be organisms in exactly the same 
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sense that individuals are organisms. To illustrate their argument, 
they applied the following example (p. 587-588): 
Consider an imaginary population of rabbits inhab-
iting an island. A mutant arises that grazes more 
efficiently—so efficiently that a population of such 
mutants will overexploit their resource and go ex-
tinct. The mutation is adaptive in the limited sense 
of causing its bearer to have more offspring than 
other rabbits, but maladaptive in the larger sense of 
driving the population extinct. (…)   
 
However, if we imagine an archipelago of islands, 
only some of which contain the mutant strain, then 
populations driven extinct by the mutant can be 
replaced by other populations without the mutant. 
The population-level adaptation can now persist, 
but only because we have added a process of natu-
ral selection at that level; fit populations replace 
unfit populations in the same sense that fit rabbits 
replace unfit rabbits within populations. 
At this point, a main difference between the old and the new concept 
of group selection is conveyed. While the old concept assumes that 
the driving force is selection at the level of the group only, the new 
concept assumes the existence of multiple levels of selection. Resur-
rected in this way, Sober and Wilson’s new concept of group selection 
(Wilson & Sober, 1994; Sober & Wilson, 1998) is a unified theory of 
natural selection that operates on a nested hierarchy of units (West et 
al., 2007). Therefore, it is usually called “multilevel selection theory.”  
However, there are other differences between old and new group 
selection, where one concerns the definition of groups. The idea of 
new group selection is that, at certain stages of an individual’s life 
cycle, interaction takes place with a limited number of individuals 
only and that, under these circumstances, cooperation can be favored 
(Wilson, 1977; Colwell, 1981; Wilson & Colwell, 1981). The new con-
cept thus relies on within-population (intrademic) group selection, 
while the old concept focused on between-population (interdemic) 
group selection (Reeve & Keller, 1999). Note that the new concept of 
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group selection thus incorporates ideas reminiscent of the concept of 
positive assortation. As Okasha (2005) put it, a central difference 
between the old and the new concept is that the old one looked at the 
evolution of group characters, while the new approach allowed for the 
evolution of individual characters within groups.  
In Figure 1 (derived from West et al., 2007) the differences between 
old group selection (Panel A) and new group selection (Panel B) are 
highlighted.  
 
Fig. 1. The difference between old and new group selection. (West et al., 2007) 
In Panel A, groups are well defined with little gene transmission 
between them (solid outline). The white circles symbolize cooperators, 
whereas the grey circles symbolize selfish individuals who do not 
cooperate. Competition and reproduction works between groups. The 
groups with more cooperators perform better, but the number of 
selfish individuals can increase within groups. Panel B shows the 
new group selection, with arbitrarily defined groups (dashed lines), 
and the potential for more genetic transmission between them. The 
different groups make distinct contributions to the same reproductive 
pool, from which new groups are formed. To elaborate on this idea, if 
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there are many groups in the population that vary in the rate of 
altruists, the most altruistic groups will differentially contribute to 
the shared gene pool. Finally, although groups are arbitrarily defined 
in the new concept of group selection, there is the possibility of influ-
ences such as limited dispersal leading to more structuring. 
To summarize, the theories of old and new group selection differ 
significantly from each other. The innovative way, in which new group 
selection (Wilson & Sober, 1994; Sober & Wilson, 1998) defines 
groups, as well as the fact that its multilevel approach is based on 
natural selection rather than self-sacrifice, has led to a much broader 
acceptance of the new concept of group selection than was previously 
achieved by the original theory of Wynne-Edwards (1962).  
4.3. Individual selection and multilevel selection - 
mathematically the same? 
Within the new concept of group selection, the evolution of coopera-
tion depends on two factors: (1) the relationship between individual 
costs of cooperation and common benefits of cooperation, and (2) the 
genetic variance that exists within groups as opposed to between 
groups. The following will show that these two factors are similarly 
incorporated in the concept of inclusive fitness (see Chapter 3.1) and 
that individual and new group selection are at least “alternative ways 
of fitness book-keeping” (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2008, p. 324). 
Remember Hamilton’s Rule b > c/r with b denoting the benefit of the 
recipient, c denoting the cost of the donor, and r denoting the degree 
of genetic relatedness between the recipient and the donor. Now 
consider the similarity between Hamilton’s rule and group selection. 
Note again that the first factor, which influences the evolution of 
altruism through group selection, is the cost-benefit ratio of coopera-
tion. If the cost impact for altruists is weaker than the impact of 
cooperative benefits for the group (i.e., between-group selection is 
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stronger than within-group selection), group selection predicts that 
cooperation will be favored. Indeed, this idea is reflected by Hamil-
ton’s Rule which implies that cooperation is favored if the benefits of 
the recipient (b) are increased and the costs of the individual (c) are 
reduced. 
The second factor, which has been identified to influence the evolu-
tion of altruism in group selection models, is genetic variance within 
and between groups. Group selection implies that cooperation is 
favored when the proportion of genetic variance that exists between 
groups is higher than the proportion of genetic variance within 
groups (West et al., 2007). As Frank (1995) noted, this again is 
equivalent to a higher kin selection coefficient of relatedness.  
Indeed, it has been known for a while that kin selection and new 
group selection are just different means to model the same evolution-
ary process; their mathematical structures are identical and both are 
thus theoretically valid (Hamilton, 1975; Grafen, 1984; Frank, 1986, 
1998; Gardner, West, & Barton, 2007). Several scholars have shown 
that when both methods are applied to analyze the same problem, 
they lead to identical results (Frank, 1986; Wenseleers, Helantera, 
Hart, & Ratnieks, 2004; Gardner et al., 2007). However, does this 
mean that multilevel selection is as relevant as individual selection to 
real life?  
4.4. Empirical evidence against multilevel selection 
Even though kin selection and new group selection may lead to 
mathematically identical results in theory, there are empirical rea-
sons why even the new concept of group selection is unlikely to be a 
relevant cause of evolution in nature. The crucial critique is that new 
group selection—as any form of natural selection—has to proceed 
through the differential reproduction of genetic entities and in this 
case the genetic entities are, besides individuals, groups.  
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The new concept of group selection presumes arbitrarily defined 
groups, but allows for processes like limited dispersal to structure 
groups. Now consider a situation in which limited dispersal was 
strong, i.e., related individuals would stick together. On the one 
hand, exclusive cooperation with kin was beneficial, but on the other 
hand, exclusive interactions with relatives would lead to incest and 
genetic degeneration. Consequently, a certain amount of genetic 
transmission between groups is needed and this is actually incorpo-
rated in the new concept of group selection. However, genetic trans-
mission between groups also remains the flaw of the theory: a group 
of altruists is vulnerable to evolving toward a selfish one as soon as 
selfish migrants enter the group, because they will have the benefit of 
altruism without paying the costs. Thus, selfish individuals will 
spread rapidly.  
To harden this argument, it should be noted that genetic transmis-
sion is not only a theoretical restriction but also an empirical fact. 
Migration can be observed in modern cultures and in hunting and 
gathering societies likewise (Richerson & Boyd, 2001; 2005). In addi-
tion, there is evidence from ancient cultures that suggests the exis-
tence of complex intermarriage systems across ethnic boundaries 
(Maenchen-Helfen, 1973). Above and beyond, the particulars of hu-
man warfare stand against the hypothesis of genetic group selection. 
As Keeley (1996) notes, anthropological evidence suggests that with 
the likelihood of war between societies, intermarriage increases. 
Additionally, some of the most brutal groups among pre-modern 
societies engaged in raids on neighbors for wife capture (Richerson & 
Boyd, 1998). Moreover, combat typically resulted in the social 
breakup of a conquered group, and the dispersal of its members to 
other groups (Soltis, Boyd, & Richerson, 1995). As defeated individu-
als form bonds with members of the victorious group, their genes—
including selfish ones that might have contributed to their defeat—
spread into the group of conquerors. Against this background of high 
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rates of genetic transmission, it is hard to see how genetic differences 
between groups could have been maintained and altruism could have 
evolved due to group-level processes. 
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5. First conclusions about the powers of individ-
ual-level and group-level theories  
Until now, the most important theories that have been developed to 
elucidate the paradox of altruism have been introduced. However, 
what about their practical relevance? Are these theories able to pre-
dict the altruistic behavior of humans in nature? Which theories are 
most important, and are some ideas wrong, while others correct? 
Which phenomena of prosociality can already be explained by them 
and which are still open to conjecture? To address these questions, 
this chapter aims at giving a résumé of the ideas that have been 
presented so far. By balancing the models against each other, first 
conclusions shall be drawn about the relative powers of the theories. 
5.1. Why group-level theories have to be rejected 
As indicated in the last chapter, the theories of group selection are 
lacking in practical relevance due to two reasons: (1) Old group selec-
tion has to be rejected, as individuals have never been shown to 
sacrifice personal fitness with the intent to serve the good of the 
group. The assumption that altruism evolved because it is good for 
the group is subject to a naturalistic fallacy. (2) The new concept of 
group selection, or multilevel selection, implies that genetic selection 
works, among others, at the level of the group. However, empirical 
evidence suggests high rates of genetic transmission between groups, 
so that genetic variation between them will hardly become sufficient 
to make group selection enforce its power. 
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5.2. What individual-level theories can already ex-
plain  
As opposed to group-level theories, individual-level theories can 
explain quite a bit regarding the evolution of altruism. Kin selection 
postulates that helping relatives is beneficial and that the degree of 
helping should increase with the degree of relatedness. In Chapter 
3.1, evidence was presented that indicates that humans indeed direct 
altruism preferentially towards kin. With regard to reciprocal altruism 
(see Chapter 3.3), systematic empirical investigation has been less 
frequent than with kin altruism. Nevertheless, there is evidence that 
although altruism has apparent short-term costs, it may pay in terms 
of reciprocal rewards in the long run (Axelrod, 1984, Nowak & Sig-
mund, 1998). Other indirect evidence, which supports the view that 
reciprocity is genetically determined, is that the norm of reciprocity 
seems to exist in every culture in the world (Schroeder, Penner, Do-
vidio, & Piliavin, 1995), although the degree of reciprocity varies 
across cultures (Henrich et al., 2004). However, kin altruism and 
reciprocal altruism do not sufficiently explain the whole dimension of 
altruistic behavior that can be observed nowadays in individuals.  
The fact is that humans today cooperate with unrelated individuals in 
large and anonymous societies where the chances of repeated inter-
actions are highly restricted. Thus, they are often willing to help 
others without any chance of reward. For example, by making 
anonymous donations, individuals reduce their own fitness and even 
forego benefits in terms of reputation gains. The mere anticipation of 
possibilities for indirect reciprocity might slightly promote this kind of 
large-scale altruism, but this explanation is not satisfying, as the fear 
of refused direct and indirect reciprocity would not suffice to disci-
pline defectors. Individuals who preferred to behave selfishly would 
still gain the upper hand. To elaborate, nowadays anybody who 
wanted to betray others could do so and simply change his or her 
residence and social environment afterwards. Thus, selfish individu-
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als would not have to bear the consequences of their misdeeds (i.e., 
social exclusion). They could simply start exploiting other individuals 
who are completely ignorant of their selfish character. Then again, 
selfish individuals could act up to the principle “Take the benefits 
and run.” To name one example, there are individuals who behave 
that way—marriage impostors try to get the most out of the new and 
anonymous world people live in, but these kinds of people are an 
exception. Most people show large-scale altruism even under condi-
tions of anonymity. Why is that?  
One might think that sexual selection (see Chapter 3.4) could help to 
clarify human’s extraordinary willingness to display altruism. Actu-
ally this reasoning is unsatisfying in almost the same manner as 
direct and indirect reciprocity, as it explains altruism in public—
particularly in the presence of potential mates—but it does not ex-
plain altruism in large and anonymous groups. 
One reason that might explain why individuals are willing to cooper-
ate with strangers in large societies is assortation (see Chapter 3.2). 
As explained earlier, assortation denotes the selective association of 
like-minded individuals. If altruistic individuals were really able to 
identify one another (at first impression), they could avoid defectors. 
By achieving extraordinary benefits through mutual cooperation, the 
selfish advantage of egoistic individuals would be out-competed. 
There are two obstacles to this theory: first, it is questionable whether 
altruists are really able to identify one another; empirical evidence is 
needed. Second, even if such a mechanism existed, real-world obser-
vation suggests that it is far from perfect, otherwise cheaters like 
marriage impostors would not succeed.  
Indeed, there might be another reason—apart from the possibilities of 
assortation—that leads people to show large-scale cooperation, and 
this might be related to the fear of sanctions connected to uncoopera-
tive behavior. This exact idea will be discussed in the next section. 
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5.3. What individual-level theories cannot explain 
5.3.1. The phenomenon of strong reciprocity as some kind 
of ultra-sociality in humans 
Gintis (2000) stated that cooperation in large groups might partly be 
due to an empirically identifiable form of prosocial behavior in hu-
mans, which he calls “strong reciprocity.” A strong reciprocator is 
defined as an individual with a tendency to reward others for coop-
erative, norm-abiding behaviors and to impose sanctions on others 
for norm violations (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). A strong reciprocator 
is willing to impose these sanctions even if the norm violations did 
not affect the strong reciprocator himself but a third person instead. 
Rewards and sanctions executed by a strong reciprocator provide a 
fitness benefit to the group as these measures may support future 
cooperation and prevent future norm violations from other group 
members. The notion that cooperation in societies is supported by 
external sanctions is indeed far from being new, but a traditionally 
held view in sociology (e.g., Dahrendorf, 1958). However, performing 
such measures is costly to the actor because it may use up resources 
and time (Gintis, 2000). This exact notion, that sanctioning others is 
far from being selfish, is captured in an alternative label for sanction-
ing behavior by strong reciprocators; such behavior is also called 
“altruistic punishment.”  
It should be highlighted that strong reciprocity is different from indi-
rect reciprocity. In the case of indirect reciprocity, which has been 
proposed by Alexander (1987) and formalized by Nowak and Sigmund 
(1998; 2005), individuals react to the behavior which other individu-
als have shown in pairwise interactions with third parties. They 
respond to cooperation with cooperation, and to non-cooperation with 
non-cooperation. The crucial aspect of indirect reciprocity is its con-
nection to reputation gains. As Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) 
speculated, indirect reciprocity is not purely altruistic, but is favored 
by an individual’s aiming for “good standing.” In an experimental 
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helping game, Engelmann and Fischbacher (2003) tested this as-
sumption by giving only half of their subjects a public helping score 
and hence a strategic incentive to help. The authors showed that 
strategic incentives to build up a reputation increase an individual’s 
general preference for helping, but that reputation gains weaken the 
influence of pure indirect reciprocity. Bowles and Gintis (2004) con-
sequently doubted that indirect reciprocity could be sustained in a 
population of self-interested individuals. Thus, they proposed strong 
reciprocation to be more likely to sustain cooperation, because strong 
reciprocators reward prosocial behavior and punish antisocial behav-
ior despite the fact that these actions lead to net costs in terms of 
fitness. Where do we find strong reciprocation or altruistic punish-
ment though?  
5.3.2. Experimental evidence for strong reciprocity 
In particular, strong reciprocation has been shown in many labora-
tory experiments that compose ultimatum games, third-party punish-
ment games, and public good games.  
In an ultimatum game, two players interact anonymously. They are 
given a certain amount of money, which has to be distributed among 
the two. The first player proposes how to divide the money between 
them, and the second player can either accept or reject this proposal. 
If the second player rejects, neither player receives anything. If the 
second player accepts, the money is split according to the proposal. 
The game is played only once, so that reciprocation is not an issue. A 
self-interested decider should accept any amount offered. Bearing 
this in mind, a self-interested proposer should offer the minimum 
possible amount. However, in a variety of studies deciders on average 
rejected offers below 30 %, while proposers mostly offered 50 % of the 
money at stake (Camerer, 2003). Obviously, the deciders were willing 
to impose altruistic punishment to those whom they perceived to be 
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unfair. Anticipating this, proposers showed more cooperative behav-
ior than predicted by a consequentialist model of self-interest. 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) studied human’s willingness to display 
altruistic punishment more extensively by conducting a series of 
third-party punishment games. Subjects were anonymously grouped 
into threes. While the first player decided about the split of money 
between himself and a second player, a third player, whose economic 
payoff was unaffected by the split, could impose sanctions on the first 
player. Although sanctioning behavior was costly, third players were 
willing to enforce fairness norms through punishment. The results 
thus showed that humans tendency for strong reciprocity extends to 
the sanctioning behavior of unaffected third parties. 
The public good game (Andreoni, 1988) has been designed to study 
cooperation in groups. The general logic is that each participant 
receives a certain amount of private money and is grouped with three 
other participants under conditions of total anonymity. All partici-
pants secretly choose how much of their private money to put into a 
public pot. They know that the amount of money in the pot will be 
multiplied by the experimenter and equally distributed among the 
participants afterwards. Public good games are played for several 
rounds. While the best strategy for the group is to put all money into 
the pot, the best strategy for the individual is to contribute nothing 
but nevertheless receive his or her share from the pot. The game 
resembles a phenomenon known under the term “the tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin, 1968). It consists of a dilemma in which multiple 
agents act independently in their own self-interest thereby damaging 
a shared resource despite the obvious fact that it is not in anyone's 
long term interest for this to happen. In a meta-study of twelve public 
goods experiments, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) showed that in the early 
rounds, contributions typically level between 40 % and 60 % of the 
endowment, but that over time contributions deteriorate until in the 
final round most subjects contribute nothing. The decay of contribu-
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tions can be explained by strong reciprocity. Subjects who initially 
play cooperatively become angry with others who contribute less than 
they do. To retaliate against free riders, they apply the only strategy 
available to them and reduce their own contributions (Andreoni, 
1995). Indeed, many experiments in which subjects were able to 
punish non-contributors directly showed that they were even willing 
to follow this strategy despite the fact that punishing implies a direct 
cost to themselves (Dawes, Orbell & Van de Kragt 1986, Sato 1987, 
Yamagishi 1988a, 1988b, 1992). 
In summary, there is a wide range of empirical evidence from the 
laboratory that shows that individuals are willing to bear costs to 
sanction others who are unwilling to cooperate. However, why do 
humans show such behavior? Neither kin altruism, reciprocal altru-
ism, nor indirect reciprocity would predict altruistic punishment. 
Even though costly signaling would predict heroism when potential 
mating partners are present, it does not predict altruistic punishment 
in anonymous situations. So why do people engage in altruistic pun-
ishment? If assortation functioned perfectly, costly sanctions would 
be unnecessary. Altruists could exclusively interact with each other. 
By doing this, altruists would reject defectors and ostracism would 
function as the ideal form of punishment because ostracism of defec-
tors includes no costs (except screening-costs). 
Highlighting the fact that standard evolutionary theories are unable 
to explain strong reciprocity, an alternative group of researchers 
argued that these findings show some kind of ultra-prosociality (i.e., 
true genetically unselfish behavior). The most important advocates of 
this idea are Bowles, Boyd, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, Henrich, and 
Richerson (e.g., Henrich et al., 2004; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 
2005). To distinguish these researchers from those who believe in 
standard individual-level theories, the terms “alternative evolutionary 
camp” and “standard evolutionary camp” will be used in the follow-
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ing. Note that these names are for reasons of identifiability, but that 
they do not imply any valuation—at least for this moment. 
However, is the notion that strong reciprocity is evidence for “true 
altruism” correct? Assuming that it is correct, how could such behav-
ior evolve? 
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6. Explanations to human ultra-sociality 
6.1. Strong reciprocity – only an experimental arti-
fact? 
As mentioned before, followers of the alternative evolutionary camp 
suggest that strong reciprocity is evidence for some kind of true 
altruism in humans or “ultra-sociality” as it was also called (Richer-
son & Boyd, 1998). However, followers of the standard evolutionary 
camp (Price, 2008; Johnson et al., 2008) have censoriously com-
mented on this argumentation. They dispute that even if a behavior 
seems individually maladaptive in the context of an economic game, 
it is illegitimate to assume that it would have been maladaptive in 
ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games are 
different from those in which cooperative behavior evolved. Therefore, 
strong reciprocity found in the laboratory should not be evaluated as 
truly altruistic (Johnson et al., 2008; Price, 2008). 
To track the disagreement between the two camps, note that most 
evidence for strong reciprocity results from ultimatum games, third-
party punishment games, and public good games. These games are 
characterized by anonymity and one-shot interactions (with the ex-
ception of the public good game, which is played for several rounds) 
and are designed with the intent to remove any incentive to engage in 
costly punishment or cooperation. Followers of the alternative evolu-
tionary camp argue that according to the selfishness axiom of tradi-
tional economics and standard evolutionary theory, game players 
who are solely interested in maximizing their personal benefits 
should transfer the minimum sum possible and accept any amount 
of money offered to them. As it was seen in Chapter 5.3.2, individuals 
do not behave in the designated selfish way, but even engage in costly 
altruistic punishment. The alternative evolutionary camp thus argues 
that true altruism exists. 
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Followers of the standard evolutionary camp sharply distance them-
selves from this interpretation (Johnson et al., 2008; Price 2008). For 
one thing, they note that most evidence for strong reciprocity stems 
from the field of experimental economics, which has low ecological 
validity. In addition, they state that experimental findings of strong 
reciprocity are—unlike the alternative camp alleges—very much in 
accordance with the predictions of standard evolutionary theory. 
Standard evolutionary theory does not strictly adhere to the selfish-
ness axiom, it does not view the mind as a fitness-maximizing device 
(Price, 2008). Instead, standard evolutionary theorists regard the 
psyche as an executor of adaptations (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). A 
cognitive adaptation has to be understood as a semi-autonomous “if, 
then” mechanism. If a specific stimulus is present (e.g., a snake), the 
psychological mechanism responds in a specific way (e.g., by making 
the individual behave carefully). Although such mechanisms usually 
executed adaptive responses in the environments in which they 
evolved, today they can only execute their established protocols and 
do not know how to generate adaptive behavior per se (Price, 2008). 
In other words, the human psyche is incapable of optimizing behavior 
in evolutionarily novel situations (Johnson et al., 2008). Therefore, 
cognitive adaptations will produce their reactions in any environment 
that provides the sort of stimulus to which they were evolutionarily 
connected, even if a novel aspect in the environment leads the adap-
tation to fail its originally fitness-enhancing purpose (Burnham & 
Johnson, 2005).  
What does this mean for the interpretation of findings from economic 
games? Bearing in mind that humans lived together in small groups 
where anonymity was rare, it might be the case that humans mistake 
the circumstances in economic games (which are explicitly anony-
mous and unrepeated) for repeated interactions (Johnson et al., 
2008). This could explain why they behave as if they were in an ongo-
ing reciprocal exchange.  
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Extending this argument, Hagen and Hammerstein (2006) stated that 
even if one-shot encounters with strangers existed in past times, an 
individual who met someone unfamiliar could not know whether this 
meeting was really a nonrecurring one. A single meeting might have 
caused an increased likelihood of additional encounters in the future. 
For example, a hunter who encountered an unfamiliar individual 
from another tribe when chasing a deer could not be sure whether he 
would meet the person a second time on another hunting occasion, 
so that it would be better to cooperate at the first go. Moreover, every 
meeting consists of many mini-reciprocal exchanges occurring over 
seconds or minutes (Trivers, 2004). In past times, these mini-
exchanges might have been life-and-death issues in that one could 
either make a new friend or be killed. Therefore, humans might have 
evolved to exhibit a general tendency to reciprocate. 
Hagen and Hammerstein (2006) highlighted another crucial aspect. 
In economic games, subjects are told to participate in one-shot-
interactions. However, this does not guarantee that subjects interpret 
the situation in that way. Often, subjects in experimental economic 
games sit in computer labs where they participate with other subjects 
simultaneously. Although the identity of the players is masked so 
that they cannot know the specific identity of their partners, they do 
know that some attendants have been allocated to them (Price, 2008). 
The potential victims thus become identifiable, and it might be that 
subjects interpret their game partners as fellow citizens or fellow 
students (i.e., in-group members) who might be met again.  
What do these arguments tell us, at the very least? All of the objec-
tions of the standard evolutionary camp are valuable, as they remind 
researchers to interpret their experimental findings carefully. How-
ever, they are not strong enough to eliminate the fact that strong 
reciprocity cannot be explained by standard individual-level theo-
ries—for three reasons. 
48 
First of all, in contrast to the doubts of Johnson et al. (2008), it 
seems likely that anonymity was given in ancient times. Why else 
would evolutionary researchers, concerned with the issue of mating 
for decades, preach the importance of a man being sure that a 
woman was trustworthy enough not to deceive by passing off another 
man’s child as his? Even though anonymous situations, as is the 
case with extra-pair matings, were rare, self-interested behavior 
would have been advantageous in any situation not observed by 
others. The loss of resources due to gratuitous altruistic behavior 
would have been too large to survive the pressures of natural selec-
tion. Instead, evolution should have favored the capability of selec-
tively adjusting the performance of self-interested and altruistic 
behavior according to the risk of being detected by others. Actually, 
humans seem to have such adaptations, as participants in economic 
games are apparently able to tell the difference between anonymous 
and non-anonymous situations and adjust their behavior accordingly 
(Andreoni & Petrie, 2004). 
There is a second reason why experimental evidence for strong recip-
rocity should not be discounted due to doubts concerning the specific 
features of economic games. Even if economic games activated psy-
chological adaptations for reciprocity and this was the reason why 
individuals showed higher altruism than predicted by the selfishness 
axiom, why on earth should individuals engage in costly altruistic 
punishment to take vengeance for unrelated third parties? This phe-
nomenon cannot be explained by the individual-level theories. 
Finally, experimental findings of strong reciprocity are confirmed by 
phenomena that can be observed in natural settings. In many cir-
cumstances, people hit back against others, bearing private disad-
vantages, although the possibility of gains through future interaction 
is remote or zero (Gintis, 2000). Betrayed lovers, for example, get 
revenge at great personal costs, although there is no future horizon of 
interaction with their ex-partners. Admittedly, this specific behavior 
49 
might serve to restore balances of power between the two ex-partners, 
but there are other examples of individually maladaptive behavior. In 
the Nazi period, citizens were willing to save the lives of unknown 
Jews even though this included the risk of punishment and deporta-
tion to themselves. Today, individuals time and time again try to save 
others from dangers like drowning by risking their own lives. Many 
people are willing to associate in movements for civil rights or politi-
cal democracy to improve living conditions for the society they live in, 
although they themselves have higher costs than benefits from these 
actions. All such activities include a considerable cost to the actor. 
Therefore, Bowles and Gintis (1986) emphasized that they cannot 
usually be explained in terms of self-interest or reciprocal altruism.  
If Bowles and Gintis (1986) were right, from the perspective of the 
individual, the type of altruism exemplified above had to be judged 
biologically unselfish. It had to be judged maladaptive. It had to be 
assumed that it was driven by some kind of “conscience” leading 
individuals to behave in accord with social norms of morality that do 
not fit their own biological interest. Yet, how could this kind of con-
science or “superego”, as Freud called it, evolve?  
Note again that at the beginning of this work, it was stated that this 
analysis must solve the puzzle of altruism by using an evolutionary 
viewpoint, which focuses on ultimate causation and requires adap-
tiveness. However, at this point in the examination, it seems that we 
do find some kind of behavior that is individually maladaptive. There-
fore, the following two alternative theories will offer reasons for why 
individually maladaptive altruism might have evolved nonetheless. 
6.2. The parent-offspring conflict and the evolution 
of conscience 
In 1995, Voland and Voland noted that the evolutionary approach, 
which explains altruistic behavior by using the perspective of the 
50 
selfish gene, may explain many phenomena related to kin altruism 
and reciprocity, but that it obviously does not suffice to explain some 
other forms of human prosociality. More specifically, the authors 
argued that there are situations in which individuals face moral 
dilemmas and have to decide whether to respond in an altruistic way, 
which leads to individually-maladaptive solutions, or in a selfish way, 
which may lead to feelings of guilt that may impair a person’s life as 
well. If individuals try to avoid feelings of guilt, they will behave in a 
way that is ethically appropriate and eases their conscience, but this 
will often be biologically maladaptive.  
Pointing out that moral conflicts are due to human conscience, 
Voland and Voland (1995) developed the hypothesis that the con-
science does not suit the selfish-gene interests of the individual pos-
sessing a conscience, but the selfish-gene interests of this individ-
ual's parents.  
To elaborate, the authors assumed that the conscience evolved due to 
the conflict that parents and their offspring face with regard to altru-
istic tendencies. As parents and their offspring are related by descent, 
they share 50 % of their genes. Therefore, their reproductive interests 
are quite similar, but not completely identical. Due to this reason, 
parents and children may develop divergent views on how to behave 
adequately; more concretely, parents will demand more altruism from 
their children than the latter are willing to display (Trivers, 1974, 
1985). 
Voland and Voland (1995) elucidated the logic of divergent interests 
between parents and their offspring using the example of the “wean-
ing conflict”: Female mammals nurse their offspring as long as the 
cost-benefit ratio is not negative, i.e. as long as nursing increases the 
inclusive fitness of the mother. After some time, the baby is old 
enough to survive without the mother’s milk and she stops lactation 
to invest in another child. Although the baby at first starts crying and 
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insists on being nursed, after a restricted transition phase during 
which the interest of the baby and its mother are divergent, the baby 
stops demanding milk. This makes sense, as the baby also shares 
50 % of its genes with its full siblings. Therefore, the baby would 
harm its own inclusive fitness if it circumvented the production of 
siblings.  
The weaning conflict is a typical example of a short phase of divergent 
interests between parents and children. However, Voland and Voland 
(1995) explained that such phases can be longer. In societies that 
install “helpers at the nest”, parents demand their offspring to assist 
in raising their brothers and sisters, instead of encouraging them to 
quickly start their own reproductive careers (Emlen, 1991). Citing 
case studies from European social history (Dickemann, 1979; Hager, 
1992; Vernier, 1984), Voland and Voland (1995) pointed out that the 
insistence on such helping behavior sometimes leads to life-long role 
differentiations within families. In some cases, it was found that 
daughters especially were permanently excluded from private eco-
nomic and reproductive opportunities and pushed into a helper’s 
role, which served the interests of their parents and siblings, but 
contradicted their own inclusive fitness. As Voland and Voland (1995) 
noted, parents’ interest in manipulating their children to behave 
altruistically may sometimes go beyond the wish to create helpers at 
the nest; parents at times gain advantages by sacrificing some of 
their children to the common good as a form of a “tax”. For example, 
they arrange marriages against their children’s interest to form politi-
cal alliances (Podolefsky, 1984) or push their sons into the role of 
soldiers to serve the defense of the group.  
As Voland and Voland (1995) stated, in all these cases, parents put 
their interests through much more effectively, the more disposed the 
deprived children are to accept the roles assigned to them. Optimally, 
children fulfill their parents’ wishes without direct parental control 
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and pressure. This succeeds best by an upbringing which aims at 
suppressing the child’s ego (Voland & Voland, 1995, p. 406): 
A conscience [italics added] serves just this pur-
pose. In case of a conflict, it regulates behavior to 
the child’s own disadvantage—even if powerful pun-
ishing parents are unable to exert direct influence. 
The conscience remains their “extended” arm; it 
cannot be expunged and its potency is not easily 
reduced. It is a “satellite” of the “selfish gene” of the 
parents; and whenever the situation requires, the 
conscience is willing to provide impulses for ethical 
and altruistic behavior—even long after the death of 
the parents. 
Summing up the idea of Voland and Voland (1995), the conscience is 
assumed to be an “extended phenotype” of parental genes, which 
rules on the offspring’s behavior in a lifelong way, even when there 
are no longer any direct opportunities for parental manipulation. But 
one question arises: if the conscience may thus lead to self-damaging 
behavior in children—why do children tolerate this kind of exploita-
tion executed by their parents?  
Voland and Voland (1995) stated that human children are extremely 
helpless when they come into the world. They are dependent on their 
parents’ support. Highlighting the complexity of human culture, the 
authors argued that children need to be taught by their parents to 
acquire culture-specific skills because cultural conformity is neces-
sary for humans to master their lives in reproductively flourishing 
ways. To become successful, children are inclined to adopt cultural 
norms and role models, and they fare well by trusting their parental 
teachers more than any other member of the group, as parents are 
genetically related to their children and thus have similar interests to 
them. The price of children’s trust is that they cannot discern in 
which cases parental nurture goes back to common interests and in 
which cases it is used as a trick to manipulate them in a way that 
serves their parents interests but is detrimental to themselves. 
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Of course, the social learning opportunities connected to parental 
guidance can be deemed highly important. It seems feasible that 
children will be interested in enjoying this support. However, should 
evolution not have favored children’s ability to assert themselves 
against adverse parental manipulation? Voland and Voland (1995, p. 
408) argued against this notion: 
 (N)atural selection will breed “learning ability” for 
as long as there are net benefits to social learning 
despite the price of manipulability. An “ontogenetic 
autarchy” with immunity against the teaching in-
fluences would not have a chance of persisting in 
natural selection at the advanced level of primate 
evolution. 
To highlight, the authors’ statement implies that a child’s obedience 
is a necessity for its survival if the child belongs to the group of “ad-
vanced primates”. Actually, this statement slightly disagrees with the 
overall message of Voland and Voland (1995). In general, the authors 
argued that an individual’s conscience contradicts his or her selfish-
gene interests. However, taking the preliminary statement seriously 
by assuming that children would at worst die if they decided to waive 
the help of their parents, it can at least be argued that children’s 
willingness to accept their parents’ manipulations is ultimately in the 
interest of their selfish genes, as otherwise they would probably not 
develop to reproductive age.  
Admittedly, there are individual cases in which the conscience really 
leads to a net cost for the individual possessing the conscience. This 
is true for suicide assassins, for example, who definitely do not in-
crease their lifetime fitness by killing themselves for maniacal reasons 
produced by their diseased minds. 
To conclude, Voland and Voland (1995) disputed that the conscience 
evolved as a result of an extended phenotype of parental genes. Tak-
ing the long phase of children’s dependency on their parents into 
account, which noticeably distinguishes the human race from other 
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animals, the authors’ idea seems prudent. The extraordinary depend-
ency of human offspring could be the reason why human altruism is 
much more pronounced than the altruism of other creatures that are 
less dependent on their parents.  
However, with regard to the authors’ interpretation that their theory 
contradicts the biological selfishness axiom, a different conclusion 
seems admissible (and is eventually supported by their own words). 
Children’s willingness to adapt a conscience can be interpreted as a 
cost that children are willing to pay to get parental support in order 
to survive. Children are in need of acquiring social skills from their 
parents, because these skills are essential to master complex envi-
ronmental and cultural challenges. In this vein, a conscience serves 
the survival of the genes of the individual having the conscience and 
thus increases his or her lifetime fitness. 
Note that Voland and Voland’s (1995) argument encapsulated an-
other striking factor. The authors assumed that children’s pressure 
to submit to their parental teachers is, amongst others, sustained by 
the complexity of culture to which children have to be habituated. 
This idea that the complexity of human culture might have contrib-
uted to human ultra-sociality will be discussed in the next section. 
6.3. Gene-culture coevolution 
The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC) emphasized the 
excellent powers of law as a cultural instrument to underpin the polis 
and positively mediate relations between people with the following 
words: “Lawgivers make the citizen good by inculcating habits in 
them, and this is the aim of every lawgiver.” (Aristotle, n.d./1962, p. 
1103). Following the example of the ancient Greeks, who were char-
acterized by a complex culture already hundreds of years before 
Christ, civilized societies today have established a variety of complex 
institutions, including law, in which all of them are designed to sup-
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port civil obedience and cooperation. Actually, institutions are not 
only found in highly developed societies. Even primitive cultures 
show primal forms of institution-building, such as monogamy, and 
this suggests that humans have tended to enforce social rules and 
norms from early times. However, if humans have installed institu-
tions for such a long time, it seems fair to ask whether the analysis of 
the evolution of human altruism may really disregard the parallel 
evolution of human culture.  
The theory of gene-culture coevolution, also known as the dual inheri-
tance theory, was developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Its 
central idea is to explain human behavior as a product of two inter-
acting evolutionary processes: genetic evolution and cultural evolu-
tion (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza, & Feldman, 1981; 
Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). The concept, which will be discussed in 
detail in the following, can thus be understood as a symbiosis of the 
social sciences, which focus on culture as the primary cause of hu-
man behavioral variation, and human sociobiology and evolutionary 
psychology, which interpret culture as an unimportant by-product of 
genetic selection. 
To highlight the importance of the analytical turn that is made in this 
chapter, note that the concept brings along two new implications that 
sharply distinguish this approach from standard evolutionary theo-
ries: (1) It is assumed that traits are influenced by their cultural 
environment inasmuch that genes, which are responsible for proso-
cial traits, adopt to the complexity of human institutions. Therefore, 
altruistic behavior, which at first glance seems biologically self-
destructive, may turn out to be self-serving if it is evaluated against 
the cultural background in which it is displayed. (Gintis et al., 2008). 
(2) The theory supposes that besides the existence of genetically 
based traits, traits have evolved that are based on cultural transmis-
sion only. These traits may adapt much more rapidly to changes in 
the environment than genetically based traits and thus can have a 
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great impact on human behavior (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). In the 
following, the basic ideas of gene-culture coevolution will be outlined 
and it will be discussed in how far the approach has added insights 
to the evolution of human altruism.  
6.3.1. Basic ideas 
The theory of gene-culture coevolution is strongly pushed by the 
group of “alternative scholars” mentioned before, who argue that the 
dimension of human ultra-sociality, which is, amongst others, indi-
cated by the phenomenon of strong reciprocity in the laboratory, 
cannot be explained by standard evolutionary theories. To solve the 
puzzle of the evolution of altruistic cooperation and altruistic pun-
ishment, the authors fall back upon the idea of group selection (see 
Chapter 4). However, being aware of the close argument that genetic 
transmission renders genetic group selection improbable, they distin-
guish themselves from the ideas of genetic group selection in that 
they propose a selection mechanism that works on cultural rather 
than genetic variation between groups. 
To sketch the basic idea, they argue that ultra-social behavior (i.e., 
biologically unselfish behavior that is not explained by standard 
evolutionary theories) was favored by cultural norms, which in turn 
evolved due to specific environmental conditions that demanded 
cooperation. The presence of divergent norms led to the development 
of divergent groups, that is, groups with many altruists as opposed to 
groups with many self-interested individuals. As groups of altruists 
fared better than groups of selfish individuals, the individual fitness 
losses of altruists were more than compensated by the superior per-
formance of the groups in which they assembled. Consequently, 
altruism could evolve due to group selection on cultural variation. 
Two problems arise: First, why should cultural group selection have a 
greater empirical relevance than genetic group selection? Are there 
specific characteristics that distinguish the two processes in a way 
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that bolster the powers of cultural group selection? Second, how 
could culture, if it really opposes the genetic interests of genes and 
individuals, ever evolve? Both issues will be considered in the follow-
ing. 
6.3.2. Similarities of genetic and cultural transmission 
Before reviewing the significant differences between cultural and 
genetic transmission, it should be highlighted that the fundamentals 
of the two processes are similar. Cultural evolution describes proc-
esses of passing over and adopting traditions via imitative learning. It 
implies that a potentially fundamental determinant of behavior is 
given from one individual to another. Considering this fact, Campbell 
(1965, 1975) as well as Baldwin (1895) argued that the principles of 
cultural and genetic evolution are comparable. 
Richerson and Boyd (2001) highlighted the analogy between genetic 
and cultural evolution by stating that both concepts are historical 
processes, which appear at the population level and regularly result 
in the adaptive diversification of human manners. To follow this 
argument, consider how cultural evolution works over time: individu-
als retrieve determinants of behavior from a large population of po-
tential parents and cultural models. Then, selection pressures oper-
ate on individuals, preferring some cultural and genetic variants 
against others. The new generation, from which the subsequent will 
be sampled, typically differs slightly from the previous one. As many 
generations pass, adjustments accumulate and evolution occurs. 
Emphasizing that genetic evolution works in the same way, Richerson 
and Boyd (2001, 2005) demanded that the great analytical powers of 
evolutionary theory, which have yielded substantive insights in the 
field of biology, should be likewise applied to the social sciences.  
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6.3.3. Differences between genetic and cultural transmis-
sion 
Although genetic and cultural transmission are similar in their fun-
damentals, Richerson and Boyd (2001, 2005) pointed out four sub-
stantive differences between the two processes. First, when adopting 
a cultural trait, humans are not restricted to sampling just two “par-
ents”, as in the case for genetic transmission, but they can choose to 
imitate out of a great variety of people an individual whose behavior 
seems to be the best. In this way, cultural transmission allows single 
persons like teachers, leaders, or celebrities to have a great impact on 
great numbers of people if they all decide to imitate them. Indeed, 
pop stars frequently “infect” whole generations of adolescents to 
follow their ideas. Hence, cultural transmission may much more 
rapidly create behavioral variance between groups than in the case 
for genetic transmission. 
Second, when cultural transmission takes place, individuals are not 
restricted to acquiring behavioral styles from individuals of their 
parental generation. Instead, they can choose models from completely 
different cohorts. For example, they may go back in time and imitate 
the behavior of grandparents or ancient leaders. This implies that 
outdated behavior is revived. However, they can also imitate behavior 
of peers. This implies a shortening of the life cycle of an item of cul-
ture. In addition, this difference implies that cultural transmission 
can enforce its powers much more quickly than genetic transmission. 
Third, while humans are stuck with the genes they inherit at concep-
tion, they may acquire new habits and cultural traditions throughout 
their lives. In fact, culture is acquired step by step, with the possibil-
ity of early-acquired items influencing those adopted later, and for 
later learned manners to reject old ones. To illustrate, many people 
change hobbies, occupations, or political and religious beliefs repeat-
edly over a lifetime. Therefore, cultural transmission, in contrast to 
genetic transmission, allows short-dated adaptations to substitute 
59 
behavior that was revealed to be disadvantageous—all within one and 
the same generation. 
Fourth, with genetic transmission, behavioral variations can only 
arise once within each individual—in the very moment the embryo is 
formed, the genetic structure of the individual is fixed. In culture, 
variations can be acquired via processes of learning (i.e., imitation). 
Therefore, variations occur much more often. In human culture, the 
results of learning in one generation are passed on to the next. Thus, 
over the generations, cumulative improvements arise by the inheri-
tance of acquired variation. 
Summing up the argument of Richerson and Boyd (2001, 2005), 
cultural transmission is less restricted and quicker than genetic 
transmission, as people may (freely) choose the models they imitate 
and can vary behavioral styles frequently. They can adapt to new 
environmental challenges at short notice. As behavioral improve-
ments are passed on to the next generations, younger generations 
can build upon improvements from earlier generations.  
However, Tooby and Cosmides (1992) denied the importance of cul-
tural transmission. In their critique, the authors distinguished be-
tween “epidemiological” and “evoked” culture. While epidemiological 
culture refers to the kind of cultural traditions that have been 
sketched above, evoked culture refers to differences that are not 
transmitted at all, but rather evoked by the local environment. To 
specify, Tooby and Cosmides (1992) argued that much of cultural 
variation is overestimated as being epidemiological, but to their view, 
all humans are endowed with the same genetically transmitted in-
formation, which simply generates divergent responses depending on 
the individual’s surroundings. Fending off this critique, Richerson 
and Boyd (2005) exemplified that if culture was only a genetically 
based automatic response to environmental challenges, a modern city 
slicker who was abandoned in the desert should as easily survive in 
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aridity as someone native. But this is not the case. The instance thus 
shows that cultural transmission may generate survival benefits.  
However, as it was discussed earlier, nothing initially develops be-
cause it leads to a sophisticated result that is advantageous at the 
group-level at a later point of time. Therefore, which circumstances 
favored the development of culture? 
6.3.4. Environmental prerequisites for cultural transmis-
sion 
Following Boyd and Richerson (1996), the prerequisite for establish-
ing culture and institutions is some kind of specialized cognitive 
machinery, which allows individuals to imitate complex traditions. 
However, there are two reasons why these capacities had a hard time 
to evolve (Richerson & Boyd, 2001; 2005): first, the cognitive capacity 
to imitate traditions is a great fitness benefit, but only if there are 
cultural traditions to take advantage of. Obviously, there cannot be 
complex traditions without the cognitive tools necessary to support 
them, i.e., the “useless-when-rare-problem”. Second, the costs of 
having an elaborate culture usually exceed the benefits. Consider the 
behavior of most animals, which is guided by a mixture of genes and 
individual experience, but does not rely on culture. These animals 
obviously never developed culture, potentially because it was too 
expensive. Hence, under which circumstances could the development 
of cultural tradition have been beneficial?  
Richerson and Boyd (2001, 2005) feasibly assumed that the genetic 
system is less likely to be affected by random transmission errors 
(mutation) than cultural tradition. They also assumed that in con-
trast to cultural transmission (i.e., learning via imitation), individual 
learning on the basis of own experiences is either costly or error 
prone. These two variables are closely related, because an increase in 
time and effort spent on learning usually leads to a decrease in mis-
takes.  
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On the basis of these assumptions, a slowly changing environment 
can be supposed to favor a fixed genetic rule rather than any combi-
nation of individual learning and traditional imitation. This is be-
cause selection, acting on a conventional system of genetic heritage, 
adapts to slow environmental changes very well, while the errors 
connected to learning and imitation entail considerable disadvan-
tages.  
At the other end of the scale, when the environment is rapidly chang-
ing, any form of transmission from ancestors—either genetic or cul-
tural—is worthless, as the world of parents is simply too different 
form the world of their offspring. Under these circumstances, an 
individual does best to rely on personal experience only, because this 
incorporates the greatest chance to adapt to the new environmental 
challenges. 
However, in intermediate environments, some combination of indi-
vidual and social learning will probably be most adaptive. To specify, 
culture is particularly advantageous in environments that are shifting 
a lot within tens of generations, but not too fast in any one genera-
tion. Under these circumstances, culture, by accumulating individual 
learning, can track environmental changes more rapidly than genes, 
yet cut back the costs and errors associated with individual learning. 
Based on these considerations, Richerson and Boyd (2001) argued 
that the cognitive capacities for social learning developed due to the 
challenges of a moderately changing environment. However, what is 
their historical evidence that these circumstances were given at any 
one time?  
Indeed, several authors have argued that the progressive brain en-
largement found in many mammalian lineages is a result of the in-
creasingly variable climates of the last few million years (deMenocal, 
1995; Potts, 1996; Richerson & Boyd, 2000). In particular, the 
strongly fluctuating Ice Age climates of the Middle and Late Pleisto-
62 
cene represented a challenging environment for which it seems fair to 
assume that both individual and social learning were advantageous 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2001). The environment of the Pleistocene may 
thus explain why many species refined their learning abilities during 
that time. It may also account for simple forms of social learning in 
humans that probably served as preadaptations to the evolution of a 
capacity for complex traditions.  
Yet, why did only humans, but no other animals, transcend simple 
forms of social learning to develop complex and cumulative cultural 
traditions, especially considering the intrinsic barrier to complex 
culture of the useless-when-rare sort? As Richerson and Boyd (2001, 
p. 450) note: 
We are on the horns of an explanatory dilemma. We 
must account for an evolutionary innovation that 
causes the extraordinary success of the only spe-
cies to have it. Our account must explain why our 
species has complex culture, and why no others do, 
despite presumably preadapted systems for simple 
social learning being rather common. 
The question that has to be asked is: how could social learning in 
humans become more efficient than in other animals? According to 
Richerson and Boyd (2000, 2001), a possible answer to this question 
is the evolution of symbols, which will be discussed in the next sec-
tion. 
6.3.5. A cultural innovation: symbols as in-group-markers 
Symbolic markers are a striking feature of the human species in that 
they explicitly define groups. Typical marks are languages and dia-
lects, or ornaments and specific clothing (e.g., a football-shirt), but 
also particular rituals (e.g., putting up a maypole or lighting an 
Easter fire). Archaeological evidence suggests that the development of 
symbols was a major innovation for the human race because it in-
creased human adaptive sophistication (Bettinger, 1991; Stringer & 
Gamble, 1993).  
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Boyd and Richerson (1987) developed theoretical models in which 
individuals use symbolic markers to decide whom to imitate. The 
authors showed that in environments with migration in which the 
best behavioral strategy is variable from place to place, a symbolic 
marker serves to avoid the effect of cultural diffusion of locally mal-
adaptive traits from neighboring environments. For example, a very 
simple marker, which might have been important within small groups 
already, would have been to imitate those individuals who were suc-
cessful in terms of economic resources and reproduction.  
To conclude, with markers, social learning may have functioned 
much more efficiently, as individuals were able to identify those 
individuals who displayed the locally beneficial behavior. Even the 
isolation of ethnic groups did not have to be complete. Foreigners 
could be identified easily. Suspicion probably helped to screen out 
mistaken foreign ideas, but after strict examination, successful 
strategies could be adopted (Richerson & Boyd, 2000; 2001) 
Extending this argument, Richerson and Boyd (2005) assumed that 
cultural evolution was not only favored by the imitation of the most 
successful strategies, but also by the imitation of the most common 
strategies. In several models, the authors showed that a frequency-
dependant conformist imitation strategy of the type “When in Rome, 
do as the Romans do” is adaptive (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 1996). 
Pointing to classic experimental evidence by social psychologists 
Sherif and Murphy (1936) that humans are indeed inclined to adjust 
their behavior to that of others, Richerson and Boyd (2005) assumed 
conformist behavioral strategies to be another important driver of 
cultural evolution. 
6.3.6. Cooperation due to gene-culture coevolution 
Summing up the ideas of gene-culture coevolution as developed by 
Richerson and Boyd (1985, 2000, 2001, 2005), it was argued that (1) 
cultural transmission works like genetic transmission but more 
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quickly, that (2) in many mammals, including humans, the first 
capacities for social learning evolved as adaptations to the fluctuating 
climate of the Pleistocene, and that (3) more complex forms of cul-
tural transmission—which are found in humans only—were favored 
by the evolution of symbols.  
The theory assumes further, that specific environmental difficulties 
promoted cooperation. This supposition is shored up by recently 
collected data from pre-modern small-scale societies (Henrich et al., 
2004). To give an example, it was shown that in environments with 
small fishes, individuals subsist by casting for small fishes singu-
larly. In contrast, in environments without small fishes, where groups 
can only live on fish if they carry out big game fishing, individuals 
cooperate. Generalizing this finding, it might be that in ancient times 
in some environments, cooperation was of vital importance, while in 
others cooperation could be neglected. But in how far did environ-
ments calling for cooperation favor the evolution of ultra-sociality?  
The degree of environmental harshness was probably related to both 
the degree of social learning, as well as the degree of demands for 
cooperation. It seems likely that a parallel development of culture and 
needs for cooperation thus led to cultural norms for cooperation. As 
long as norms for cooperation were simple—e.g. “Men have to ascer-
tain that their elderly parents are catered with enough food.”—no 
complex psychological machinery was needed to fulfill the demand. 
However, as soon as multiple norms existed, the challenges accrued. 
For example, if a second norm said “On bad fishing days, all men 
have to distribute their catch of fish equally among the families of the 
tribe”, and a third norm read “Ill members of the tribe have to be 
granted relief by the means of additional food supply”, individuals 
had to balance the pros and cons of their acts. They had to decide 
which norm to follow first. Putting the different rules in a permanent 
order would have been insufficient, because individuals had to recon-
sider the specific circumstances every day. They had to weigh their 
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own needs against the hardships of others: “How hungry am I? How 
hungry is my wife? What about my children? Do I have to give fish to 
my mother today—or did she find enough berries to satisfy her hun-
ger? How much fish did the other men catch, and are the other fami-
lies replete already? And how ill is Kurt? Is he so bad off that I have 
to help him?” In such circumstances, individuals faced moral trade-
offs because their own fitness was at risk. They had to weigh their 
action alternatives and had to decide whether to act selfishly, thereby 
increasing their own fitness, or to fulfill the cultural norms by acting 
altruistically. Even if they decided to follow the norms, they had to 
weigh which norm to follow first. All these decisions are not only 
reducible to facts, but also demand reflection. Individuals were in 
need of specific psychological equipment to fulfill these tasks.  
As Richerson and Boyd (2005) argued, the distinctiveness of human 
psychological machinery evolved in social environments that had 
been shaped by cultural processes. As soon as groups established 
systems in which prosocial norms were enforced by reward and pun-
ishment, selection should have favored specific social instincts. To 
elaborate, in many situations the reward for non-cooperation can be 
enjoyed directly, while the cost of punishment will be suffered later 
on. Thus, people who overvalue the immediate payoffs of non-
cooperation, may fail to collaborate although this is in their own 
interest to do so. If generally cooperative behavior was favored in 
most social environments, selection should have favored more sophis-
ticated genetically transmitted social instincts, like feelings of guilt, 
which predispose individuals to cooperate, in larger and more com-
plex social groupings. 
Accepting for the moment that the conscience evolved due to cul-
ture—how could it stand the pressures of natural selection? It has to 
be assumed that a mutant who was able to capitalize on cultural 
traditions and cooperation in observed situations, but was not bur-
dened with an unconditionally norm-abiding conscience, which 
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would lead him to sacrifice resources for the well being of others even 
in anonymous situations, must have invaded a group of conscience-
burdened cooperators.  
As mentioned previously, gene-culture coevolutionary theorists solve 
this dilemma by pointing to the powers of group selection (e.g., Rich-
erson & Boyd, 2001; Gintis, Henrich, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2008). 
They argue that in the years in which the modern Homo sapiens 
emerged, ultra-social behavior became fitness enhancing, but only 
because groups with many true altruists functioned better than 
groups of selfish individuals. They assume further that true altruists 
suffered individual fitness losses, but that these were more than 
compensated by the enhanced performance of the groups to which 
they belonged. The theorists thus conclude that the evolution of 
altruism is not only due to personal benefits, like the ones incorpo-
rated in kin altruism and reciprocal altruism, but that it is due to 
benefits realized at the level of the social group. 
Computer simulations have supported the theoretical ideas outlined 
above. Assuming a deme-structured population (i.e., a population in 
which organisms interbreed with one another and share a distinct 
gene pool), Bowles (2001), and Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz (2003) 
tested models with culturally transmitted group differences in social 
institutions and genetically transmitted differences in individual 
behaviors. The scholars showed that intergroup conflicts could ex-
plain the evolutionary success of both (1) prosocial behaviors towards 
unrelated members of one's group and (2) group-level institutions, 
such as food sharing, even if these institutions were costly to the 
groups adopting them.  
6.3.7. Gene-culture coevolution as explanation to strong 
reciprocity 
In chapter 5.3.1, it might have seemed that invoking strong reciproc-
ity as an explanation for the maintenance of altruism simply created 
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a new evolutionary puzzle: why do people incur costs to reward coop-
eration and punish selfishness thereby providing benefits to third 
parties? However, Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson (2003) denied 
that this is a new puzzle and pointed to the fact that selection pres-
sures against altruistic punishment are not as harsh as selection 
pressures against altruistic cooperation. The reason for this is that 
the payoff disadvantage of altruistic cooperators relative to defectors 
is highly independent of the frequency of defectors in the population, 
whereas the payoff disadvantage for altruistic punishers declines as 
defectors become rare, because then there is no need for punishment.  
For illustration, a computer simulation of Boyd et al. (2003) assumes 
a population with defectors, cooperators and punishers. Cooperators 
bear costs of cooperation, punishers bear costs of cooperation plus 
costs of the execution of punishment. Defectors bear costs of suffer-
ing punishment. However, as soon as the costs of suffering punish-
ment exceed the costs of cooperation, defectors change their strategy 
and cooperate. As sanctions have to be performed less frequently 
then, the costs for altruistic punishers decrease. Consequently, 
within-group selection against punishers becomes weaker, that is, 
the number of punishers will decrease only very slowly and their 
existence will sustain cooperation within the group. Because the 
variation of cooperation between groups is thus heightened, between-
group selection is enabled to make its impact: groups with altruistic 
punishers will out-compete groups lacking altruistic punishers.  
How far does this idea coincide with the evolution of culture? As Boyd 
et al. (2003) note, cultural institutions moderate within-group differ-
ences in individual success. Examples for such institutions are mo-
nogamy or food sharing, which have emerged and diffused repeatedly 
in a wide variety of ecologies during the course of human history. For 
example, monogamy implies an exclusive sexual relationship with a 
single partner. It therefore reduces mate competition: even those 
individuals whose attractiveness would theoretically allow them to 
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acquire multiple mates are restricted to one mate, because culture 
narrows down their opportunities. Likewise, in societies that practice 
food sharing, individuals who perform particularly well in hunting 
and gathering are unable to fully capitalize on their talent as they are 
forced to contribute to the common good. Consequently, cultural 
institutions limit within-group selection against behaviors that are 
individually costly but serve the group benefit. Thus, small costs, 
which, for example, arise through altruistic punishment, carry less 
weight.  
As Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) pointed out, in this way culture and 
altruistic punishment may bolster up one another: altruistic punish-
ment ascertains the preservation of the culturally selected norms and 
cultural norms protect altruistic punishers from too harsh fitness 
disadvantages.  
However, with regard to the practical relevance of altruistic punish-
ment in foraging societies, it has to be noted that altruistic punish-
ment probably implied much greater costs than assumed by Boyd et 
al. (2003). Altruistic punishment almost certainly means to offend 
somebody directly for behaving non-cooperatively. In contrast to 
executors in modern societies with complex systems of law, altruistic 
punishers in foraging societies were most likely less well protected 
when performing such acts. At worst, an insult would have let to 
death. Therefore, invoking primitive institutions like monogamy or 
food sharing as shields of altruistic punishment seems skewed. Actu-
ally, it appears that more complex institutions, like elementary forms 
of law, must be considered to strengthen the idea that altruistic 
punishment was supported through the establishment of cultural 
rules. 
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6.4. Summary: how ultra-sociality might be ex-
plained 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was questioned whether human 
ultra-sociality, which has not been explained by standard evolution-
ary theories yet, might simply be a maladaptation to novel contexts. 
In particular, it was debated whether psychological adaptations for 
prosociality, which evolved in ancient environmental contexts, are 
triggered in novel contexts due to mistakenly interpreted cues of 
reciprocity and publicity, and thus lead to self-detrimental results. 
However, it was noted that this interpretation is not satisfying. 
Rather, it seems likely that human ultra-sociality is guided by a 
conscience, whose moral postulations are derived from extra-
individual social interests entailed in cultural norms. 
Two ideas were presented for how conscience could have evolved. 
Starting with a résumé of the more complex theory of gene-culture 
coevolution, it was assumed that humans’ unique competencies in 
the development of culture added a distinctive direction and speed to 
the process of genetic evolution in that humans developed proximate 
mechanisms, which gave way to the evolution of individually costly 
but group-beneficial behaviors (Boyd & Richerson, 2004; Gintis et al., 
2008). Richerson and Boyd (2001) remarked that humans today are 
thus determined by two forces—their biological drives on the one 
hand and morality on the other. These forces are often collaborators, 
but they are antagonists whenever biologically beneficial behaviors 
are morally objectionable. Drawing parallels to Sigmund Freud’s 
theory of human beings being painfully torn between an animal id 
and a cultural superego, the authors put forward the idea that as 
soon as culturally immoral behavior generates too much psychic 
pain, genetic benefits will be neglected and humans will obey inter-
nalized cultural norms. 
Indeed, this statement is strikingly similar to Voland and Voland’s 
(1995) idea of the conscience as a force that evolved in the parent-
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offspring conflict and drives humans into moral dilemmas. The 
authors sketched a scenario in which helpless children follow the 
guidance of their parents in order to obtain their support and to enjoy 
the advantages of socialization. As they are unable to discern which 
parental educational measures redound to their personal advantage 
and which work in the interest of their parents but to their own dis-
advantage, they cannot protect themselves from manipulation in the 
form of internalized norms. 
Both theories, the theory of gene-culture coevolution as well as the 
theory of the extended phenotype, are valuable, as they provide inno-
vative ideas to enlighten the paradox of the evolution of complex 
cooperation in humans. However, both theories have assets and 
drawbacks.  
The theory of gene-culture coevolution makes many assumptions, 
starting with the causal relationship of environmental conditions in 
the Pleistocene and the evolution of social instincts like guilt through 
to the assumption of group selection on variations of culturally de-
termined traits. These assumptions have not been supported irrefu-
tably with the aid of empirical data. As Johnson et al. (2008) remark, 
the principle of Occam’s razor advises scientists to explain any phe-
nomenon with as few assumptions as possible, or, to put it in the 
words of Williams (1966, p. 5): “[W]hen recognized, adaptation should 
be attributed to no higher a level of organization than is demanded by 
the evidence.” With the application of group selection, the theory of 
gene-culture coevolution indeed assumes adaptiveness on a high 
level of organization. Theorists have to be careful not to leapfrog 
important levels in between. 
Compared to the theory of gene-culture coevolution, the theory of the 
extended phenotype is captivating due to the simplicity of its pre-
sumptions. It seems likely that the struggle between parents and 
their offspring influenced evolutionary processes, because the parent-
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offspring conflict is a prevalent phenomenon: all creatures on earth 
have parents. However, this is a pro and a con to the theory at the 
same time. Voland and Voland (1995) do not make as sophisticated 
suggestions as the advocates of gene-culture coevolution with regard 
to the question why the conscience evolved in humans only, but not 
in other primates.  
Moreover, Voland and Voland (1995) do not state explicitly why par-
ents should be inclined to implant a conscience into their children, 
which does not operate only in favor of their personal interests, but 
also in favor of the interests of society. Admittedly, Voland and 
Voland (1995) argue that parents might have personal advantages by 
sacrificing their children to the social group they live in. But this 
again implies that this time parents fulfill some kind of social norm, 
which serves the group but is disadvantageous to themselves. To 
illustrate, a son who fights for the group simultaneously fights for his 
parents, but, taking over a consequentialist point of view, parents 
would do best if they acted as free-riders in that they let other par-
ents’ sons protect the group and assigned their own son the role of 
the warrior in front of their own doorstep.  
Therefore, even on the grounds of the theory of the extended pheno-
type, it seems plausible that in some way the evolution of culture has 
intermingled with the evolution of genes. At the very least, culture 
can be assumed to have given input to a conscience that evolved due 
to still cloudy causes.  
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7. A call for an integration of evolutionary theo-
ries 
For a long time, evolutionary theory was strongly associated with the 
selfishness axiom. As Price (2008) noted, this might have been trig-
gered by the title of Dawkins’ 1976 publication “The Selfish Gene”. 
However the evolutionary theory behind this title does not assume 
that selfish genes produce selfish individuals. It simply assumes that 
selfish genes support their own replication by increasing the fitness 
of their bearers. An increase in fitness may sometimes be accom-
plished by making individuals behave selfishly, and other times it 
may be accomplished by making individuals behave altruistically. 
Anyway, as Price (2008) notes, the central idea of present orthodox 
evolutionary theory is that genes replicate primarily by increasing 
individual fitness. 
What does this approach imply? It implies that the gene-centered 
framework is an extremely narrow level of analysis and that it re-
mains fair to apply only as long as measuring the fitness of a gene is 
independent of its surroundings. As soon as a number of genes act 
jointly to produce a phenotypic effect (i.e., an effect on any observable 
characteristic or trait of an organism), a higher level of analysis—the 
individual—has to be considered. 
Indeed, this idea is reminiscent of the central insight of Gestalt the-
ory, which says that the whole is different from the sum of its parts. 
Max Wertheimer (1925), who is credited as the founder of the theory, 
postulated that the “Gestalt” (engl. ‘shape’ or ‘figure’) is primary and 
defines the parts of which it is assembled, rather than being a secon-
dary formation that emerges from those parts: 
Es gibt Zusammenhänge, bei denen nicht, was im 
Ganzen geschieht, sich daraus herleitet, wie die 
einzelnen Stücke sind und sich zusammensetzen, 
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sondern umgekehrt, wo—im prägnanten Fall—sich 
das, was an einem Teil dieses Ganzen geschieht, 
bestimmt von inneren Strukturgesetzen dieses sei-
nes Ganzen. 
(There are contexts in which what is happening in 
the whole cannot be deduced from the characteris-
tics of the separate pieces, but conversely; what 
happens to a part of the whole is, in clear-cut 
cases, determined by the laws of the inner struc-
ture of its whole.) 
To transfer the idea of Gestalt theory to the present issue, it can be 
argued that only if the individual, as a higher level of analysis, is 
factored into the evolutionary analysis, can the meaningfulness of 
genetically determined traits be evaluated.  
However, if it is the case that the consideration of higher levels of 
analysis is necessary to solve specific questions, it seems fair to ask 
whether the level of the individual is the highest level that has to be 
taken into account when trying to explain the dimension of altruism 
in present-day people, or whether even higher levels of analysis—like 
the group and the cultural environment—are useful. To elaborate, the 
inclusive fitness of a gene may depend on the environment within 
which it is situated. Yet, the relevant environment does not have to be 
bounded to the body of the individual. For example, the cultural 
conditions of ancient times might have represented an environmental 
force that affected individual fitness in a way that promoted prosocial 
traits. As Diamond (2005) noted, the leading trend in human history 
has been the replacement of smaller, less complex societies by larger, 
more complex ones. Therefore, I would like to follow theorists of gene-
culture coevolution by stating that neglecting of the higher force of 
cultural evolution could lead to fatal mistakes when analyzing the 
adaptiveness of genetic variations in modern human beings (see 
Gintis et al., 2008). However, an application of higher levels of analy-
sis must always proceed with caution. 
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What does my clamor imply? Summing up the last chapters, various 
theories were presented to elucidate the paradox of human altruism. 
Standard evolutionary theories of kin altruism, reciprocity, and sex-
ual selection were presented to explain distinct forms of human 
cooperation. However, human cooperation is highly complex, and it 
seems that some humans show true altruism, in that they behave in 
biologically self-detrimental ways. However, until now, it has not been 
explained why this is the case. The puzzle of the evolution of altruism 
still remains unsolved. It seems that biologically self-detrimental 
behavior is indeed governed by an originally extrinsic control author-
ity, which Sigmund Freud called the “super-ego”, that controls the 
natural drives of our selfish “id”. To elucidate the evolution of this 
kind of super-ego, alternative theories —including group-level theo-
ries—should be considered. The development and discussion of any 
serious theories that try to elucidate the origins of human coopera-
tion, are useful, as all of behavioral science and eventually the whole 
of humankind will profit when the puzzle of altruism is finally solved. 
As empirical findings showed that different theories may explain 
distinct forms of cooperation in humans, an integration of theories, 
rather than a battle between ideologies, seems to be the most fruitful 
way to master this challenge. 
Commenting on the roots of human ultra-sociality for a second time, 
there are still many theorists who assume that true altruism is only a 
maladaptation to novel interaction contexts in that individuals are 
unable to adjust their degree of prosocial behavior according to the 
degree of anonymity. If this was true, it had to be assumed that 
natural selection, in the long run, would raze out true morality. In 
this case, we were approaching the evolution of Machiavellianism in 
such that opportunistic individuals, who behave altruistically when 
they are observed but switch to pure selfishness as soon as this is 
efficient, would gain the mastery. To put it in the words of Machiavelli 
(1514/2008) himself: 
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For a prince (…) it is not necessary to have all the 
[virtuous] qualities, but it is very necessary to ap-
pear to have them (…). [It] is useful, for example, to 
appear merciful, trustworthy, humane, blameless, 
religious—and to be so—yet to be in such measure 
prepared in mind that if you need to be not so, you 
can and do change to the contrary.  
If present-day individuals who follow Machiavelli’s standard were 
better off indeed, true altruism had to be judged a maladaptation and 
true morals should die out in the long run. While this view might be 
right, I consider it too discouraging to share.  
Therefore, the commitment model of Frank (1988), which assumes 
that ultra-sociality is identifiable and is able to prevail because true 
altruists may avoid to be exploited by egoists, is a ray of hope on the 
intellectual horizon. If altruists were really able to exclusively mingle 
with each other, they could reach extraordinary benefits through 
mutualism. These synergetic benefits would out-compete the advan-
tages of egoists, and human morality could be sustained.  
As announced at the beginning, two empirical studies will be pre-
sented in the following, which were designed to test whether the 
hypothesis of positive assortation can be supported in reality. In 
Study 1, whether humans can identify the altruistic tendencies of 
others by first impression was investigated. In Study 2, how well 
individuals know the true characters of their daily interaction part-
ners and whether individuals indeed assort themselves along the 
dimension of altruism was investigated. 
Although theories of assortation may explain why different degrees of 
altruism subsist within one and the same population, they do not 
explain why such inter-individual differences in altruism originally 
evolved. Therefore, the third study in the following empirical part of 
this work deals exactly with this question. It is discussed whether 
different levels of prosociality might be explainable with the help of 
mate choice theories. 
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As keeping others unnecessarily on tenterhooks comes near to self-
ishness, this preliminary theoretical consideration will end now, and 
empiricism shall bear witness to explanations for the evolution of 
altruism. 
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Part II: Empirical investigation 
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8. Study 1: Not only states but traits - Humans 
can identify permanent altruistic dispositions 
in 20 seconds1 
8.1. Introduction 
The existence of altruism in humans, which puzzled already Darwin 
(1871), has been a niggling issue for generations of researchers, 
namely, “how can altruism, which by definition reduces personal 
fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection?” (Wilson, 1975, p. 3). A 
range of theories has been developed to explain the phenomenon and 
it seems fair to assume that various forms of selection shaped the 
evolution of human altruism. For example, kin altruism (Hamilton, 
1964) accounts for prosocial behavior towards relatives. Reciprocal 
altruism (Trivers, 1971) occurs in ongoing relationships with a suffi-
cient “shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984) that includes opportuni-
ties to be compensated. Recent theories of indirect reciprocity (Milin-
ski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2001) and altruistic punishment (Fehr 
& Gächter, 2002, 2003) showed that humans are willing to reward 
altruism and punish selfishness even if the selfish behavior is not 
directed to themselves but to an unrelated person instead. Thus, 
social norms may lead to sustained altruism in large groups (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003). 
To investigate altruistic behavior, economists, and more and more 
frequently also psychologists and biologists, often use the so-called 
dictator game (for a summary of research see Camerer, 2003). In this 
paradigm, two persons interact with each other only once and under 
conditions of total anonymity. The dictator is given a certain amount 
of money and has to divide this money between him or herself and an 
                                                
1 A modified version of this chapter is currently under review for publication in 
Evolution and Human Behavior together with Detlef Fetchenhauer and Ton 
Groothuis. 
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unknown recipient. The recipient has no means to influence or to 
veto the decision of the unknown dictator.  
Analyzing this situation—what result would the above stated theories 
predict as to the decision of the dictator? According to the theory of 
kin altruism (Hamilton, 1964), prosocial behavior should not be 
observed, as it can be presumed that the recipient in the dictator 
game is genetically unrelated to the dictator. Likewise, the theory of 
reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) would not predict any cooperation, as the 
interaction is non-iterated and does not allow for compensation. 
Because the interaction is anonymous, costs in terms of losses of 
reputation (Milinski et al., 2001) or punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 
2002, 2003) are irrelevant. The dictator game thus constitutes a 
“golden opportunity” (Frank, 1988, p. 73) to act self-interestedly 
without any negative consequences. Conclusively, the dictator should 
keep all the money for himself.  
However, a vast number of studies, both in industrialized societies 
(Camerer, 2003) and hunter-gatherer societies (Henrich et al., 2004), 
showed that the average amount of money given to the recipient is 
substantially above zero, even when large amounts of money are at 
stake (Camerer, 2003).  
The “mismatch hypothesis” (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006, p. 341) 
tries to elucidate this finding by stating that humans evolved in an 
environment different to the setting in an economic game (Trivers, 
2004). It might be the case, for example, that humans cooperate in a 
dictator game because their psychological mechanisms evolved for 
reciprocal altruism. According to this concept cooperating on the first 
round is often a good tactic (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006). Indeed, 
anonymity was rare in ancient times and it could moreover be that 
evolutionarily relevant cues in a dictator game might be processed in 
a manner that may be cognitively impenetrable, so that humans—
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even when they are unobserved—might rely on a heuristic which 
implies that antisocial behavior is generally identified and punished.  
However, this argument neglects the potentially strong selection 
pressure to enhance humans’ ability to modify their behavior accord-
ing to the likelihood of being detected and punished by others. In 
fact, humans are highly sensitive to such cues and adjust their deci-
sions accordingly (Fehr & Henrich, 2003; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & 
Fehr, 2003; Haley & Fessler, 2005).  
A second phenomenon, which could not be explained yet, relates to 
the great variation of humans to behave altruistically under one and 
the same circumstance (Camerer, 2003). By far not everyone behaves 
altruistically in a dictator game, nor does everybody behave egoisti-
cally. Persons rather show great differences in their tendencies to 
cooperate when nobody is watching. Why does the behavior of indi-
viduals diverge to such an extent? 
To summarize, although existing theories of the evolution of human 
altruism have provided great insights, they are not capable of ex-
plaining two phenomena conclusively: first, that humans show such 
high levels of altruism in one-shot interactions with unrelated strang-
ers under conditions of total anonymity (e.g. in dictator games 
(Camerer, 2003), in trust games (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, in press), 
and in prisoner’s dilemmas (Sally, 2000)), and second, that there are 
some individuals who oppositely keep all the money for themselves. 
One argument, which has been developed independently in the two 
fields of evolutionary psychology (Miller, 2000, 2007) and economics 
(Frank, 1988; 2004; 2008), may explain these findings by assuming 
that some humans, though not all, have a stable disposition to act 
altruistically even in the absence of incentives to do so. According to 
evolutionary theory, such individuals would pursue ultimate genetic 
self-interest through proximate psychological mechanisms that em-
body a genuine concern for others (de Waal, 1997; Nesse, 2001). 
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From the point of view of an ancient hunter-gatherer such persons 
would have been predestined to be a good mates, friends, or interac-
tion partners (Miller, 2007) and should have been preferred against 
those individuals who conditionally act altruistically in situations of 
social surveillance only. 
But how could a tendency for unconditional altruism ever have 
evolved? Following Miller (2000, 2007), moral virtues, including altru-
ism, evolved as fitness indicators for mate choice. Hence, altruism is 
sexually attractive because it advertises individual fitness in terms of 
parenting- and relationship-coordination abilities. Moreover it pro-
motes good genes as altruism depends on empathetic social intelli-
gence which is absent if one has a high mutation load that impairs 
the development of a complex Theory of Mind. Therefore, altruism 
may function as a kind of neurogenetic warranty, which, according to 
costly signaling theory (Gintis at al., 2001; McAndrew, 2002) is hard 
to fake and can therefore remain reliable over time (Zahavi & Zahavi, 
1997). 
The economist Frank (1988, 2004, 2008) also suggests the evolution 
of dispositional altruism. In his commitment-model, he postulates 
that unconditional altruists are proximately driven by strong moral 
emotions about fairness and shame, which make them behave right-
eously on principle. Rather than focusing on utility in terms of sexual 
attractiveness, he implies that altruism evolved because it is directly 
advantageous in every type of relationship – at least as long as altru-
ists avoid egoists but interact exclusively with each other in order to 
reap extraordinary profits through collaborative synergies. 
The common postulate of these two theories is that individuals with a 
genuine concern for others display signals of their moral intentions. If 
these signals can be observed so that moral intentions are identified 
by others, high virtue individuals may profitably team up with one 
another leaving lower virtue individuals no chance but to stay among 
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themselves. Such a mechanism could also explain the continuing 
variation in altruistic tendencies among humans (Frank, 1988). On 
the one hand, the higher the percentage of altruists in a given popu-
lation, the less monitoring of the altruism of others will take place, 
and the more adaptive it is to act non-altruistically. On the other 
hand, the lower the percentage of altruists in a given population, the 
more monitoring will take place, and the more adaptive it is to act 
altruistically. This would lead to frequency dependent selection and 
an equilibrium of altruists and non-altruists existing side by side. 
There is one obvious criticism of this argument. When signaling 
altruism is profitable, self-interested persons should be interested in 
faking the relevant signal in order to reap the benefits of an altruist 
without paying the cost of altruistic behavior (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2005). In evolutionary terms, this means that natural selection 
should create a deceptive copy of the altruistic signal. Though this 
argument is pressing, it can be reversed, as the existence of a decep-
tive copy should lead to the modification of the original signal in 
order to prevent plagiarism (Frank, 2005). An arms race between the 
true signal and its fraudulent copy should arise. For the present 
moment of our evolutionary history, the relative strengths of the true 
signals of altruism are unknown and it remains an open question 
whether and how far humans may signal their altruistic dispositions 
unmistakably so that others can reliably identify them. 
This study aims at disclosing whether humans can identify altruism 
in others via first impressions whereas it shall be highlighted that the 
crucial question is not whether humans can read signs to altruistic 
emotional states, but rather whether they can identify stable cues to 
permanent altruistic traits. While states are short-lived and presumed 
to result from direct situational factors (Spielberger, 1972), traits are 
highly enduring and “emanate from within individuals” (Allen & 
Potkay, 1981, p. 917). Being a result of distant and causal factors, 
like genes and upbringing (Fridhandler, 1986), traits may explain 
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inter-individual differences in behavioral responses to a given situa-
tion (e.g. Spielberger et al., 1973). In a situation, in which individuals 
have the choice to either act altruistically or selfishly, individuals 
with an altruistic trait can thus be expected to act prosocially. 
The question whether humans may identify altruistic traits by first 
impressions has not been answered yet. Nevertheless previous em-
pirical research hints at the ability of humans to predict altruistic 
behavior of other persons. Pradel et al. (in press) showed that school 
students are able to estimate the dictator game decisions of their 
classmates better than chance. Frank et al. (1993) as well as Brosig 
(2002) evidenced that people can predict the altruistic behavior of 
others after being acquainted for only half an hour. 
Brown et al. (2003) went a step further and investigated whether 
cooperation is predictable by first impression alone. Target persons 
were videotaped and asked to indicate their level of altruism in a self-
report. Subsequently, judges had to rate the target’s level of altruism 
on the basis of these video-clips. The judges’ ratings correlated sig-
nificantly with the self-reported altruism of target persons. However, 
this method incorporated an honest signaling problem in so far as 
self-reports of target persons might have been beautified because of 
the targets’ interest in cultivating a positive self-concept. Therefore, it 
remains unsolved in how far these results evidence the recognition of 
true rather than self-construed altruism. 
This limitation does not hold for a study by Verplaetse et al. (2007) 
who also investigated predictive cheater detection abilities on the 
basis of first impressions but used a behavioral measure to assess 
the degree of altruism. Using pictures of completely unknown target 
persons who had played a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game earlier, 
the authors asked participants to rate how cooperative these target 
persons were. Results showed that individuals could clearly differen-
tiate between cooperative and non-cooperative target persons, but 
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only if they responded to an event-related picture which was taken 
during the decision-making moment rather than when they re-
sponded to neutral pictures or event-related pictures that were taken 
during a practice round. The authors concluded that humans sub-
consciously identify cues of non-cooperativeness which consist of 
facial expressions evoked by significant social decisions. 
Summarizing these results, it seems that humans have a limited 
cheater detection module. However, in all of these studies partici-
pants could observe target persons either in or directly before the 
very moment when those grappled with the challenge of making the 
social decision in question. They thus could base their estimates on 
stimuli that entailed cues to the emotional states of the target per-
sons. It therefore remains unclear whether the accuracy of predic-
tions was supported by the identification of stable altruistic traits. 
Though these studies provided important insights to the validity of 
person perception they are not able to underpin the hypotheses of 
Miller (2000, 2007) and Frank (1988) as these authors assumed that 
humans are able to identify signals which indicate permanent altruis-
tic traits, rather than cues to emotional states. In the present study 
we exactly address Miller’s and Frank’s assumption by investigating 
whether humans are indeed able to predict the altruistic behavior of 
strangers via the identification of permanent cues to altruism. 
To test the hypothesis, we adopted the so-called “thin slices para-
digm” (Ambady et al., 2000; Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993). This para-
digm has been used to show that people are able to identify perma-
nent characteristics of others, e.g. intelligence (Borkenau, Mauer, 
Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner, 2004), sociosexuality (Gangestad, 
Simpson, DiGeronimo, & Biek, 1992), or personality disorders (Olt-
manns, Friedman, Fiedler, & Turkheimer, 2004) by watching short 
videotapes of target persons. We created silent videoclips of target 
persons lasting 20 seconds and afterwards asked them to play a 
dictator game, thereby measuring their true level of altruism. Subse-
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quently, judges were asked to watch and rate the targets’ level of 
altruism. By investigating predictions that grounded on stimulus 
material which was on the one hand completely unrelated to altruis-
tic behavior, and on the other hand recorded before the dictator game 
took place, we could check whether individuals were able to make out 
permanent signals to altruism. 
8.2. Methods  
In step 1, we invited N = 56 students of business administration to 
the laboratory, where they were videotaped sitting behind a desk and 
in front of a white wall. The target persons were asked to talk into the 
camera and briefly introduce themselves. For each target person, the 
zoom was calibrated in such a way that the face and the upper body 
could be seen on the videos. 
After being videotaped, the target persons were accompanied into a 
different room where they were left alone to fill in a questionnaire 
untroubledly. Target persons initially completed three personality 
scales, which amongst others served as distraction tasks. Afterwards, 
via the instructions target persons were familiarized with the logic of 
the dictator game without naming the game as such. Target persons 
had to imagine a situation with two individuals, a dictator and a 
recipient, in which the dictator receives a certain amount of money. 
Taking the perspective of the dictator, participants had to consider 
the distribution of the money between themselves and an unknown 
recipient. Neutral vocabulary was used all throughout the instruc-
tions to avoid influencing the participants in any possible way. For 
example, the dictator game was referred to as a “distribution task”, 
the dictator was referred to as “Person A”, and the recipient was 
named “Person B”. 
Target persons were given 60 Euro (about US $ 94) and had four 
alternatives for dividing the money: they could either give 30 Euro, 20 
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Euro, 10 Euro, or nothing to the recipient. They were told that by a 
random mechanism, one out of six of them was making the decision 
for real. They were also informed that their interaction partner was 
another randomly chosen individual who participated in the study, 
but that this recipient would never be informed about the identity of 
the dictator who was accountable for his or her outcome. The stu-
dents were asked to write a code word on their questionnaire and put 
the questionnaire into a sealed envelope. A week after the experiment 
participants could get their money at the secretary of the department 
by taking the envelope with their personal code word written upon. 
On average, the targets gave 20.17 Euro (± 11.67) to the recipient. 
Twenty-seven targets (48.2%) split the money equally (i.e., gave 30 
Euro to the recipient), 14 (25.0%) targets gave 20 Euro to the recipi-
ent, and 4 (7.1%) of them gave 10 Euro to the recipient. A substantial 
minority of 11 participants (19. 6%) decided to transfer nothing but to 
keep everything for themselves. 
In the second step, the logic of the dictator game was explained to a 
group of 34 biology students of the University of Groningen. They 
were then shown the videos of the 56 different target persons. Each 
video lasted 20 seconds and the sound was switched off during the 
whole experiment. After each video, the judges had to estimate which 
of the four alternatives the target had chosen in the dictator game. 
Under no circumstances did the judges receive feedback on the cor-
rectness of their estimates. Moreover, on inquiry it was assured that 
none of the judges knew any target persons. 
8.3. Results 
The judges' average estimates of the amount of money given by the 
dictator to the recipient differed substantially between the target 
persons, ranging from 4.40 Euro to 25.65 Euro. Combining the dif-
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ferent judges’ estimates into one single scale resulted in a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .84 (the mean inter-rater correlation was .14). 
Indeed, the judges' estimates were accurate as actual and estimated 
dictator game contributions correlated significantly (r = .41, p < .01). 
Giving z-standardized values, Figure 1 highlights this result.  
 
Fig. 2. Relationship between the actual dictator game contributions of target 
persons and the mean estimates of judges concerning the targets’ contribu-
tions. Estimates for those who contributed nothing differed significantly from 
estimates for those who contributed 10, 20, or 30 Euro. 
As can be seen, the average estimated contribution pertaining a 
person who kept all the money was more than 1 standard deviation 
lower than the average predicted contribution pertaining a person 
who divided the money equally (i.e. who transferred 30 Euro). Post 
hoc tests revealed that estimates for those who acted completely self-
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interestedly and transferred nothing differed significantly from the 
average predictions for those who belonged to the other three catego-
ries (p < .05). However, differences between the average predictions of 
the three other categories (i.e. giving either 10, 20, or 30 Euro to the 
recipient) were not significant. Figure 1 thus accentuates that judges 
performed particularly well in identifying those target persons who 
had kept all the money for themselves.  
But which cues did the judges use for their estimates? One valid cue 
could have been the sex of the target as females on average gave away 
more money than males (M = 24.61 vs. M = 16.33 Euro; t (56) = 2.81, 
p = .007). In fact, judges took this sex difference into account by 
assuming that female targets had given away more money (M = 18.67 
Euro) than males (M = 14.10 Euro) (t (56) = 3.77, p < .001). Neverthe-
less, the accuracy of the judges' estimates cannot be explained by the 
identification of this sex difference alone. A regression analysis using 
judges’ estimates as dependent variable and both the targets’ sex and 
their actual behavior as independent variables showed that both 
independent variables were significant predictors: F (2) = 9.798 (p < 
.01). The impact of gender was  = .34 (p < .01), whereas the impact 
of the targets’ actual behavior amounted to  = .29 (p < .05). 
8.4. Discussion 
Miller (2000, 2007) and Frank (1988, 2004, 2008) hypothesize that 
some humans pursue ultimate genetic self-interest through psycho-
logical adaptations that embody a genuine concern for others. If such 
individuals carry observable cues of their altruistic traits, these cues 
should be used by others in order to accurately assess strangers’ 
dispositions. Highlighting the adaptiveness of accurate person per-
ception, Gangestad et al. (1992, p. 688) remarked, “Because interac-
tions between unacquainted individuals regularly occur, the ability to 
detect certain behavioral propensities in others – sociability, trust-
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worthiness, warmth, manipulativeness, and so forth – may be highly 
functional.” 
Our study aimed at testing whether individuals are able to estimate 
the level of altruism of unacquainted target persons on the basis of 
20 seconds of silent video clips. As target persons had been video-
taped in a setting completely unrelated to altruistic behavior, it could 
be checked whether individuals were able to make out permanent 
cues to situation-independent altruistic traits. Results showed that 
individuals were indeed able to estimate the altruistic behavior of 
target persons better than chance. 
The proper identification of altruists can be advantageous in a variety 
of situations. In line with Miller (2000, 2007), the reliable detection of 
moral virtues should lead to improved assortative mating so that high 
value mates choose one another and low value mates have no chance 
but to stay among themselves. Following Frank (1988, 2004, 2008) 
the ability to identify altruistic tendencies might contribute to solve 
principal-agent problems (Grossmann & Hart, 1983) in a multiplicity 
of relationships. Principal-agent problems arise when individuals 
have to choose an interaction partner but lack information about the 
trustworthiness and potential future behavior of this person. This 
problem exists in particular when the potential interaction partner is 
completely unknown to the individual and can be supposed to have 
little commitment to behave trustworthily (Schelling, 1960). 
Only recently, Verplaetse et al. (2007) investigated whether subjects 
are sufficiently sensitive to non-cooperative cues in strangers as 
accurate judgments by first impression could help to compensate the 
commitment information deficit. Using motionless pictures of target 
persons who had played a prisoner’s dilemma game, the authors 
asked individuals to rate the cooperativeness of target persons. It was 
shown that humans indeed have some capability to differentiate 
between cooperative and non-cooperative individuals. However, this 
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effect could only be evidenced when individuals responded to pictures 
that had been taken during the moment of decision-making rather 
than when they responded to neutral pictures unrelated to the deci-
sion task. Therefore, Verplaetse et al. concluded that humans may 
pick up emotional states of target persons, but are incapable of as-
sessing permanent traits of (non-) cooperativeness. 
Against the background of research on the thin slices paradigm, 
results of Verplaetse et al. (2007) are noteworthy; as Ambady et al. 
(2000) stated, short excerpts of dynamic behavior—often no longer 
than 30 seconds—enable accurate judgments of other persons, but a 
still photograph is not sufficient as it bears no dynamic information 
on the target person. It thus seems substantial that Verplaetse et al. 
(2007) could evidence any cheater detection abilities at all. However, 
the fact that they were not able to prove the judges’ ability to read 
permanent cues to altruism on the basis of neutral pictures could 
have been due to the narrowness of cues entailed in the stimulus 
material. 
Accordingly, discrepancies between the findings in hand and those of 
Verplaetse et al. (2007) might be caused by differences in the stimu-
lus material. While Verplaetse et al. used motionless pictures, accu-
rate assessments of permanent cues to altruism in this study were 
evidenced on the basis of short excerpts of dynamic behavior. To our 
view, the present approach was valuable in terms of external validity 
because our ancestors did not stick to photos either when judging a 
stranger on the basis of first impression. 
The altruistic tendencies of our target persons were assessed via the 
dictator game. Bearing insights from the field of differential psychol-
ogy in mind, one might ask whether the dictator game as a single 
behavioral measure is favorable to assess dispositional altruism, 
which can be defined as the general tendency to behave altruistically 
in a variety of situations and on different occasions. Personality 
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psychologists tend to measure prosocial personality dispositions by 
the means of self-report scales (e.g. the dimension of agreeableness in 
the NEO-FFI by Costa & McCrae, 1998). However, from an evolution-
ary perspective this approach has to be judged critically. According to 
signaling theory, altruism is one of the characteristics where egoistic 
individuals should be motivated to disguise their true character in 
order to avoid discrimination by their social environment. Therefore, 
subjects in self-reports must be expected to deceive by stating a level 
of altruism that is above the true value. As Trivers (1991) remarked, 
deception may even generate self-deception as positive illusions 
facilitate to hide deception from others and to perform deception 
reasonably efficiently, that is, with modest cognitive cost. Therefore, 
biased self-reports may even result unintentionally. 
Using a behavioral measure rather than a personality scale thus 
seemed essential. The dictator game represented the preferable in-
strument to us, not only because it assesses actual behavior, but also 
because the specific characteristics of the paradigm, namely non-
iteration and anonymity, provide no strategic reasons to behave 
altruistically at all. Instead, altruistic behavior displayed in the dicta-
tor game may be attributed to a general preference of the actor to 
display prosocial acts. Beyond, empirical research authorizes the 
dictator game as an adequate instrument to assess altruistic traits, 
as Fetchenhauer and Huang (2004) could show that dictator game 
behavior correlates significantly with prosocial personality disposi-
tions. 
Although the judges’ estimates were far from being perfect, our data 
indicate that humans are able to predict accurately and uncon-
sciously the extent of altruistic behavior of others based on a limited 
set of dynamic cues in a very short time span. Judges performed 
especially well in identifying those target persons who kept all the 
money for themselves. This result strikingly replicates findings of 
Pradel et al. (in press). In their study, students had to assess the 
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dictator game behavior of classmates and were also most accurate in 
estimating decisions of selfishly playing peers. This seems reasonable 
from an evolutionary point of view. It is not that important to distin-
guish the nice ones from the very nice ones, but it is essential to 
identify the real egoists as not doing so can literally be lethal. 
Our results suggest that humans honestly signal altruistic disposi-
tions through cues other than their altruistic acts and that variation 
in these dispositions exists. This adds a new dimension to the study 
of the evolution of human altruism: as altruism is identifiable it 
might simply be advantageous to behave altruistically due to the 
opportunity of altruists to carefully choose like-minded individuals 
for mutual cooperation. 
In fact, individuals, when allowed to choose their partners freely, try 
to interact with those whom they expect to cooperate more (Johnson 
et al., 2008). In this vein, altruistic subjects in a public good game by 
Page, Putterman, and Unel (2005) mingled together when information 
about the contribution histories of players was given and proceeded 
to interact more productively than less cooperative coplayers did. 
Similarly, Sheldon et al. (2000) asked university freshmen to recruit 
three peers to participate in an N-person prisoner’s dilemma game 
and found that prosocial individuals tended to stick together achiev-
ing higher group-level returns than antisocial participants. Tran-
scending settings in the laboratory, the assortation of individuals 
with comparable altruistic tendencies even seems to be of importance 
in real life. Pradel, Euler, and Fetchenhauer (in press, see Chapter 9) 
could observe that students who play altruistically in a dictator game 
choose friends who behave similar to themselves. 
As this study shows that altruistic traits are already sensed after a 
very short time span, it may be possible that altruists not only be-
come choosy after a phase of shared experiences, but rather that 
interactions are selective from the very first moment of acquaintance. 
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Our findings also open a new avenue of research on the actual cues 
involved in non-verbal signaling of altruistic dispositions and raise 
the question, why these signals are reliable and thus evolutionarily 
stable. One cue, which judges in this study used, was sex. This cue 
was valid as in line with earlier studies (Eckel & Grossman, 1998), 
females indeed acted more altruistically than males did. However, as 
accuracy in judgments could not be explained by sex differences 
alone, other cues are likely to be relevant. One possibility is that the 
cues involved are involuntary facial expressions that are difficult to 
bring under voluntary control for strategic use. Even if a dishonest 
use of these cues was possible, it may be maladaptive to use them in 
this way because humans’ willingness to engage in altruistic pun-
ishment might be especially strong towards those that signal a high 
level of altruism – and then do not comply with these signals. 
Hence: You want to seem nice? Be nice! Humans possess the ability 
to recognize permanent features of altruism.  
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9. Study 2: Spotting altruistic dictator game 
players and mingling with them - The elective 
assortation of classmates2 
9.1. Introduction 
From birth to their grown-up years, humans daily interact with oth-
ers and feel a need for social attachment (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). 
The dependence of humans on their social world can be risky in 
terms of resources, reproduction and survival, if individuals choose 
the wrong interaction partners. The evolutionary perspective therefore 
suggests that humans should have developed adequate skills to judge 
other persons accurately in order to find the right lovers, friends and 
allies, but to avoid the villains (Haselton & Funder, 2006).  
One criterion for a good social interaction partner is altruism. Altru-
ism denotes an individual’s willingness to give up resources in order 
to benefit others. The evolution of altruism has puzzled scientists for 
generations and although there has been considerable progress in its 
theoretical explanation, the question how such self-detrimental be-
havior could survive the pressures of natural selection has not been 
answered unanimously. Most game theoretical models of the evolu-
tion of altruism assume random encounters between interaction 
partners (Aktipis, 2004). However, for many species, encounters with 
others are non-random. It has thus been supposed that the evolution 
of altruism may have been driven by assortation processes (Wilson & 
Dugatkin, 1997), i.e. the gathering of like-minded individuals (for a 
general overview of social selection via the cooperation between corre-
lated characters see Frank, 1998; 2006).  
                                                
2 A modified version of this chapter is currently in press in Evolution and Human 
Behavior together with Harald Euler and Detlef Fetchenhauer. 
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Consider a population with egoists and altruists. If individuals were 
really equipped with a “personality judgment instinct” (Haselton & 
Funder, 2006), they should be able to distinguish altruists from 
egoists. As altruists should have an interest in assorting themselves, 
they would leave self-interested individuals no chance but to stay 
among each other. As altruists could consequently reap extra benefits 
through mutual cooperation, the selfish advantage of egoistic indi-
viduals would be out-competed. Altruism would become adaptive as 
it would provide a long-term benefit. (West et al., 2007, have argued 
that such behavior should be termed mutualism, rather than altru-
ism.) 
Several scholars (Boorman & Levitt, 1973; Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 
1982; Frank, 1988; Peck, 1993; Wilson & Dugatkin, 1997) construed 
scenarios similar to the one outlined above, in which altruists prefer 
like-minded interaction partners against the selfish rest of the popu-
lation. To make assortation, as specified in the scenario, work as a 
driver of the evolution of altruism, two conditions have to be fulfilled: 
(1) Individuals have to be able to distinguish altruists from egoists, 
and (2) altruists have to elect like-minded individuals for mutual 
cooperation in order to reap synergetic extra benefits. The present 
study was designed to test whether these two assumptions hold true 
in a natural context, as only then assortation may reliably be invoked 
as an additional explanation for the evolution of altruism. 
As to the first condition, there is indeed evidence that humans are 
equipped with a psychological mechanism to detect cheaters in social 
interactions (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). A few studies examined 
whether humans are also capable of predicting altruistic behavior 
reliably. Frank et al. (1993) offered groups of participants the oppor-
tunity to get acquainted with each other for 30 minutes before play-
ing a prisoner’s dilemma game. Subjects were able to discuss the 
paradigm for 30 minutes and make non-binding pronouncements to 
their interaction partners about their game decision (defection or 
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cooperation). Subsequently, the participants indicated their actual 
response covertly and were asked to predict the responses of their 
counterparts. Predictions were better than chance. However, Ocken-
fels and Selten (2000) criticized these results suggesting that the 
accuracy of the predictions might have been due to the explicit pro-
nouncement of defectors. As defectors would have had little interest 
in deviating from their announced decision, predicting their behavior 
was easy. Brosig (2002), therefore, replicated the experiment under 
restricted conditions. Pre-communication sessions were filmed so 
that subjects who explicitly announced their intention to defect were 
excluded from the analysis. Accuracy of predictions exceeded chance 
level under these conditions as well.  
Going a step further, Verplaetse et al. (2007) investigated whether 
cooperation is predictable by only minimal visual information about 
the person. Subjects were shown photos of unknown target persons 
that had been taken when the target persons made a decision in a 
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, and they had to rate how coopera-
tive these target persons behaved. The subjects were able to differen-
tiate between cooperative and noncooperative target persons. 
Fetchenhauer, Groothuis, and Pradel (unpublished data) could even 
prove that subjects may predict the level of altruistic behavior on the 
basis of 20 seconds of silent video clips that were recorded in a neu-
tral setting unrelated to altruistic behavior. Thus, first impressions 
seem to give humans a clue of what kind of person they are dealing 
with. 
As to the second condition for the evolution of altruism by assorta-
tion, namely that altruists choose like-minded persons for mutual 
cooperation, assortation with respect to mating (‘assortative mating’) 
is a well established empirical phenomenon (Mascie-Taylor, 1995; 
Spuhler, 1968) that has been shown for a variety of somatic and 
psychological characteristics. The phenomenon, furthermore, exceeds 
mate choice as it has been evidenced as well for friendship (Ber-
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scheid, 1985). Sheldon et al. (2000) investigated assortative partner 
choice with particular respect to prosociality. The authors asked 
university freshmen to recruit three peers to participate in an N-
person prisoner’s dilemma game. Subjects with a prosocial value 
orientation tended to assort with one another. They thus achieved a 
group-level advantage in the game returns which counteracted the 
individual-level advantage of antisocial participants.  
In sum, data show that persons seem to be capable to predict the 
level of altruism in other persons, and moreover tend to associate 
with those persons who show a level of prosociality similar to their 
own one. Yet, the empirical evidence so far is based on laboratory 
studies with unknown ecological validity. The present study investi-
gates whether the prediction of altruistic behavior and the grouping 
of altruistically like-minded individuals holds true also in genuine 
social groups in a natural setting. School classes are such genuine 
social groups, and a study of students of different grades offers the 
opportunity to investigate the possible age-dependence of prosociality 
assessments and assortation processes.  
In school classes relationships between students vary in intensity. A 
typical student has a few friends among classmates, several she 
simply likes, and others she might dislike. Additionally, the relation-
ship to some classmates could be one of indifference. This setting, 
therefore, offers the opportunity to examine the relationship between 
social closeness and the accuracy of judgments about other students’ 
altruistic behavior. In the present study, altruistic behavior was 
operationalized as the decision in a dictator game, in which each 
student was asked to secretly divide a sum of money between himself 
or herself and another anonymous classmate. Subsequently, each 
student was asked to predict how each classmate had divided the 
money in the dictator game. We assumed that individuals might be 
better in predicting the behavior of their friends, with whom they 
have shared many experiences, than the behavior of more distant 
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persons. As to the study of assortation, the school setting further-
more allows to observe in how far students choose friends who make 
dictator game decisions like they themselves do. 
It might be noted that when making predictions about the accuracy 
of character assessments, evolutionary theory takes a position very 
different to the one represented by mainstream social psychology. The 
latter would not expect adolescents to be capable of accurately as-
sessing the behavior of their peers in such a situation as social cogni-
tion in general is regarded to be biased (Kunda, 1999). For example, 
Ross, Greene, and House (1977) described the so-called false consen-
sus effect, which is due to an individual’s unfounded assumption of 
similarity between himself and a target person. Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning (2006) showed the false consensus effect to be present in a 
variety of game-theoretical paradigms. However, the assumption of 
similarity does not always provoke a false consensus effect but may 
induce accurate predictions if the target person is indeed similar to 
the judge (Dawes & Mulford, 1966; Hoch, 1987). We shall, therefore, 
refer to this effect neutrally as ‘consensus effect’. Because the con-
sensus effect has been shown to be frequent within close relation-
ships (Schul & Vinokur, 2000), it needs to be controlled for when 
studying social perception.  
Another factor to be taken into account is the better-than-average 
effect, the pervasive tendency of individuals to assume that they are 
superior to others. This effect has been shown for a large range of 
socially desirable attributes, altruism included (Dunning, 2005). 
Therefore, persons can be expected to underestimate the trustworthi-
ness and altruism of others (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, in press). 
Both effects, the consensus effect and the better-than-average effect, 
are independent and may co-exist as individuals may base their 
predictions on their own behavior (consensus effect), while at the 
same time using a somewhat lower anchor (better-than-average 
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effect) to estimate the behavior of others (Fetchenhauer & Buunk, 
unpublished data). 
The present study tests the following three hypotheses: (1) Students 
are able to predict the level of altruistic behavior of their classmates 
in a dictator game. (2) Classmates who play altruistically in the dicta-
tor game are more often labeled as likable or as friend than egoists 
are. (3) Classmates positively assort themselves in their friendships 
along the dimension of altruism, i.e. altruists have friends who play 
altruistically, too and egoists have friends who play egoistically, too.  
9.2. Methods 
9.2.1. Participants 
Participants were 127 students (60 female, 67 male) from six secon-
dary school classes of a different grade each. Age varied from 10 to 19 
years: 5th grade (aged 10 to 11), 8th grade (aged 13 to 14), and 10th, 
11th, 12th, and 13th grade (aged 15 to 19). Size of classes varied from 
14 to 29 students. Parents had given written consent for their child’s 
participation and were debriefed after the experiment. 
9.2.2. Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in two secondary schools in Cologne, 
Germany. Sessions, one for each class, were carried out in social 
science lessons. No detailed information about the experiment was 
given to the participants in advance. In order to guarantee experi-
menter-subject anonymity, a subject number was handed out to 
every participant. To enable participants to link subject numbers to 
classmates, which was necessary for a later task, the participants 
were seated in a circle so that they could see each other with their 
subject number. This procedure assured that no real names entered 
the data sets. 
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The students were first familiarized with the logic of the dictator game 
without naming the game as such. The participants then received the 
first part of the questionnaire, which was coded with their subject 
number, and were asked to secretly mark down their own dictator 
decision. This means that they had to imagine a situation with two 
persons, a dictator and a recipient, in which the dictator receives a 
certain amount of money. Taking the perspective of the dictator, 
students had to consider the distribution of the money between 
themselves and the recipient, who was an anonymous student of the 
class. Neutral vocabulary was used all throughout the instructions to 
avoid influencing the participants in any possible way. For example, 
the dictator game was referred to as a “distribution task” and the 
dictator was referred to as “Person A” while the anonymous recipient 
was called “Person B”.  
The participants were informed that their decisions had a tangible 
consequence in that a payment would be made a week later. To main-
tain comparable incentives, the sum to be divided increased with the 
students’ age, ranging from 6 Euro (about US $ 9) in 5th grade to 10 
Euro (about US $ 15) in 13th grade. These payments corresponded 
approximately to the age-specific recommendations for allowances of 
the German youth welfare offices (Sport-, Schul- & Jugendamt 
Springe, n.d.). The participants could pass money in whatever whole-
numbered proportion they wanted, but could also keep the entire 
amount for themselves. The recipients were unknown to the partici-
pants and the participants were told that—although for the payment 
session recipients were secretly allotted to them later—they would 
never be informed about the identity of their respective classmate.  
Communication was not allowed during the whole experiment. It was 
always made clear that information on the actual behavior of any 
person could never be traced back to a face or name, neither by any 
other subject nor the experimenter, as data management and analy-
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sis for each class were made by different persons than the experi-
menter. 
After all participants had made their dictator decision, they received 
the second part of the questionnaire in which they were told that they 
now had to act as judges and assess how each of their classmates 
had decided in the preceding distribution task. The participants 
could not have expected this task when they had made their own 
dictator game decisions. For motivational reasons, it was announced 
that the participant with the most accurate predictions would win a 
ticket for the local cinema.  
For a sociometric analysis, the participants were finally asked to write 
down which of their classmates they characterized as friend, as lik-
able, or as dislikable. The participants were free to nominate as many 
classmates as they wanted for each of these three categories. 
For the purpose of payment management, half of the participants 
were randomly assigned the role of the dictator after the experiment, 
the other half the role of the recipient. Each dictator was randomly 
matched with a recipient. Resulting pairs were paid one week later 
according to the distribution chosen by the respective dictator. The 
participants received the money in a closed envelope labeled with the 
subject number. No participant obtained any information about the 
identity of the other classmate with whom they had been paired.  
9.2.3. Data preparation 
As the amount of money that had to be distributed in the dictator 
game increased with the participants’ age, payment values were 
transformed into percentages for reasons of comparability. Five out of 
127 students (3.9 %) passed more money to the recipient than they 
kept for themselves. According to Camerer (2003) dictator game 
contributions above 50 % are rare in western cultures. The fairness 
principle of equality, which demands parity of resources, would sug-
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gest contributions of 50 % but nothing more. So would the equity 
rule, which demands a division of resources according to effort. Since 
both students, the dictator and the recipient, expended the same—
namely none—effort in the acquisition of this money, an equal split 
would have been suggested. Thus it could not be ruled out that out-
liers who passed more than 50 % might have misunderstood the 
experiment, especially since all these five participants were from 
lower grades. For this reason, these five participants were excluded 
from all further analyses. In order to maintain consistency, those 
3.7 % of the predictions in which students had expected their class-
mates to keep less than 50 % for themselves were excluded as well. 
However, results were only minimally influenced by these exclusions. 
For the sociometric analysis the participants had been asked to clas-
sify their relations to every other classmate according to three levels 
of social closeness: friendship, liking, or dislike. Because students 
were free to make as many nominations as they wanted, some inter-
individual relations were not classified at all. These relations were 
consequently labeled as ‘indifferent’. As class size varied, relationship 
nominations between students of different classes were incomparable 
(i.e. the number of nominations was likely to depend on the number 
of students in the relevant class). Thus, relationship nominations 
were transformed into relative values taking into account the possible 
number of nominations that could be made in the respective class. 
Two sets of data were created. Data set 1 comprised 122 cases, one 
for each participant, with information about the participants’ own 
decision in the dictator game, their average prediction concerning 
others, how the behavior of the participants was predicted on average 
by their classmates, and the relative number of nominations of 
friendship, liking, and dislike each individual received. In data set 2 
each case represented a single prediction from one student (judge) 
concerning another (target). As students were asked to predict all 
their classmates’ behavior, (ni – 1) predictions were received from 
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each judge, where n refers to the number of students in the respec-
tive class. A total of 2437 cases were obtained from all six classes. 
Moreover, data set 2 included information on the nature of the rela-
tionship between each judge and the respective object (i.e. the level of 
social closeness).  
9.3. Results 
9.3.1.  Actual and predicted dictator game contributions 
Participants on average contributed 37.3 % towards the other person. 
The largest fraction (49 % of the participants) handed half of the 
money to Person B. A total of 8 % of the participants kept the entire 
amount for themselves, while 43 % made a contribution in-between. 
Participants slightly underestimated the altruism of their classmates 
as the average predicted contribution amounted to 34.0 % (t (122) = 
3.09, p < .01, d = 0.24).  
Girls acted more altruistically (contribution of 42.1 %, ± 11.6) than 
boys (32.8 %, ± 18.1, t (122) = -3.39; p < .001; d = 0.61). This sex 
difference was reflected by the participants’ predictions about their 
classmates, as girls were predicted to make higher contributions than 
boys (37.9 %, ± 6.4 versus 30.0 %, ± 9.4, t (122) = -5.36; p < .001; d = 
0.98).  
9.3.2. The ability to estimate the altruistic behavior of 
others 
Our first hypothesis stated that students are able to estimate the 
level of altruistic behavior of their classmates in the dictator game. 
Because every participant rated every other participant, predictions 
were non-independent. Moreover, the variance of individual predic-
tions could be assumed to be partly attributable to class member-
ship. To control for these facts, a method developed by Warner, 
Kenny, & Stoto (1979) was used. The average prediction of several 
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individuals concerning a single student was adjusted so that the 
effects of repeatedly occurring judges and class-membership were 
sorted out (see Appendix A). These adjusted average predictions were 
z-transformed for reasons of clarity and comprehensibility.  
We explored the relationship between actual contribution and ad-
justed average predictions by a partial correlation analysis controlling 
for class membership. This was necessary as the variance of actual 
contributions was affected by class membership, too. Five dummies 
were created, one for each class, with class 5 as the reference cate-
gory. The average prediction of a target’s behavior indeed correlated 
with her actual behavior (r = .39, p < .001, one-tailed) showing that 
students were able to predict the dictator game behavior of their 
classmates better than chance. This result persisted when the tar-
get’s sex was controlled for (partial r = .31, p < .001, one-tailed) indi-
cating that classmates were able to make out those variations in the 
degree of altruistic behavior that went beyond differences due to the 
sex of the target. To highlight this result, we trichotomized the actual 
dictator game behavior into three categories: egoistic behavior (no 
contribution), moderate altruistic behavior (0 % < contribution < 50 
%) and altruistic behavior (contribution = 50 %). As can be seen in 
Figure 1, the effect of classified actual dictator contributions was 
highly significant [F (2, 119) = 9.27, p <.001]. The average predicted 
contribution pertaining a person who kept all the money was more 
than 1.5 standard deviations lower than the average predicted contri-
bution pertaining a person who transferred 50 %. Post hoc tests 
revealed that the average predictions for those students who had 
contributed nothing differed significantly from the average predictions 
for those who belonged to the altruistic categories. However, average 
predictions for moderate altruistic contributions (0 % < c < 50 %) and 
altruistic contributions (50 %) did not differ significantly from each 
other. Figure 1 thus accentuates that students performed particularly 
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well in spotting those classmates who had kept all the money for 
themselves.  
 
Fig. 3. The average prediction of classmates concerning the dictator game 
behavior of a target (n = 122) depending on the target’s actual contribution in 
the dictator game. Prediction values are adjusted for non-independence due to 
class-membership and repeatedly occurring judges and targets. 
Having focused on the analysis of average reputation so far, we now 
wanted to find out whether individual predictions concerning the 
behavior of an object were a good indicator for actual behavior, too. 
We thus repeated our analysis by using data set 2, in which a single 
prediction (again adjusted for non-independence of cases, see Appen-
dix A) of one student concerning the behavior of another was treated 
as the unit. Students’ individual predictions matched the behavior of 
their classmates significantly better than chance (r = .21, p < .001, 
one-tailed). The match was maintained when the target’s sex was 
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partialled out (partial r = .16, p < .001, one-tailed). Thus, the hy-
pothesis that persons are able to identify altruistic disposition in 
classmates was confirmed. 
9.3.3. The social appraisal of altruism  
Our second hypothesis was that classmates who distribute the 
money evenly in the dictator game are more often labeled as likable or 
as friend than egoists are. To test this, we initially explored the rela-
tion between the number of received liking nominations and the 
individual’s level of altruism. The correlation was slightly positive 
with class membership and sex partialled out (partial r = .14, p = .07, 
one-tailed). Likewise, the effect of altruism on received dislike nomi-
nations was slightly negative (partial r = -.12, p = .10, one-tailed). As 
to the question of whether altruists had more friends than egoists, 
the correlation between the number of received friendship nomina-
tions and altruism was not significant (partial r = -.08, p = .20, one-
tailed). Summarizing these results, the hypothesis that individuals 
who share the money are more popular than individuals who keep 
everything for themselves could not be confirmed. 
9.3.4. The assortation of altruists 
The third hypothesis claimed that classmates positively assort them-
selves along the dimension of altruism. To test this, we investigated 
the relationship between the dictator contributions of friendship 
nominators and the contributions of their friendship nominees which 
correlated significantly with each other (partial r = .21, p = .01, one-
tailed), with class membership partialled out. The correlation per-
sisted when controlling for sex (partial r = .19, p = .02, one-tailed) 
which excludes the explanation of an artifact due to sex-specificity of 
friendship dyads, namely that altruistic girls are friends with altruis-
tic girls and self-interested boys are friends with self-interested boys. 
Thus, our hypothesis that altruists choose like-minded persons as 
friends was confirmed. 
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9.3.5. Accuracy of predictions and grade 
In order to investigate the relationship between the accuracy of pre-
dictions and grade, a variable was needed which indicated the quality 
of predictions of every individual. For this purpose, the individual 
accuracy rate of each participant was calculated by correlating the 
predictions of judges with the actual behavior of their respective 
targets. A total of 122 correlation coefficients resulted which can be 
considered to be individual accuracy rates. However, a relationship 
between the individual accuracy rates and grade could not be proven 
(r = .10, p = .30, one-tailed). Younger students performed as well as 
older students in predicting their classmates’ decisions. 
9.3.6. Accuracy of predictions and social closeness 
We further aimed at finding out whether the level of social closeness 
between two persons (i.e. friendship, liking, dislike, indifference) 
influenced the accuracy of their predictions. Of all 2437 dyadic rela-
tionships, 17 % were mutual friends (both participants nominated 
each other as friends). Mutual liking occurred in 10 % of the dyads, 
mutual dislike in 8 %, and mutual indifference in 10 %. The remain-
ing dyads (55 %) were mixed relationship declarations (e.g. Person A 
declared friendship and Person B declared liking) which were ex-
cluded for further analyses.  
Accuracy rates (correlations between actual behavior and predictions) 
for the four relationship types are shown in Table 1 (complete sub-
samples). The accuracy of predictions varied with social closeness 
and was highest for mutual friendships, followed by dislike relation-
ships and finally mutual liking relationships. The accuracy of predic-
tions of unrelated individuals was lowest and reached chance level 
only. Thus, students were most accurate when they judged friends 
and individuals they disliked.  
Dyads had been treated as independent cases until now. However, 
some dyads were connected such that one of the dyad members 
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occurred repeatedly (e.g. because he or she was a mutual friend with 
more than one person). Hence, the present sub-samples could be 
construed as asymmetric Social Relations Model designs whose esti-
mation is complex (Kenny, Cashy, & Cook, 2008). We refrained from 
controlling for the interconnections between cases as any corrections 
should have had no influence on effect sizes but on standard errors 
only. Yet, the stability of social closeness effects on accuracy of pre-
dictions was tested under tightened conditions so that every dyad 
member only appeared once. Cases were randomly selected which 
means that if a person was a friend with two other individuals, only 
one of these dyadic relationships was included in the sample of mu-
tual friends via random sampling. As it can be seen in Table 1 (ran-
dom parts of sub-samples), accuracy rates were still significant for 
friendships and dislike-relations. Accuracy rates for liking-relations 
and indifferent peers were not significant. These results were compa-
rable to those of the complete samples: individuals judged those 
persons best to whom they had a decided opinion—being either posi-
tive or negative. The following analyses were thus based on the com-
plete samples, treating predictions of individuals as independent 
ones.  
Relationship 
Complete 
sub-samples 
 Random parts 
of sub-samples 
 
 
n 
Accuracy 
of prediction 
 
n 
Accuracy 
of prediction 
Mutual friendship 418 .34 **a  52 .35 **a 
Mutual liking 246 .11 *  b  51 .16     a 
Mutual dislike 186 .18 **a,b  41 .30 *  a 
Mutual indifference 274 -.07     c  35 .09     a 
Table 1: Accuracy of prediction for different types of relationships (Pearson 
correlation coefficients). Note. Correlation coefficients that do not share 
subscripts differ significantly at p < .05. n = number of predictions. 
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In the analysis so far, the influence of a possible consensus effect had 
not been controlled for. The potential influence of a consensus effect 
can be seen in Table 2 which shows that individuals who disliked 
each other behaved differently in the dictator game, whereas mutual 
friends behaved alike. The high accuracy rates for friends could thus 
have been driven by a consensus effect. 
Relationship N Objective similarity 
Mutual friendship 209 .16 **a 
Mutual liking 123 .09     a 
Mutual dislike 93 -.22 *  b 
Mutual indifference 137 .08     a 
Table 2: Actual similarity between dyad members (Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients). Note. Correlation coefficients that do not share subscripts differ 
significantly at p < .05. N = number of dyads. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
To find out how much of the reported accuracy rates in dyads was 
really due to the judge’s explicit ability to identify the object’s level of 
altruism (“true accuracy”) and how much of the prediction was due to 
bias in form of a consensus effect, the model of Kenny and Acitelli 
(2001) for the simultaneous measure of accuracy effect and consen-
sus effect was applied (see Appendix B). Note that subsequently the 
term accuracy effect denotes the proportion of variance within predic-
tions due to true accuracy and the term overall accuracy denotes the 
correlation between predictions and actual behavior of targets which 
had been given in Table 1. 
For all types of relationships, Table 3 shows which proportion of the 
predictions was due to the observers’ distinct ability to identify altru-
ists (accuracy effects) and which proportion was due to bias (consen-
sus effects). Predictions were indeed inflated considerably by the 
consensus effect for all relationships. However, under control of the 
consensus effect true accuracy could be proved for friends and dis-
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like-relations. Thus, the hypothesis that altruistic behavior can truly 
be predicted was at least confirmed for these two groups.  
Relationship N Accuracy effects Consensus effects 
Mutual friendship 209 .28***a .58***a 
Mutual liking 123 .10      b .40***b 
Mutual dislike 93 .27***a,b .34***b 
Mutual indifference 137 .05      a,b  .53***a,b 
Table 3: Accuracy and consensus effects (unstandardized regression coeffi-
cients). Note. Regression coefficients in the same column that do not share 
subscripts differ significantly at p < .05. N = number of dyads, *** p < .001. 
To analyze how the concurrence of accuracy and consensus effects 
contributed to overall accuracy rates, the correlations between actual 
and predicted contributions were decomposed into true accuracy and 
the increment due to bias. As can be seen in Table 4, mutual friends 
benefited from the consensus effect as they had made identical dicta-
tor contributions. In contrast, the overall accuracy of individuals who 
disliked one another was reduced as they, too, assumed similarity, 
which did not actually exist. Predictions of individuals who liked one 
another were mainly driven by true accuracy, though a positive im-
pact of the consensus effect could be shown nonetheless. For unre-
lated individuals a decomposition of the overall accuracy rate was 
impossible as overall accuracy was insignificant.  
Relationship N r True 
accuracy 
Increment due to 
consensus effect 
Mutual friendship 209 .34 .25 .09 
Mutual liking 123 .11 .08 .03 
Mutual dislike 93 .18 .25 -.07 
Mutual indifference 137 -.07 n.a. n.a. 
Table 4: Partitioning of the overall accuracy correlations (r). Note. As the 
accuracy correlation for mutual indifferences was insignificant, the validity of 
the decomposition could not be assured. N = number of dyads. 
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To summarize, beyond the consensus effect a true ability to identify 
altruists could be demonstrated. Biased overall accuracy but also 
true accuracy was highest for friends and disliked persons, indicating 
that predictions were more valid when the judge had a firm attitude 
towards the object, be this attitude positive or negative, than when 
the attitude was one of indifference or just acceptance.  
9.4. Discussion  
The purpose of the present study was to test the hypotheses that (1) 
individuals are able to predict the level of altruistic behavior in a 
dictator game of individuals familiar to them, (2) individuals who play 
altruistically in the dictator game are judged more positively than 
egoists and have more friends than egoists, and (3) that individuals 
positively assort themselves in their friendships along the dimension 
of altruism. Hypotheses 1 and 3 were supported. Individuals are able 
to identify altruism, and altruists preferably choose other altruists for 
mutual cooperation. Hypothesis 2 could not be answered unambigu-
ously as judgments of affection concerning target persons only mar-
ginally correlated with their degree of altruism. Furthermore we 
wanted to explore the influence of age and social closeness on the 
validity of social perception. While the accuracy of predictions was 
linked to social closeness, it was independent of age. 
Accuracy of predictions was measured by asking subjects to predict 
the dictator contributions of their classmates. This task can be con-
sidered demanding for the participants as Dunning et al. (1990) 
showed that accurate predictions of someone’s behavior strongly 
depend on the availability of two types of information: A judge needs 
to have accurate information about the exact nature of the situation 
confronting the target and about the target’s construal or under-
standing of the situation at the point the target must respond. Even 
though participants had precise information on the objective features 
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of the situation, as they all took part in the same anonymous dictator 
game, they still needed to accurately anticipate the meaning of this 
situation from the individual perspective of each classmate. This was 
likely to be a difficult task as it has to be presumed that students 
might have interpreted the situation in different ways.  
Following Hagen and Hammerstein (2006), cues of the degree of 
reputational consequences in economic games are processed in a 
manner that may be intuitive or affective and thus cognitively im-
penetrable. Admittedly, our experimental setting, in which we seated 
participants in a circle to enable them to link classmates with subject 
numbers, might have created a context that students perceived as 
partly public, despite the explicit propositional information in the 
instructions of the dictator game, which announced that anonymity 
would always be guaranteed.  
There is evidence that removing anonymity from economic games 
increases individuals’ contributions to a public good (Andreoni & 
Petrie, 2004). Moreover, it has been shown that already subtle cues of 
observability, namely images of eyespots, affect generosity (Burnham 
& Hare, 2007; Haley & Fessler, 2005). It can be assumed that par-
ticipants who behaved strictly egoistically when sitting face-to-face 
with their classmates almost surely would have behaved equally 
egoistically if anonymity had been even more certain. Per contra, it 
must be presumed that the behavior of those who transferred money 
could have been partly evoked by cues of publicity which activated 
evolutionarily relevant psychological mechanisms that manage repu-
tation independent of explicit reasoning.  
Observed altruistic behavior in the non-iterated anonymous dictator 
game, therefore, cannot unconditionally be interpreted as ‘pure’ 
altruism in the sense that it was independent of reputation manage-
ment efforts. It rather seems plausible that there were some individu-
als who were strongly inclined to manage their reputations and coop-
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erated because they perceived the experimental situation as public 
and thus followed rules which are rational in their everyday life 
(McKenzie, 2003), while there were others who were intrinsically 
motivated to behave altruistically regardless of the specification of the 
situation.  
With reference to the accuracy of predictions, we do not know 
whether participants’ predictions grounded on the exact assessment 
of the extent to which a participant perceived the situation as private 
or public and acted accordingly, but nevertheless students were able 
to predict with some accuracy how their classmates would behave. So 
whatever the level of anonymity that was perceived by an actor, it 
seems reasonable to assume that either the same level of anonymity 
factored into his or her predictions about others’ behavior or—even 
more elaborate—that he or she made predictions about how the 
respective target person would interpret and thus act in this ambigu-
ous situation. In any event, individuals were able to estimate their 
classmates decisions to some extent and they performed especially 
well in predicting egoistic decisions. This can be considered adaptive 
because altruistic persons should always—irrespective of their intrin-
sic or extrinsic motivation—be favored over egoists as cooperation 
partners. 
The average dictator contribution of students in our study amounted 
to 37 %. As Camerer (2003) reported, the mean dictator contribution 
of adults generally ranges from 20 % to 40 %. In a study by 
Takezawa, Gummerum, & Keller (2006) mean dictator contributions 
of 11- to 14-year-olds amounted to 44 %. Thus, the level of contribu-
tions in our study is similar to that of earlier studies. Moreover, our 
results replicate the findings of Harbaugh, Krause, and Liday (2003) 
that the dictator contributions of children and adults are comparable. 
Benenson, Pascoe, and Radmore (2007) suggested that even young 
children have biologically based altruistic dispositions which are 
additionally fostered by socialization practices. In line with earlier 
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studies (Eckel & Grossman, 1998), females in our study acted slightly 
more altruistically than males did. 
Although the participants succumbed to the better-than-average 
effect and underestimated the absolute level of dictator contributions 
of their classmates, they correctly differentiated between the altruistic 
behavior of boys and girls in that they predicted girls to pass a higher 
amount than boys. As to the relative accuracy of predictions, the 
students performed well as the variation of average predictions 
matched the variation of actual behavior. Individual predictions, too, 
were significantly better than chance. Moreover, the students did not 
base their predictions on sex alone, as it could be shown that over 
and above the ability to differentiate between altruistic tendencies of 
boys and girls, students took into account the variation of altruism 
within both sexes. Thus, adolescents are indeed able to distinguish 
self-interested individuals from altruists.  
The accuracy of predicting dictator contributions did not increase 
with grade; 11-year-olds performed as well as 19-year-olds. This 
result seems especially noteworthy when one considers that the 19-
year-old participants had known each other for up to nine years, 
while the youngest students had only been acquainted for several 
months. Moreover, in a follow-up-study we could show that even 9-
year-old children achieve comparable outcomes (Pradel & Fetchen-
hauer, unpublished data). As recent results indicate, infants as 
young as 6 months can take into account an individual's helping or 
hindering actions towards others by evaluating this individual as 
appealing or aversive (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). The early 
development of capabilities to evaluate the prosocial behavior of 
others as well as their developmental stability support the proposition 
that the ability to evaluate altruistic dispositions in others is not 
primarily dependent on general learning or general socialization 
experiences, but is the result of biological adaptation. 
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Although altruistic students favored like-minded persons as friends, 
altruists were not generally favored as interaction partners. Liking 
and antipathy nominations only marginally correlated with the degree 
of altruism. Moreover, altruists and egoists had a comparable num-
ber of friends. This finding contradicts the hypothesis about the 
popularity of altruistic players. However, it should be mentioned that 
these German students nominated on average only three classmates 
as friends. The term ‘friend’ is used quite selectively in Germany and 
more equivalent to the term ‘best friend(s)’ in English-speaking coun-
tries. With the benefit of hindsight, one might wonder whether the 
hypothesis that egoists are spurned in general was justified as it is 
not actually generated from the models of assortation which we inves-
tigated. For example, Frank (1988) did not suggest that egoists do not 
have friends at all. He supposed instead that altruists preferentially 
cooperate with other altruists, and this supposition is indeed sup-
ported by our data. Nevertheless, it seems understandable that ego-
ists have friends, too. They just choose or get friends who are less 
altruistic than friends of altruists. 
Predictions about the dictator contribution of a friend were more valid 
than predictions about the contributions of liked and unrelated 
classmates, as can be expected from the intensity of communication 
and interaction in friendships. Interestingly, the overall accuracy for 
predicting the dictator contribution of disliked classmates was high 
as well and did not differ significantly from the accuracy of predicting 
the behavior of friends. When controlling for the consensus effect a 
similar pattern emerged. True accuracy was highest when students 
evaluated friends, but similar levels of true accuracy were reached for 
the evaluation of explicitly disliked persons. In ancestral environ-
ments, a valid evaluation of exactly these two groups must have 
conferred fitness benefits. Persons ought to know about the true 
intentions of their best friends as they are interacting with them 
regularly and are thus highly dependent on correct assessments of 
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their characters. People should further be aware of the intentions of 
disliked individuals, that is, those with different interests, because 
they are potential adversaries. However, we have to admit that the 
direction of causation could be the opposite. It could be that indi-
viduals befriend those who they believe to have good intentions (and 
who truly have good intentions) whereas they dislike those who they 
believe to have evil intentions (and who indeed have evil intentions). 
In sum, our study shows that humans—although succumbing to 
some well-known biases of social perception—are able to predict 
altruistic or self-interested behavior of others, and that they moreover 
tend to assort themselves in their friendships along the dimension of 
altruism. Speculating about the consequences of these findings, it 
seems reasonable to expect that altruists, who mingle electively with 
each other, reach extra benefits through mutual cooperation. As 
these benefits may counteract the individual advantage of egoists, it 
can be assumed that altruism may have evolved due to assortation 
processes between altruists who acknowledged each other’s coopera-
tive tendencies. 
Our empirical results thus support the theories of assortation and 
complements findings on various mechanisms which have probably 
contributed to the evolution of altruism, like reciprocity (Trivers, 
1971), social norms and punishment (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002, 2003), to name only a few. We therefore think that 
this study adds a small but important piece to solve the puzzle of 
human altruism.  
Although the ability to spot altruists was proven, the exact nature of 
cues to altruism remains unknown. Frank (1988) argued that altru-
ism is motivated by moral emotions. Drawing on the fact that emo-
tions are linked to nonverbal behavior and involuntary facial expres-
sions (Darwin, 1872), which are difficult to produce on command 
(Ekman, 1985), altruism might have been signaled through emotional 
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displays. However, as this explanation is rather vague, future re-
search is needed to open the black box of processes underlying the 
intuitive assessment of altruism. But the conclusion stands that 
persons can predict the altruistic behavior of acquaintances and that 
they draw consequences from their insights. Birds of feather flock 
together—so do altruists. 
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10. Study 3: Partner in life or one-night stand? - 
How reproductive strategies might have 
shaped the evolution of altruism 
10.1. Introduction 
Moral virtues have been an inspiring phenomenon for two groups of 
evolutionary psychologists: for those who investigate their relevance 
as mate choice criteria (for a cross-cultural longitudinal analysis see 
Buss, Shackelford, Kirkpatrick & Larsen, 2001), and for those who 
try to explain their phylogenetic roots (e.g. de Waal, 2008; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003; Hamilton, 1964; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Trivers, 
1971). Usually, the two lines of research rarely interact with each 
other as can be seen from the fact that within textbooks they tend to 
form completely isolated chapters. The present paper aims at inte-
grating the two research lines by arguing that theories of mate selec-
tion might help solving the puzzle of the evolution of altruism. To 
specify, it is investigated whether prosocial virtues might have 
evolved because people look out for them when searching for a part-
ner in life as distinguished from a one-night stand. 
Research on mate preferences shows that moral traits like kindness, 
fidelity, sympathy, and prosociality are sexually attractive (Miller, 
2007) and form the top criteria for mate choice in both sexes and 
across cultures (e.g. Buss, 1989). These preferences are not only 
reflected by interviewees’ statements on research questionnaires, but 
can also be recognized in single’s ads where lonely hearts all over the 
world advertise and seek moral qualities (e.g. Oda, 2001; Koziel & 
Pawlowski, 2003). The appreciation of morality as a partner criterion 
is comprehensible as high virtue individuals are likely to take interest 
in their partner’s happiness and well-being and—considering family 
planning—can be expected to take care of potential off-spring (Miller, 
2007).  
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But why do humans behave prosocially at all? Indeed, since the time 
of Darwin, evolutionary scholars have been harassed by this ques-
tion. The principle of natural selection expects individuals to behave 
in ways that increase their own fitness (i.e. their chances of survival 
and reproduction), and not that of others. But by behaving altruisti-
cally, individuals reduce their own fitness, e.g. they share food and 
hazard starvation. They thus put themselves at a selective disadvan-
tage as opposed to individuals who behave selfishly and risk their 
own extinction. So how could altruism evolve, and why has it not 
been eliminated by natural selection?  
Evolutionary scientists have developed ranges of theories to elucidate 
parts of the puzzle including the most important ones of kin altruism 
(Hamilton, 1964), which explains altruism towards blood relatives, 
and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), which shows that prosocial 
behavior is useful whenever individuals can expect to be rewarded by 
their beneficiaries at a later time. But despite the merits of all those 
theories, one question has not been answered yet: if altruism is 
strictly beneficial in specific situations (e.g. if the relationship en-
dures and people can expect to be rewarded), why do people consid-
erably differ in their levels of altruism?  
The present work intends to give additional insights to the evolution 
of altruism by drawing particular attention to the explanation of 
inter-individual variations in altruistic tendencies. It is supposed that 
prosocial personality traits might have evolved as a response to de-
mands on the mating market. Singles who explicitly search the mat-
ing market for long-term partners, rather than short-term affairs, are 
likely to look out for moral virtues. It is moreover suggested that 
inter-individual variations in the supply of prosociality might be due 
to persons’ inter-individual variations in other qualities. For example, 
people might increase their level of morality to compensate for deficits 
such as physical unattractiveness. As it will be suggested in the 
following, individuals who are seeking for a partner adjust their mate 
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preferences for prosociality as well as their preferences for long-term 
as opposed to short-term relationships according to their own mate 
value and the environmental challenges they are confronted with 
(Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). 
From an evolutionary point of view, mating has two basic functions: 
successful reproduction and child raising. The crucial point within 
the mating game is that men and women differ in their reproduction 
rates (Trivers, 1972). While for men a single sexual intercourse may 
suffice, the minimum effort for women includes pregnancy and, at 
least in pre-modern cultures, a compulsory period of breastfeeding. 
Moreover, women show a higher level of parental care than their male 
partners (Low, 1989; Kroska, 2003).  
Because women cannot increase their reproduction rate significantly 
by obtaining more mates, they have to concentrate on quality instead 
of quantity to maximize their reproductive output. And the key to 
conceiving and raising high-quality children is to invest in a commit-
ted long-term relationship with a mate who possesses both good 
parenting abilities and good genes (Wilson, 1978). While good parent-
ing abilities are signaled via general tendencies for prosocial behavior 
(Miller, 2007), research shows that good genes are reliably signaled 
via signs of physical attractiveness like facial symmetry and average-
ness (Rhodes, 2006). Moreover, skin quality, hair quality, or a good 
set of teeth are hints to a person’s age and his or her current and 
lifetime health and thus inform about genetic quality likewise (Sugi-
yama, 2005). It is no wonder that the fairy tale prince of whom 
women dream is therefore characterized by two qualities: virtue (as 
good parent indicator) and handsomeness (as good genes indicator). 
However, there is one dilemma: men, in contrast to women, are able 
to enhance their reproduction rate by inseminating large numbers of 
females. To maximize the number of offspring, it pays males to be 
“hasty, fickle, and undiscriminating” (Wilson, 1978, p.129) in that 
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they should strive for frequent short-term mating in form of premari-
tal sex, one-night-stands, and short affairs. And indeed, men report 
desiring four times as many sexual partners as women do (Buss & 
Schmitt, 1993). But if aggressiveness and assertiveness in short-term 
mating is the best strategy for men to maximize the number of mates, 
why do only some men invest in fleeting sexual encounters? 
By far not every man is blessed with the natural gift of attracting 
numerous women as sexual partners without the need of committing 
himself to a long-term relationship. The theory of strategic pluralism 
by Gangestad & Simpson (2000) thus states that less attractive men, 
forced by the mate preferences of choosy women, have to show high 
commitment and prosocial behavior in order to obtain one long-term 
partner and raise joint children. At this point, the argumentation 
conveys how mate choice might have contributed to the evolution of 
altruism: although prosocial behavior is costly, for some men it might 
have been a wretched necessity to obtain access to females and to 
reproduce. 
But, “misery loves company” and women are likewise restricted in 
mate choice, as they face difficulties to acquire a partner who is both 
highly attractive and highly prosocial, i.e. kind, understanding, car-
ing, generous, trusty, etc. (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). Empirical 
findings show that men’s physical attractiveness is positively corre-
lated with unrestricted sociosexuality (i.e. the willingness and ability 
to engage in multiple short-term affairs), and that unrestricted soci-
osexuality again is negatively correlated with capacity for close rela-
tionships, warmth, responsibility, and trustworthiness (Simpson et 
al., 2004). Women are thus forced to trade off between a man’s at-
tractiveness and his prosocial virtues. According to Gangestad and 
Simpson (2000) women should cope with this conflict by choosing 
their mates in accord with their own qualities as well as the environ-
mental challenges they are confronted with. If the environment is 
harsh and/or a woman is weak and in particular need of a partner’s 
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support, she should neglect physical attractiveness but should focus 
on men’s prosociality and engage in a long-term relationship. Con-
versely, if the environment is temperate and/or the woman is a com-
petent provider herself, she should focus on attractiveness (i.e. ge-
netic quality) and should be willing to engage in (extra-pair) short-
term relationships with highly attractive men, although this includes 
the risk of loosing her primary less attractive mate as a long-term 
benefactor.  
This extra-pair short-term mating with an attractive man can be 
especially profitable when women reach the fertile days of their men-
strual cycle, as they might be able to lay a high-quality cuckoo’s egg 
in their long-term partner’s high-quality nest (Benshoof & Thornhill, 
1979). Empirical results show that women’s sexual interest near 
ovulation reflects this opportunity. In their fertile days, women have a 
higher tendency to dress up (Haselton, Mortezaie, & Pillsworth, 2007) 
and to engage in extra-pair flirtation (Haselton & Gangestad, 2006). 
Moreover, ovulating women against non-ovulating women prefer more 
competitive men (Gangestad, Garver-Apgar, & Simpson, & Cousins 
2007) and the scent of men with more masculine and symmetrical 
faces (Thornhill & Gangestad, 1999). All these attributes are cues to 
good genes (Rhodes, 2006; Scheyd, Garver-Apgar, & Gangestad, 
2008) and it seems that women tend use them in their fertile days to 
get the best semen available. 
Summing up, the theory of strategic pluralism suggests that men just 
like women are likely to possess psychological mechanisms which 
make them susceptible to both short-term and long-term mating.  
When looking for a long-term partner, women should be highly inter-
ested in finding a good and prosocial provider. This suggestion is 
supported by empirical findings of Brase (2006) who showed that 
cues of a positive disposition for parental investment (e.g. caring 
behavior towards babies or an elderly person) increase women’s 
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evaluations of male attractiveness for romantic relationships. By 
contrast, when looking for a short-term partner, women should be 
primarily interested in genetic quality, which is signaled through 
physical attractiveness; prosociality should be a nonsignificant crite-
rion for short-term mate choice.  
Indeed, research of Kelly and Dunbar (2001) supports the idea of 
varying female mate preferences as a function of intends for either 
short-term or long-term relationships. The scholars asked female 
subjects to rate personality profiles of men and found that altruism 
was deemed essential in long-term relationships, while in short-term 
relationships bravery was much more important. In a recent study of 
Gangestad et al. (2007), women watched video-clips of men who had 
been interviewed for a potential lunch date. The women rated the 
desirability of each man both as a long-term and as a short-term 
mate. A second sample of women rated each man on ten broad di-
mensions preferred in long-term and/or short-term mates. Results 
showed that good partnership/parenting indicators (i.e., faithfulness, 
warmth, intelligence, potential to be a good father, potential for fi-
nancial success) predicted men’s long-term desirability, while good 
genes indicators (i.e., arrogance, confrontativeness, muscularity, and 
physically attractiveness) predicted short-term desirability. Providing 
additional evidence, Kruger, Fisher and Jobling (2003) showed that in 
hypothetical scenarios, which were based on passages of British 
romantic literature, females preferred proper (i.e. law-abiding, com-
passionate, kind, and monogamous) heroes for long-term relation-
ships while they were more likely to choose dark (i.e. dominant, 
rebellious, frequently a criminal, and often promiscuous) heroes as 
partners the shorter the relationship under consideration. 
Turning the focus to long-term preferences of men, we suppose that 
they will try to find someone loyal and prosocial just like women do. 
Indeed, Li and Kenrick (2006) evidenced that one of men’s main 
criteria for choosing long-term mates is kindness. This preference 
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seems to be adaptive, as men who commit themselves to a long-term 
partner, should be interested in avoiding women who are likely to 
conceive by another man and might even pass of a bastard child as 
theirs (Buss & Schmitt, 1993) 
With regard to short-term preferences, empirical research proofs that 
men prioritize physical attractiveness against all other values (e.g. Li 
and Kenrick, 2006). But does this mean that men neglect prosociality 
in potential short-term mates? Until now, this question has not been 
studied, but indeed, we hypothesize that this is the case. Men who 
invest in short-term mating intend to quit the relationship soon. 
However, they should be interested in the survival of potential off-
spring resulting from the sexual intercourse. One might assume that 
just because of that, men look out for prosocial women who promise 
to personify caring single mothers. But we deny this option. However 
caring a woman is, her prosociality will be useless if she gives birth to 
unhealthy children and is to weak to pull her progeny through with-
out male support. We therefore think that men are only looking out 
for attractiveness in short-term mates. As far as we can see, this 
supposition is braced by literature and art, as god’s gift to men has 
traditionally been illustrated as a slinky vamp – a creature with the 
genetic quality to survive solitarily but with no cue to warm-
heartedness. 
One might recognize that our hypothesis that men trade of prosocial-
ity with attractiveness implies that women correspond to men in that 
their prosociality is negatively correlated with their physical attrac-
tiveness as well as their willingness to invest in a short-term relation-
ship. This assumption is feasible as women who view themselves as 
physically attractive were evidenced to be higher in unrestricted 
sociosexuality and women who are unrestricted in sociosexuality 
were shown to be less agreeable, not moralistic, and ethically incon-
sistent (Simpson et al., 2004).  
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To summarize, the present study explores the connection between 
mating strategies (i.e. long-term versus short-term mating) and mate 
preferences (attractiveness versus prosociality). By investigating both 
sexes and experimentally varying information on prosociality within 
potential sexual partners, we sought to extend previous research on 
mate choice criteria, which largely focused on females’ preferences 
and mainly consisted of surveys or scenario studies. We presented 
short video-clips of target persons to a group of judges of the opposite 
sex and additionally gave information on the targets’ prosociality by 
announcing how each of the target persons had behaved in a money-
sharing task (a ‘dictator game’). We asked judges to rate each of the 
target persons with regard to their desirability as short-term and 
long-term mates. In doing so we tested the following hypotheses: (1) 
when evaluating a prospective long-term mate, both men and women 
are interested in prosociality (besides physical attractiveness). (2) 
When evaluating a prospective short-term mate, prosociality does not 
matter, but men and women are inclined to focus on physical attrac-
tiveness only. 
10.2. Methods 
10.2.1. Stimulus material 
151 students (77 female, 74 male) of different disciplines were video-
taped at the University of Groningen (The Netherlands). Target per-
sons sat in front of a white wall, and introduced themselves into the 
camera. The video-material was cut into small clips, with each target 
person being shown for 20 seconds. On the basis of these silent 
video-clips, 7 male judges rated the attractiveness of female targets 
(Cronbach’s Alpha: .83, Intraclass-coefficient: .42) and 5 female 
judges rated the attractiveness of male targets (Cronbach’s Alpha: 
.81, Intraclass-coefficient: .46) on a 7-point-scale. All judges were 
psychology students from the University of Cologne (Germany). Aver-
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age ratings of physical attractiveness for target persons ranged from 
1.1 for men and 2.0 for women (least attractive targets) to 5.9 for men 
and 6.6 for women (most attractive targets) with a mean value of 3.19 
for men (SD = 1.16) and 4.31 for women (SD = 1.03). 
10.2.2. Participants and procedure 
Participants were 28 biology students from the University of Gronin-
gen, 19 females with a mean age of 21.88 years (SD = 1.66) and 9 
males with a mean age of 22.76 years (SD = 2.17). Participants were 
invited to the laboratory where they received a questionnaire.  
In the first part of the questionnaire, participants were familiarized 
with the logic of the so-called dictator game. Participants had to 
imagine a situation with two individuals, a dictator and a recipient, 
who only interact once: The dictator receives 10 Euro and has to 
decide whether to keep all the money for him/herself or whether to 
transfer half of the money to an unknown recipient. The dictator 
knows that his/her identity and his/her decision will always stay 
anonymous. To avoid influencing the participants, neutral vocabulary 
was used to explain the dictator game (e.g. the dictator was called 
Person A, the recipient was called Person B and the dictator game 
was referred to as ‘distribution task’). 
In the second part of the questionnaire, participants were informed 
that they were now going to watch video-clips of target persons who 
had taken part in the dictator game in the role of the dictator. Par-
ticipants were asked to rate each of the target persons with regard to 
his/her desirability as a prospective mate on a 7-point scale. Next to 
the scales, the questionnaire entailed information on how prosocially 
each of the target persons had behaved in the dictator game (i.e. 
whether they had kept all of money for themselves or whether they 
had split the money equally). Unknown to the participants, this in-
formation had been randomly assigned to the target persons before 
the experiment took place. 
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The experiment started when participants had finished reading the 
instructions. Male participants were shown silent video-clips of fe-
male targets. Female participants were shown silent video-clips of 
male targets. To control for sequence effects in the presentation of 
target persons, video-clips were randomly shown in two directions 
(i.e. forwards and backwards). The sequence of target persons did not 
affect results. 
One half of the participants rated the desirability of target persons as 
long-term mates; the other half rated the desirability of target per-
sons as short-term mates. For a long-term relationship, participants 
were asked to imagine high emotional involvement and the potential 
of a life-long bond. For a short-term relationship, participants were 
asked to imagine a fleeting sexual affair without considerable emo-
tions. Participants were randomly allocated to the two groups. With a 
time gap of one week, participants were shown the video-clips again. 
This time, participants had to accomplish the respective opposite 
task (i.e. participants who had rated short-term desirability in week 
1, rated long-term desirability in week 2 and vice versa). The se-
quence of rating long-term and short-term desirability in either week 
1 or week 2 did not affect results.  
10.3. Results 
Desirability as long-term and short-term mates had been measured 
on a 7-point scale. When judging long-term desirability, participants 
ascribed target persons a mean value of 2.21 (SD = .97). When judg-
ing short-term desirability, a mean value of 2.76 (SD = 1.36) was 
ascribed. 
To explore the associations between short-term/long-term desirability 
of targets and their prosociality, physical attractiveness and gender, 
we initially conducted intercorrelations between the variables (see 
Table 5).  
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The desirability of individuals as long-term mates correlated with 
their desirability as short-term mates (r = .66, p < .01), but was not 
identical. As predicted, people preferred prosocial individuals against 
selfish individuals when evaluating a potential long-term mate (r = 
.32, p < .01). However, when evaluating a potential short-term mate, 
people preferred selfish individuals against prosocial individuals (r = -
.19, p < .01). Physical attractiveness was stronger correlated with 
short-term desirability (r = .77, p < .01) than with long-term desirabil-
ity (r = .52, p < .01; Fisher’s z = 3.94, p < .01). Gender was associated 
with desirability as a short-term mate (r = .38, p < .01), indicating 
that men cherished women as short-term mates more than women 
cherished men as short-term mates. Finally, gender was related to 
physical attractiveness (r = .48, p < .01), indicating that men per-
ceived women as more attractive than the other way around. Because 
the information whether an individual had behaved prosocially or 
selfishly in the dictator game had been randomly assigned to the 
target persons, as required, prosociality was uncorrelated to gender 
and physical attractiveness.  
 
1. 
Desirability 
as long-term 
mate 
 
2.  
Desirability 
as short-
term mate 
 
3. 
Prosociality: 
Selfish = 0, 
Prosocial = 1 
 
4.  
Physical 
attractive-
ness 
 
5. 
 Targets’ 
gender:  
Male = 0, 
Female =1 
1.  —  .66**  .32**  .52**  .11 
2.   — - .19**  .77**  .38** 
3.    — - .14 - .01 
4.      —  .48** 
5.      — 
Table 5: Intercorrelations between the criteria variables desirability as long-
term and short term-mate, and the predictor variables prosociality, physical 
attractiveness, and the gender of the target person. Note. ** p < .01 
Summing up bivariate results, our hypothesis that long-term desir-
ability is positively associated with prosociality was strongly sup-
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ported. In contrast, short-term desirability was negatively associated 
with prosociality. Physical attractiveness was relevant for both short-
term and long-term desirability.  
To investigate whether the same relations held true on a multivariate 
level, we conducted two regression analyses. First, we regressed long-
term desirability on the predictor variables prosociality, physical 
attractiveness, and gender (R2 = .45, F = 40.485; see Table 6).  
Predictor variable B SE B ß 
Selfish = 0; Prosocial = 1  .82 .12  .41** 
Physical attractiveness  .58 .06  .67** 
Male = 0; Female = 1 - .42 .14 - .21** 
Table 6: Association between the desirability of individuals as long-term 
mates, their prosociality, their physical attractiveness, and their gender. 
Note. R2 = .45; ** p < .01 
As hypothesized, prosociality significantly influenced the desirability 
as a long-term mate (ß = .41, p < .01): individuals who reportedly had 
split the money equally in the dictator game received .82 points more 
on the 7-point desirability scale than individuals who reportedly had 
kept everything for themselves. As was expected, physical attractive-
ness also predicted long-term desirability (ß = .67, p < .01). Long-term 
desirability of female targets was lower than long-term desirability of 
male targets (ß = -.21, p <.01). This finding contrasts bivariate re-
sults, which showed that gender and long-term desirability were 
uncorrelated (r = .11, n.s.). Indeed, the negative beta weight of gender 
in the regression analysis results from the high intercorrelation be-
tween gender and the second predictor physical attractiveness (r = 
.48, p < .01). Instead of explaining valid variance within the regres-
sion, gender accounts for error variance in attractiveness. Thus, 
gender functions as a suppressor and its negative beta weight has to 
be judged a methodological artifact. In sum, our findings show that 
both males and females judge the opposite sex the more desirable as 
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a long-term mate, the more prosocial and the more physically attrac-
tive they are.  
Table 7 gives parameter estimates for the regression of short-term 
desirability on the predictors prosociality, physical attractiveness, 
and gender (R2 = .61, F = 75.023).  
Predictor variable B SE B ß 
Selfish = 0; Prosocial = 1 - .17 .11 - .08 
Physical attractiveness  .65 .05  .75** 
Male = 0; Female = 1  .04 .12  .02 
Table 7: Association between the desirability of individuals as short-term 
mates, their prosociality, their physical attractiveness, and their gender. 
Note. R2 = .61; ** p < .01 
Only physical attractiveness significantly influenced short-term de-
sirability (ß = .75, p < .01). Neither prosociality nor gender influenced 
multivariate results, although they had been moderately correlated 
with short-term desirability on a bivariate level. In sum, the regres-
sion shows that for both males and females the single significant 
criterion for an individual’s desirability as a short-term mate is 
his/her physical attractiveness. 
10.4. Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to test the hypotheses derived 
from the theory of strategic pluralism (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000) 
that individuals are focusing on prosociality when searching for a 
long-term mate, but that they do not care for prosociality when look-
ing for a short-term mate. Both hypotheses were supported for both 
sexes. 
Our empirical findings back up recent theoretical considerations of 
Miller (2007) who argued that mate choice might have shaped the 
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evolution of moral virtues. Indeed, the existence of prosocial behavior 
is engaging evolutionary theorists for a long time, because it is costly 
to perform, and why should such self-detrimental behavior survive 
the pressures of natural selection? This study shows that prosociality 
may serve as a means to obtain sexual partners. It thus goes with 
findings of Farrelly (2007) who showed that people intuitively seem to 
be aware of the magnetism of altruism as they preferentially direct 
prosocial behavior towards more desirable members of the opposite 
sex. It seems fair to conclude that especially those individuals who 
are unable to attract short-term mates due to a lack of physical at-
tractiveness are well advised to invest in prosocial acts, as they serve 
as good partnership and parenting indicators, and may thus pave the 
way to reproduction. Indeed, the notion that an individual’s disposi-
tion for prosociality should be contingent on his or her other qualities 
may account for the great inter-individual variance in prosociality 
which is still troubling evolutionary theorists. 
Complementing research on mate choice, our results show that both 
men and women may contemplate long-term and short-term mating 
as sexual strategies but that the application of each of these strate-
gies is related to distinct preferences, namely that prosociality is 
valued in long-term relationships, but that it is irrelevant when 
choosing a short-term mate. Basically, these results are in accord 
with most evolutionary theories of mate choice. However, our findings 
are identical for both sexes. To our impression, this result strikes, as 
in mainstream evolutionary theory the topic of mate choice has been 
ruled by the question how hard-to-please women make their careful 
choice. Preferences of men have been taken note of rarely, and if 
researchers did, they often assumed them to be simple and archaic: a 
“real hottie” should be very young, and highly attractive. However, in 
this study, men corresponded to women in appreciating prosociality 
as a core asset in a long-term mate.  
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Prosociality was operationalized as altruistic behavior in a dictator 
game. We can only speculate about the way participants might have 
interpreted this cue, but it seems likely that they took prosocial be-
havior in the dictator game as an indicator for general altruistic 
tendencies. This heuristic makes sense as empirical research shows 
that dictator game behavior correlates significantly with prosocial 
personality dispositions (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004). 
As theorized at the outset, women’s strive for prosocial partners is 
motivated by their need for long-term commitment and parental 
investment. However, men’s strive for prosociality in long-term rela-
tionships can be interpreted in two ways. First, men might be looking 
for a deeply devoted wife who is unlikely to conceive by another man. 
But second, men might be searching for a woman who cuts a warm 
and loving figure as mother of their children. However, if the second 
explanation was the driving force, men should have applied the same 
standards of prosociality to short-term mates, as a woman with car-
ing abilities should have been ever more valuable if men anticipated 
that they themselves would omit parental care. As men did not care 
for prosociality in short-term partnerships, their preference for proso-
ciality in long-term partnerships seems to reflect their primary inter-
est in finding a loyal wife rather than their interest in finding a loving 
mother for potential off-spring.  
Commenting on the signaling value of prosocial traits, our results are 
substantive with regard to a hypothesis formulated by Miller (2007). 
The author argued that moral virtues advertise two classes of traits: 
good partnership/parenting abilities and good genes. With regard to 
prosociality as good genes indicator, Miller referred to costly signaling 
theory (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997) and argued that prosocial virtues are 
difficult to display if one has a high mutation load that impairs the 
precision of brain development. For example, many mutations asso-
ciated with autism, schizophrenia and other disorders disturb the 
development of a complex Theory of Mind, which is essential to dis-
133 
play empathy and considerate behavior. Therefore, Miller states, 
moral virtues may serve as a “neurogenetic warranty” for good genes 
(Miller, 2007, p. 101). However, our data suggest that people do not 
use prosocial behavior as cue to genetic quality. If prosocial behavior 
was used as a good gene indicator, it should have been a significant 
criterion for choosing a short-term mate. But this was not the case—
neither in our study, nor in the study conducted by Gangestad et al. 
(2007) who investigated short-term and long-term preferences of 
women. Therefore, it seems, that individuals interpret prosociality—at 
least prosocial dictator game behavior—as a cue to good partner-
ship/parenting abilities but not as a cue to good genes. 
To conclude, our results suggest that the evolution of human proso-
ciality as well as its amplitude, which sharply distinguishes the hu-
man race from the rest of the animal kingdom, has been underpinned 
by sexual selection. More than any other species in the world, hu-
mans are in need of biparental care to achieve reproductive success. 
This need is reflected by women’s mate choice preferences for proso-
ciality when they are in search of a long-term partner. But going 
beyond child-raising, a long-term, perhaps lifetime bond may yield 
considerable pay-off in various other domains for both partners, as a 
good couple can function more efficiently than either individual alone 
(Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Therefore, men, just like women, value pro-
social personality dispositions in potential long-term partners. As 
individuals seem to trade off between physical attractiveness and 
prosociality depending on whether they are looking for a short-term 
or long-term partner, it seems fair to assume that inter-individual 
variations in prosocial personality dispositions are a result of inter-
individual variations in other mating relevant criteria, particularly 
physical attractiveness. In other words: If you are equipped with a 
skew nose and a belly like a bear, you might not be an amorist but as 
long as you have a great heart you can nevertheless win the partner 
in life you dream of. 
134 
11. General discussion 
11.1. Conclusions 
This work aimed at shedding light on the evolution of human altru-
ism. In the theoretical part, a number of explanations to the phe-
nomenon were reviewed. On the one hand, it was concluded that 
genetic group selection for altruism has to be rejected. On the other 
hand, it was noted that the most influential individual-level theories 
of kin altruism (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Alex-
ander, 1987) may explain a lot. However, these theories are insuffi-
cient to justify the evolution of ultra-social behavior in humans, i.e. 
behavior which traces back to human conscience.  
Human conscience was conceived of as an internal moral authority 
that, superficially analyzed, contradicts human biological desires in 
that it provokes maladaptive behavior. However, daring a rather 
profound view, it was argued that as to the complexity of culture, the 
evolution of human conscience might yet again have been an adapta-
tion to master compound social challenges.  
Modern humans face multifaceted social decision problems everyday. 
They are able to solve these problems because they have distinctive 
psychological features. First of all, their cognitive capacity, which can 
be perceived as their psychological hardware, enables them to reflect 
on the characteristics of complex situations. Moreover, the internali-
zation of cultural norms, that is human psychological software, al-
lows them to evaluate the pros and cons of action alternatives and to 
respond to the situation in a culturally appropriate way. Cultural 
conformity is to the best advantage of most present-day individuals in 
the majority of cases. In this way, it was argued that the conscience 
functions as a superior control authority, which enables humans to 
deduce adaptive behavior patterns.  
135 
Two theories were introduced which offer explanations of how human 
conscience might have evolved, the theory of the extended phenotype 
and the theory of gene-culture coevolution. As it was discussed, both 
theories provide valuable ideas; nevertheless they bear certain weak-
nesses that are particularly linked to the fact that they make non-
proven assumptions. However, although the reasons for the evolution 
of conscience have not yet been explained satisfactorily, the state-
ment rests that humans have a moral conscience. But does this 
mean that individuals whose conscience leads them to uncondition-
ally comply to moral standards win in the evolutionary game?  
As discussed, many theorists doubt this assumption. They rather 
assume that true altruism is a maladaptation. If this was right, op-
portunistic individuals with Machiavellian intelligence (Byrne & 
White, 1988; 1997), who display altruism when they are observed, 
but switch to strict egoism when facing an anonymous situation, 
should gain the upper hand in the long run.  
Offering an alternative to this desolate scenario of the future of man-
kind, the theory of assortation, in particular the commitment-model 
of Frank (1988, 2008) was raised which assumes that true altruism 
may stand the pressures of natural selection, because true altruists 
are able to identify other true altruists and consequently choose one 
another for mutual cooperation. Because cooperating altruists reach 
extraordinary benefits through mutualism, they may out-compete 
egoists (i.e., strict egoists as well as opportunistic individuals with 
Machiavellian intelligence).  
The commitment model makes two assumptions: (1) true altruism is 
identifiable, and (2) individuals assort themselves along the dimen-
sion of altruism. We conducted two studies to test whether these 
hypotheses are supportable.  
In Study 1 we applied the thin slices paradigm and investigated 
whether individuals are able to estimate the level of altruism of unac-
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quainted target persons on the basis of 20 seconds of silent video 
clips. As target persons had been videotaped in a setting completely 
unrelated to altruistic behavior, it could be checked whether indi-
viduals were able to make out permanent cues to situation-
independent altruistic traits. The results were striking as individuals 
estimated with notable accuracy how altruistically complete strangers 
had behaved when these strangers had faced a situation in which 
they had been unobserved. Hypothesis 1 that true altruism is identi-
fiable was thus supported.  
Study 2 tested whether individuals in genuine groups can identify the 
altruistic tendencies of their daily interaction partners. It was further 
observed whether altruism influences the formation of friendships in 
such that individuals assort themselves along the dimension of altru-
ism. Students of six secondary school classes played an anonymous 
dictator game. Afterwards and unannounced, the students had to 
estimate their classmates’ decisions. Again, subjects’ estimations of 
the altruistic behavior of others were better than chance. Thus, our 
second study secured the validation of hypothesis 1 that altruism is 
identifiable. Moreover, hypothesis 2 was supported, as altruistic 
subjects preferably chose other altruists as friends.  
In Study 2 we additionally investigated in how far social closeness 
(i.e., friendship, liking, dislike, and indifference) influenced the accu-
racy of predictions. Estimates concerning the dictator contribution of 
a friend were more valid than predictions about the contributions of 
liked classmates, as it was expected from the intensity of communica-
tion and contact in friendships. Predictions about the contributions 
of unrelated classmates were nothing but random. However, the 
accuracy for predicting the dictator contributions of disliked class-
mates was high and did not differ significantly from the accuracy of 
predicting the behavior of friends. It was argued that a valid evalua-
tion of exactly these two groups—friends and disliked persons—is 
adaptive. Persons ought to know about the true intentions of their 
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best friends, because they are interacting with them frequently and 
are thus very dependent on correct assessments of their characters. 
People should further be aware of the intentions of disliked individu-
als, that is, those with different interests, because they are potential 
adversaries.  
However, balancing the results of Study 1 and 2 against each other, 
why were people astonishingly accurate when predicting the behavior 
of complete strangers (Study 1), but unable to predict the altruistic 
behavior of classmates whom they met with indifference (Study 2)? 
The disparity of these results is probably linked to the fact that sub-
jects in Study 1 and Study 2 processed divergent information to 
predict the behavior of their respective target persons. In Study 1, 
subjects almost certainly relied on their intuitive personality judg-
ment abilities. It has been shown that judgmental accuracy in thin 
slices studies is generally linked to intuitive impressions of nonverbal 
behavior (Ambady et al., 2000). Especially global molar impressions, 
although fuzzier and vaguer than codings of specific behaviors, were 
shown to yield most accurate personality judgments (Ambady & 
Rosenthal, 1993). Probably, such global and intuitive character as-
sessments are made only if one encounters someone else for the first 
time in life. 
In contrast to the thin slices paradigm that explicitly called for the 
activation of human intuitive powers of person perception, the design 
of Study 2 probably motivated subjects to recall the reputations of 
their classmates rather than making spontaneous judgments about 
their altruistic tendencies. Obviously, reputations of classmates met 
with indifference were simply less clearly figured and thus less valid 
than reputations of classmates towards whom participants had a firm 
attitude, be this attitude positive or negative. Research by Anderson 
and Shirako (2008) supports the view that the validity of reputations 
is dependant on the social connectedness of the person who pos-
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sesses the reputation. The authors found that on average, individu-
als’ reputations are only moderately related to their record of behav-
ior, but that the link between reputation and actual behavior is more 
intense for people who are more well-known and receive more social 
interest in the community than for less well-known people. 
Therefore, results of Study 1 and 2, which at first glance seem to be 
contradictory, can be assumed to simply reflect different kinds of 
personality judgment abilities in humans: on the one hand, it seems 
that people are quite accurate in making rapid and intuitive judg-
ments on the altruism of unfamiliar persons. On the other hand, 
people use reputations to evaluate the altruism of known persons; 
these reputations are the more valid the more socially visible the 
target person is.  
In sum, both studies confirm the existence of the two prerequisites 
for the evolution of altruism through assortation: the predictability of 
altruistic behavior and the association of altruists. Both mechanisms 
were simultaneously evidenced in the natural context of school 
classes. This suggests that our altruistic ancestors were likewise able 
to identify other altruists within their groups and to consolidate 
alliances. Going further, it seems feasible to assume that our ances-
tors, when meeting a stranger, were able to decide at short notice 
whether it was useful to establish a friendship with this person or 
whether it was more appropriate to face this person with caution. 
Therefore, it seems likely that positive assortation supported the 
evolution of altruism. 
Although the theory of assortation may explain the evolution of altru-
ism in general, it does not explain the existence of inter-individual 
differences in altruism. In Study 3, the focus was therefore turned to 
a different phenomenon that was supposed to shed light on this 
issue: sexual selection. Based on the theory of strategic pluralism 
(Gangestad & Simpson, 2000), it was hypothesized that men and 
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women, when looking for a partner, should be interested in both 
altruism (as indicator of good partnership and parenting abilities) and 
physical attractiveness (as indicator of genetic quality), but that these 
traits are difficult to get simultaneously: highly attractive people are 
able to acquire mates without being nice; they will tend to engage in 
frequent short-term mating. Nice people are likely to show altruism 
because they have to compensate for deficits in attractiveness. For 
them, altruism is a necessity to obtain at least one long-term partner.  
In view of the ensuing trade-off between attractiveness and prosocial-
ity, which lonely-hearts face, we investigated whether the desirability 
of prosociality varies depending on whether individuals are looking 
for a short-term or a long-term mate. As moral virtues are the more 
important the closer the relationship to a partner, Study 3 assumed 
that (1) altruism is highly valued in potential long-term mates, but 
that (2) altruism is insignificant for the judgment of potential short-
term mates. Judges rated the short-term and long-term desirability of 
target persons on the basis of short video-clips as well as on the basis 
of information on the level of altruism of each target. Both hypotheses 
were supported: altruism pushed a target’s long-term desirability, but 
it was insignificant for a target’s short-term desirability.  
The results suggest that although altruism is costly, at least for some 
individuals, especially for those who lack in physical attractiveness, it 
is a wretched necessity to obtain access to mates and to reproduce. 
Hence, it seems fair to assume that the evolution of inter-individual 
variations in altruistic personality dispositions has been effected by 
inter-individual variations in the propensity to engage in either short-
term mating or long-term mating which in turn is influenced by an 
individual’s variations in other mating relevant criteria. 
The three studies presented in this work provided small, but certainly 
valuable pieces for solving the puzzle of human altruism. In the fol-
lowing section, propositions for future research will be made that are 
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designed to address both limitations of the previous studies as well 
as novel research questions.  
11.2. Future Research 
11.2.1. A further investigation of assortation processes: Do 
prosocial university students mingle with each 
other and are they more successful than egoists? 
Present-day humans are willing to cooperate in anonymous and large 
groups, although there are high risks of exploitation. In the theoreti-
cal part of this work, it was argued that this phenomenon might be 
due to assortation processes. In Study 2 of the empirical part, it was 
shown that assortation is a real-life fact: school students were able to 
estimate the altruism of their classmates and assembled in friend-
ships along this dimension. However, the classes that we investigated 
consisted of 14 to 29 students only. If anything, our design thus 
resembled the structural features of an ancient small-scale society 
(e.g., a small band), but it did not grasp the characteristics of pre-
sent-day large, and anonymous societies. The question whether large-
scale cooperation exists due to assortation of altruistic individuals is 
thus still open to conjecture.  
Study 1 indicated that assortation might be possible under quasi-
anonymity, because it proved that humans judge the altruistic ten-
dencies of complete strangers better than chance. But even if altru-
ism is identifiable in unknown persons, do altruists, who meet in 
more or less anonymous contexts, assemble over time? And above all, 
are altruists in the end really more successful than egoists?  
The University of Cologne, which is a quite anonymous association of 
people as it consists of over 44.000 students, seems to be the perfect 
place for conducting a longitudinal field study concerned with the 
investigation of these questions. To specify, it could be observed 
whether altruistic university freshmen over time mingle with other 
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altruistic students and whether they are more successful in their 
studies, because, for example, they achieve better results whenever 
group work is demanded and cooperate in exchanging protocols of 
courses. 
To research the issue, university students should be recruited at the 
beginning of their studies (e.g., in the introductory lecture on eco-
nomic and social psychology at our department). Over the time of 
their studies, students should be tested with respect to different 
characteristics. There should be a specific pattern on the basis of 
which students are able to construe an identification code (id). Each 
time they participate in a survey, they should be asked to indicate the 
id so that their data could be accumulated on an individual basis. 
In the first surveys, besides demographics, prosociality should be 
measured. To grasp different dimensions of prosociality, scales could 
be used, but a variety of economic games should be applied likewise. 
For example, the dictator game could be used to identify true altru-
ism free of strategic concerns (for a description see Chapter 8.2). In 
addition, a trust game could be played to identify trustfulness and/or 
trustworthiness. In this game an investor receives an endowment e 
and can transfer a part of that endowment p via the experimenter to 
a trustee. The investor knows that the experimenter will multiply the 
transferred sum (e.g., times 3). The trustee receives the multiplied 
amount of money and decides how much to send back to the inves-
tor. If the trustee is completely trustworthy in that he/she sends 
50 % of the received amount back to the investor, the best strategy 
for the investor is to initially transfer the whole endowment (p = e). 
The use of a trust game thus allows for measuring both trustfulness, 
if the participant is in the role of the investor, and trustworthiness, if 
the participant is in the role of the receiver. 
In the following surveys, diverse control variables should be meas-
ured. For example, students should be asked to fill out intelligence 
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tests, and personality scales (e.g., the “Big Five”). Finally, cooperative 
behavior in the context of studying should be surveyed with specific 
items (e.g., “How often do you lend out written notes to fellow stu-
dents?” “Do you enjoy working together in study-groups?” etc.). 
To investigate the relationship between prosociality and studying 
success, each individual’s data would have to be associated with his 
or her grades. To accomplish this, in the following semesters when-
ever grades are announced, students should be asked to inform the 
department about their respective id-grade-linkage. To assure ano-
nymity, we would optimally construe an online-tool that students 
could use to make their announcement. This tool could become an 
integral part of the department’s website, so that students could use 
it whenever they visit the website to find out about their grades. 
To investigate in how far students associate along the dimension of 
altruism, the grouping of individuals in small courses could be ana-
lyzed. Especially the experimental course, which economic and social 
psychology students in Cologne enroll at the end of their duration of 
studies, provides a good opportunity to identify cooperative alliances. 
At the beginning of this course, students should be asked to indicate 
their degree of acquaintance with every course member. It would be 
interesting to see whether some individuals are already acquainted 
with each other and whether these acquaintanceships have to do 
with similar levels of prosociality between the course members. The 
students should moreover be asked to estimate the level of altruism 
of each of their fellow students, and to indicate their willingness to 
cooperate with each of them.  
Students in this experimental course usually have to engage in a lot 
of teamwork during the semester. It would thus be interesting to see 
in how far additional interaction and communication influences the 
perceived level of acquaintance between individuals, the validity of 
their judgments about each other, as well as their choice preferences 
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concerning the cooperation with specific course members. Therefore, 
at the end of the course, the questions that were asked at the begin-
ning of the semester, should be asked for a second time. To ensure 
experimenter-subject-anonymity (i.e. docent-student-anonymity) in 
this specific part of the study, subject numbers should be used when 
students make their evaluation of each other. In addition, the docent 
should leave the classroom during the experiment. 
How could students be convinced to participate in this study? Stu-
dents should be told that (1) we are trying to assess whether there 
are any correlations between personality characteristics and success 
in studying our subject, and (2) that their participation would, in the 
long-term, give us the opportunity to coach our students in the most 
effective way. However, this announcement should only be made after 
students had played the economic games, as otherwise, this an-
nouncement could increase demand characteristics that might influ-
ence the level of prosocial behavior of students displayed in economic 
games—and this would be fatal, as prosocial behavior is the most 
crucial variable of this study. 
To my view, conducting such a study would be valuable for several 
reasons: (1) it allowed for the investigation of the prosociality-
success-linkage as well as for the investigation of assortation proc-
esses in a large and more or less anonymous group; (2) it allowed for 
the collection of data in a real-life setting; (3) it provided high-quality 
data at moderate surveying costs; and (4) the results of this study 
might moreover provide a basis to optimize the coaching of subse-
quent generations of students of our subject. 
Having discussed possible future research connected to the theory of 
assortation, in the next sections the focus will be drawn to research 
on sexual selection. 
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11.2.2. Preferences for prosociality depending on own pro-
viding capabilities and situational challenges: Are 
jobless women particularly prone to “good guys”? 
The theory of strategic pluralism (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; see 
Study 3 in Chapter 10) suggests that men and women were selected 
to use both long-term and short-term mating tactics. With regard to 
women, Gangestad and Simpson (2000) predicted that they evolved to 
trade off between the genetic fitness of men and their partnership/ 
parenting abilities, whereas the specific mating strategies and prefer-
ences which women adopted depended on the nature of their local 
environment. If the local environment was complicated and de-
manded biparental care, women deemed the investment potential of 
prospective mates more valuable than their genetic fitness and con-
sequently adopted long-term mating tactics almost exclusively. If, in 
contrast, pathogens were common in the local environment, or the 
environment signaled the weight of genetic fitness of offspring in 
other ways, women deemed indicators of genetic fitness of prospective 
mates more valuable than their partnership/parenting abilities. In 
such environments, a higher number of women should have engaged 
in short-term, extra-pair mating to acquire genetic benefits from men 
who offered less parental investment, although this strategy included 
the risk of loosing their primary long-term mates. Based on these 
suggestions, Gangestad and Simpson (2000) concluded that the 
mating tactics and preferences of women should have varied between 
populations as to the inter-population differences of environmental 
challenges.  
However, Gangestad and Simpson (2000) additionally assumed that 
preferences of women should have varied within populations, as 
women should have inter-individually differed in the extent to which 
they could have profited from obtaining genetic versus material bene-
fits. If some women were good providers themselves, they could have 
primarily enhanced their fitness by mating with men who provided 
better genes. These women should either have preferred long-term 
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mates with particularly good genes (if they were to get), or they 
should have engaged in opportunistic extra-pair mating with such 
men. In contrast, if other women could have enhanced their fitness 
by obtaining mates who offered more material benefits, these women 
should have preferred long-term mates with superior partner-
ship/parenting abilities and they should have tended to renounce 
extra-pair mating completely to circumvent the loss of their primary 
mate by all means. 
The connection between women’s sociosexuality and their personality 
traits provide indirect support for these assumptions. Unrestricted 
women, who are prone to short-term mating, tend to be more socially 
dominant, more extroverted, and less harm-avoidant (Gangestad & 
Simpson 1990). As Gangestad and Simpson (2000) note, each of 
these traits should facilitate the gaining and maintenance of inde-
pendent resources and accordingly increase women’s willingness to 
waive long-term relationships.  
However, as Gangestad and Simpson (2000) themselves noted, direct 
support for the assumed correlations is mixed. On the one hand, 
differences in mate preferences between populations were supported. 
Across the cultures surveyed by Buss (1989), Eagly and Wood (1999) 
found that an increase in women’s access to resources and power is 
linked to a lower mate preference for financial success, which can be 
assumed as an indicator of good partnership/parenting abilities. But, 
on the other hand, within cultures this relationship could not be 
evidenced: Women with high-paying jobs tend to value resources as 
much as or even more than women with lower paying jobs do (e.g., 
Buss 1989; Townsend 1989; Wiederman & Allgeier 1992). Gangestad 
and Simpson (2000) offered an explanation for this contradiction. 
They assumed that the effects of women’s access to resources across 
cultures might be especially high because what women learn about 
the value of a mate’s resources is shared within a culture.  
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However, if mate preferences exist for central biological reasons, to 
my view, women—also within populations—should differ with regard 
to their mate preferences for prosociality, as eventually every culture 
consists of subcultures. Thus, women who lack financial resources 
should be more interested in finding prosocial men than women who 
are good providers themselves. Actually, it seems likely that results of 
Buss (1989), Townsend (1989), and Wiederman and Allgeier (1992), 
which showed a positive link between women’s own wealth and their 
interest in resources of a potential partner, were not so much trig-
gered by their pursuit of prosociality (i.e., an indicator of partner-
ship/parenting abilities), but rather driven by their pursuit of male 
status (i.e., a good genes indicator). And indeed, the theory of assor-
tative mating would expect that high-status women look out for high-
status men. 
To find out whether a lack of financial autonomy in women is never-
theless linked to a higher preference for good male providers, a study 
should be conducted, in which providing abilities are operationalized 
as prosocial behavioral tendencies, rather than the absolute amount 
of financial resources a man has. The design of Study 3 of this work 
(see Chapter 10) could be used as a model for such a study, as it met 
this demand. As a reminder, we investigated whether partner-
ship/parenting abilities are an important factor for long-term mate 
choice, whereas the key feature of our study was to experimentally 
manipulate partnership/parenting abilities by giving information on 
the degree of prosocial behavior of the potential mate (instead of the 
height of financial resources).  
To explore whether women’s mate preferences for prosociality indeed 
vary as a function of their own providing abilities, two groups of 
women could be studied: working women and unemployed women. 
Unemployment is connected to a decreased access to material re-
sources and a reduction in psychological well-being with an increased 
rate of depression and anxiety (Wilson & Walker, 1993). It thus can 
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be hypothesized that unemployed women show a greater preference 
for prosocial men than working women, because prosocial men signal 
a higher sense of responsibility and willingness to care for their part-
ner’s well-being and supply. 
To survey unemployed women, one part of the study could be con-
ducted in employment offices. To survey working women, interview-
ees could recruit participants on the street or, preferentially, in public 
buildings. Demographic characteristics other than occupational 
status should be held constant (i.e., samples should be similar in 
terms of age, residence, and marital status, etc.).  
As noted, the design of the study should be based on the design of 
Study 3. For reasons of practicability, photos of target persons, rather 
than video-clips should be used. This approach would allow survey-
ing participants on the street and in public buildings without the 
need of additional technical equipment. Women should be given 
questionnaires with photos of target persons and information on their 
prosociality (i.e., information on the dictator game behavior of each 
target). To control for methodological effects, photos and prosociality-
information should be varied (see Chapter 10.2.2). Women should be 
asked to rate the desirability of men either as short-term mates, or as 
long-term mates.  
The overall-design of the experiment would be a 2 (occupational 
status: employed vs. unemployed) X 2 (mating context: short-term vs. 
long-term) X 2 (sequence of photos: forwards vs. backwards) X 2 
(sequence of information on prosociality of target: forwards vs. back-
wards) – between-subject-design. 
According to the theory of strategic pluralism, unemployed women, as 
opposed to working women, should (1) place more weight on proso-
ciality in long-term partners, and (2) should have a decreased desire 
for short-term mates, especially if they were in a relationship at the 
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moment of the interview so that engaging in an extra-pair short-term 
relationship included the risk of loosing their primary mate. 
To my view, the conduction of this study would be valuable, because 
it allowed for a more precise investigation of hypotheses derived from 
the theory of strategic pluralism, namely that individuals adjust their 
mating strategy, and accordingly their mating preferences, depending 
on the environmental challenges they are confronted with, as well as 
their personal capabilities. Exactly these two variables differ between 
working and unemployed people, as unemployment may implicate 
both situational problems as well as personal deficiencies. In particu-
lar, an examination of unemployed women allowed for the investiga-
tion of concrete hypotheses under conditions of high ecological valid-
ity. Moreover, as unemployment is a severe problem nowadays, a 
deeper understanding of the dimension of its effects could be valuable 
for our society. If jobless individuals indeed changed their mating 
habits, this again would be evidence for the severe impacts of unem-
ployment on all areas of life. Such results should once again sensitize 
society for its responsibility towards its weakened members. 
In fact, an investigation of the effects of unemployment on male mat-
ing strategies would be likewise interesting. While strategic pluralism 
theory does not predict changes in male mating strategies as a result 
of environmental challenges, it does predict that men’s propensity to 
engage in short-term mating is contingent on their ability to satisfy 
the short-term mate preferences of women. Thus, their tendency to 
perform short-term strategies should be a direct function of their 
genetic qualities, whereas men’s tendency to invest in single, commit-
ted long-term relationships should be inversely related to their ge-
netic fitness. If unemployment was a signal to low genetic fitness—or 
was at least perceived as such a signal in the eyes of women—
unemployed men should be more inclined to look out for long-term 
mates. However, unemployment is also a signal for decreased provid-
ing potential. Thus, although unemployed men might be inclined to 
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signal more sympathy and warmth, they will be less able to signal 
providing capabilities in terms of resources. Whether and how men 
change their mating strategies in consequence of unemployment is 
less predictable than in the case of women. However, it would be 
likewise interesting to examine. 
Finally, besides studying the effects of unemployment on mate pref-
erences for altruism, it would be likewise interesting to investigate in 
how far unemployment alters an individual’s propensity to display 
altruism. As it was discussed, altruism is a costly signal. It might be 
that unemployed individuals are thus less prone to demonstrate this 
virtue. 
Although the topic of unemployment will be left aside in the following, 
the general idea of variations in the display of altruism will be high-
lighted in the next section. To specify, it will be asked whether differ-
ent mating targets elicit divergent efforts to display altruism as a 
costly signal. 
11.2.3. Conspicuous courtship display: Does “Meg Ryan” 
provoke more altruism than “Angelina Jolie”? 
As discussed in the theoretical part of this work, costly signaling 
theory may help to explain altruistic behavior (Zahavi, 1975; Zahavi 
& Zahavi, 1997). It suggests that individuals frequently engage in 
costly behaviors as a means of signaling to others positive informa-
tion about themselves. As altruism signals an individual’s ability to 
incur costs without the need of reaping benefits, such displays en-
hance an individual’s status and prestige (e.g. Hardy & Van Vugt, 
2006), and, as a consequence may improve the individual’s ability to 
attract and keep desirable mates.  
Based on hypotheses derived from costly signaling theory, 
Griskevicius et al. (2007) recently investigated the idea that self-
sacrifice in the context of mating might actually be self-presentation. 
In four experiments, the authors investigated whether the triggering 
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of mating motives influences the display of conspicuous benevolence. 
In women, mating goals increased public, but not private, helping. In 
men, mating motives did not increase helping in general (e.g., mailing 
a letter that someone had dropped on the way to the post office), but 
mating goals increased helping in contexts in which men could dis-
play heroism or dominance (e.g., diving into icy water after a stranger 
falls from a boat in a storm). 
However, against the background of strategic pluralism theory (Gang-
estad & Simpson, 2000), men should adjust the specific kinds of 
conspicuous courtship displays according to the characteristics of the 
mating context. They should signal good genes virtues selectively in 
short-term mating, while they should display good partner-
ship/parenting abilities primarily in long-term mating contexts 
(Miller, 2007). To test whether this hypothesis holds true, a study 
could be conducted which examines the effect of short-term versus 
long-term mating motives on men’s willingness to show prosocial 
behavior. Men could be invited to the laboratory. Different mating 
motives (i.e., either short-term or long-term mating) could be in-
duced. Afterwards, it could be measured whether the level of proso-
ciality differs as a function of mating motives. 
To induce mating motives, subjects could be exposed to photos of 
attractive females and they could be asked to imagine and write down 
stories about potential dates with these persons. 
To measure the prosociality of men, a dictator game could be used. If 
long-term mating motives indeed increased dictator game contribu-
tions of men, this would retroactively justify the approach that we 
employed in Study 3. As a reminder, in that study we assumed that 
women interpreted prosocial dictator game behavior of target persons 
as valid cues to men’s willingness to engage in a committed long-term 
relationship.  
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However, if results of Griskevicius et al. (2007) are representative, 
measuring prosociality with a dictator game is probably not suffi-
cient, because in their study conspicuous benevolence was only 
evidenced for situations in which men could display heroism and 
dominance. The dictator game is characterized by anonymity. Thus, 
heroism, which implies publicity, can hardly be constituted in this 
game. Therefore, a second measurement of prosociality should be 
applied. Following the example of Griskevicius et al. (2007), specific 
items could be developed to measure different forms of helpfulness, 
that is, non-heroic as well as heroic helpfulness. 
The overall design of the experiment would be a 2 (participant sex) X 
3 (mating motive: short-term vs. long-term vs. control) X 3 (Prosocial-
ity: dictator game vs. non-heroic helpfulness-items vs. heroic helpful-
ness-items) mixed-factorial design. Sex and mating motive would be 
between-participants factors, while prosociality would be a within-
participant factor, meaning that everyone would have to play a dicta-
tor game and would have to answer all questions about non-heroic 
and heroic helping.  
Subjects would be invited to the laboratory. The study should pref-
erably be accomplished in separate parts. To avoid potential suspi-
cion and biased responses, a cover story should be devised to sepa-
rate the different parts of the study. For example, participants could 
be told that they were going to take part in three unrelated studies in 
one session (i.e., participating in a money-sharing-task, story-writing 
to examine their visualization talent, and answering survey questions 
about diverse behavioral preferences). 
Part I: Triggering of mating goals through story-writing 
Subjects would be accompanied in a room, where they were left alone 
to fill out a questionnaire. In the control condition, a poster of a 
person of the same sex should hang on the wall of the lab room. In 
the test conditions, posters with attractive persons of the opposite sex 
152 
should hang on the wall to induce a mating state. These posters 
should either show individuals desirable as short-term mates, or 
individuals desirable as long-term mates. To illustrate, if a man was 
in a short-term condition, he should be exposed to a vamp-like 
woman (e.g., someone looking like Angelina Jolie). If he was in a long-
term condition, he should be exposed to a warm-hearted woman of 
the “girl next door”-type (e.g., someone looking like Meg Ryan). To 
meet different tastes, it might be considerable to hang up two photos 
in each category, (e.g., an attractive vamp with blond hair and an-
other one with dark hair). Prior to the study, posters should have 
been evaluated to assure that equal “overall attractiveness” of short-
term and long-term stimuli is given and that the subjects shown on 
the posters effectively match the stereotypic category of either short-
term or long-term mates. 
Subjects should be offered a seat in front of the posters. They should 
be asked to look at the posters and to select the person whom they 
thought was the most desirable sexual partner. Then, participants 
should be asked to imagine a date with this individual and to write 
down their ideas about this date. In the short-term condition, sub-
jects should be asked to imagine a typical short-term date with the 
stimulus person (e.g., a holiday flirtation or a one-night-stand). In the 
long-term condition, subjects should be asked to imagine a date 
connected to a typical long-term relationship (e.g., a first romantic 
dinner with pleasant conversation during which they developed the 
wish to romantically pursue the stimulus person). In the control 
condition, participants should imagine to be friend with the same-sex 
person shown on the poster. They should, for example, imagine going 
out clubbing with that person. As a manipulation check, a content 
analysis should be made, classifying the vocabulary which partici-
pants used in their stories into two groups: words typically related to 
(1) short-term mating (e.g., unrestrained sex) or (2) long-term mating 
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(e.g., an affectionate glance). The amount of words connected to these 
categories should significantly differ between the three conditions. 
Part II: Measuring dictator game behavior 
Afterwards, subjects should be given a new questionnaire in which 
the logic of the dictator game should be explained (see Chapter 8.2). 
The experimenter should leave the room. Participants should be 
asked to play the dictator game in the role of Person A with real 
money (e.g., 10 Euro in coins). Money should be given to them in an 
envelope. Subjects should be asked to freely decide how to split the 
money between themselves and an unknown Person B. Subjects 
should be asked to directly keep the money that they ascribed to 
themselves, and to put the money for Person B back into the envelope 
and to through it into an urn. 
Part III: Measuring helping behavior 
After the dictator game, participants should be given another ques-
tionnaire in which they had to indicate in how far they were willing to 
help others. (It might be useful to place a filler task between the 
dictator game and the helping items to prevent an intensification of 
demand characteristics and biased responses.) Similar to the study of 
Griskevicius et. al. (2007) items should reflect non-heroic as well as 
heroic helping, (e.g., non-heroic helping: helping elderly persons to do 
their shopping; heroic helping: running into a burning building in 
which someone is trapped). 
Hypotheses and further considerations 
According to the theory of strategic pluralism, prosociality as a cue to 
good partnership/parental abilities should be displayed primarily in 
the long-term mating condition. Assuming that both dictator game 
contributions and non-heroic helping behavior indicate good partner-
ship/parenting abilities, these two displays should be higher in the 
long-term condition as opposed to the control condition and the 
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short-term condition, although, as discussed, it could be that effects 
for anonymous dictator game contributions are weaker than effects 
for items designed to measure public helping behavior. 
A second objection to the hypothesis is that Griskevicius et al. (2007) 
showed that mating goals only increase heroic helping in men. If this 
result was replicated, it would be interesting to observe whether long-
term mating motives and short-term mating motives increased heroic 
helping, as indeed heroic helping might on the one hand be an indi-
cator of good partnership/parenting abilities, but on the other hand it 
might likewise be an indicator of genetic fitness. Of course, it would 
also be interesting to investigate the same relation for women. 
11.2.4. Condition-dependant costs: Are “good-gene-
altruists” nobler than “good-parent-altruists”? 
In the preceding section, one problem loomed: in some cases it is 
hard to differentiate whether a specific prosocial trait is either an 
indicator of good partnership/parenting abilities, or an indicator of 
genetic quality, or even both (e.g., heroic helping behavior).  
Actually, Miller (2007) exactly assumed these three types of signaling 
functions of moral virtues. As discussed in the theoretical part of this 
work, with regard to genetic quality Miller (2007) argued that moral 
virtues, like altruism, are difficult to display if one has a high muta-
tion load that impairs the precision of body and brain development. 
For example, people burdened with mutations associated with psy-
chological disorders like autism tend to develop limited Theories of 
Mind. They consequently show deficits with regard to empathy and 
prosocial behaviors. Turning the argument the other way around, 
prosociality may therefore serve as a kind of neurogenetic warranty 
when judging a potential mate. With regard to partnership/parenting 
abilities, the relevance of the argument was even more obvious be-
cause altruism is an attractive feature in its own right and individu-
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als who display altruistic acts now are likely to care for their partner’s 
and children’s well-being at a later time.  
However, to differentiate the signaling functions of prosociality (i.e., 
whether a prosocial behavior is a good genes or a good part-
ner/parent indicator), Miller (2007) made specific predictions. These 
predictions were based on varying costs of prosociality as a function 
of an individual’s genetic fitness (i.e. his/her “condition”). Miller 
(2007) stated that individuals with higher genetic quality should be 
easier able to suffer the costs of prosociality and should consequently 
display moral virtues more steadily. Thus, stable prosociality would 
be an indicator of good genes, and “good gene prosociality” should 
correlate positively with other fitness indicators, such as health, 
fertility, intelligence, or physical attractiveness. On the contrary, 
Miller (2007) assumed moral virtues as good partnership/parenting 
indicators to obtain their temporal reliability (from the beginning of a 
relationship to a long-term relationship) not so much from condition-
dependence, but, amongst others, from the social-reputational costs 
connected to moral backsliding.  
If Miller’s assumptions are true, individuals should vary their proso-
cial behavior depending on (1) their level of genetic quality, and (2) 
the reputational costs connected to a misdeed. To test this, a dona-
tion study could be conducted. 
Assuming that donating behavior is a prosocial virtue that may signal 
both good genes as well as good partnership/parenting qualities, 
specific falsifiable predictions can be made on the basis of Miller’s 
(2007) considerations, such that individuals with good genes show 
donation behavior often and steadily, while individuals with good 
partnership/parenting abilities show donation behavior more selec-
tively in contexts with reputational consequences in relation to a 
prospective mate, because for them the display of donation behavior 
is more costly in relation to their overall fitness.  
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Participants should be invited to the laboratory. To trigger mating 
goals, they should be welcomed by an attractive experimenter of the 
opposite sex. First of all, the genetic fitness of participants should be 
measured via two proxi-variables: physical attractiveness and intelli-
gence. To measure physical attractiveness, participants should be 
asked to present themselves into the video camera so that based on 
these video-clips, a group of judges could rate the physical attractive-
ness of participants later. Afterwards, participants should be left 
alone to fill out an intelligence test. (In addition, it might be consider-
able to hand out a scale to measure sociosexuality, as indeed high 
genetic quality should also be related to unrestricted sociosexuality.) 
Subsequently, donation behavior should be measured. In the public 
condition with high reputational consequences, the attractive experi-
menter of the opposite sex should personally hand out the financial 
reward connected to this study (e.g., 10 Euro in coins). Presenting an 
official donation box (e.g., a box of doctors without borders) to the 
participants, the experimenter should ask them whether they are 
willing to spend a portion of their money for a charitable purpose. 
By contrast, in the anonymous condition without reputational conse-
quences, participants should receive their financial reward in an 
envelope together with the questionnaire in which intelligence is 
tested. The experimenter should leave the room. An info leaflet inside 
the envelope should call attention to the donation box, which should 
stand on a table in the lab room. Having accomplished the intelli-
gence test, subjects could make their donation choice unobserved 
and free of reputational consequences.  
In the public condition with high reputational consequences, social 
demand characteristics would be high so that individuals with good 
genes (i.e., highly attractive, intelligent people (unrestricted in soci-
osexuality)), as well as individuals with good partnership/parenting 
abilities should show high levels of donation. However, in the anony-
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mous condition, donation behavior of individuals with good genes 
should be higher than donation behavior of individuals with good 
partnership/parenting abilities. 
The conduction of this study seems useful as it offers a possibility to 
test whether the assumption that prosocial behavior primarily indi-
cates good partnership/parenting abilities is really true. This suppo-
sition, indeed, is incorporated in many studies on evolutionary theo-
ries of mate choice (like the one that was presented in Chapter 10). 
However, before proceeding to conduct studies that are based on this 
assumption, the assumption should at first be challenged empiri-
cally. 
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12. Closing words 
The theories and the research presented in this work indicate that 
the study of the evolution of altruism has been extensive but that it is 
still expanding. The research proposals that were outlined in the last 
section may have been slightly suggestive of how much delicate work 
still has to be accomplished to compose the human altruism puzzle 
with all its tiny pieces. However, any science that deals with a com-
plex phenomenon like human cooperation should not only focus on 
the investigation of tiny elements—it should instead always keep the 
big picture in view by asking the “big questions.”  
One of these big questions certainly is in how far human behavior is 
really determined by genes and how much of behavioral variation is 
due to culture. For a long time, biology and the social sciences have 
been opposing camps in that they tried to explain the same behav-
ioral tendencies with divergent means. It seems that slowly but surely 
a more integrative approach gains ground on the basis of which 
biology and culture may best be understood as forces that are mutu-
ally restrictive, but likewise constructive. In this regard, the combina-
tion of cross-cultural research and evolutionary thinking has to be 
pressed ahead as it may bring about the most sophisticated conclu-
sions as to the relative importance of genes and culture for the shap-
ing of the human race.  
Altogether, it is invigorating to see how evolutionary theory allows for 
the collaboration of scholars from divergent scientific fields and how 
their disputes lead to ever more interesting questions that open new 
avenues for investigation. The Nobel laureate William Lawrence Bragg 
once said “The important thing in science is not so much to obtain 
new facts as to discover new ways of thinking about them.” In this 
spirit, the study of the evolution of human altruism promises to 
create still a few viewpoints that will force us to rethink our beliefs 
about the world and our place in it. 
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 14. Appendices 
Appendix A:  Controlling for non-independence of prediction 
scores within school classes 
Warner et al. (1979) showed that in a so-called Social Relations Model 
in which every individual of a certain group rates every other individ-
ual of this group, a prediction X of an actor i concerning partner j can 
be expressed by the following equation: 
jijiji gbamX +++=  
where 
• m denotes the mean prediction within the group,  
• ai is the actor effect for person i, which is his tendency to exhibit a 
consistent level of predictions across interaction-partners 
• bj is the partner effect of person j, which again measures the ten-
dency of group members to judge a person in a consistent way 
• gij is the relationship-effect which is set at the dyad level. It meas-
ures the prediction of actor i concerning partner j after removing 
their individual level tendencies (i.e. the actor- and the partner. 
The estimation of the actor-effect equals: 
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where  
• n is the group size,  
• Mi. is the mean of predictions exhibited by person i,  
 • M.i is the mean of predictions received by person I, and 
• M.. is the mean of all the predictions. 
The estimation of the partner-effect equals: 
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As the partner-effects are precisely those values, which signify the 
tendencies of objects to be predicted as behaving altruistic by all their 
classmates, we used partner-effects as adjusted prediction scores 
when testing hypothesis 1 on an aggregated level (e.g. the question 
whether the average reputation of a student matched his actual 
behavior). This means that actual dictator contributions of the stu-
dents were correlated with their partner-effects (n = 122). 
When testing hypothesis 1 on the individual level (e.g. whether indi-
vidual predictions, too, matched the behavior of their classmates), we 
additionally integrated the unique perception of an actor concerning a 
partner into our analysis. That is, the sum of partner-effects and 
relationship-effects belonging to a single prediction (bi + gij) were 
correlated with the actual dictator contributions of the student (n = 
2437). 
 Appendix B:  Measuring true accuracy and the consensus-effect 
in mutual predictions of two persons 
Kenny and Acitelli (2001) depicted a paradigm for the simultaneous 
measure of accuracy and consensus effect in 2-person relationships: 
the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM). Our replica is pre-
sented in the following figure:  
 
 
It consisted of four variables: (1) the dictator contribution of Person A 
“DA”, (2) the dictator contribution of Person B “DB”, (3) the prediction 
of person A concerning the dictator contribution of person B “PAB”, (4) 
the prediction of person B concerning the dictator contribution of 
person A “PBA”. While the actual dictator contributions of the two 
persons DA and DB were treated as determinants, the predictions of 
the dictator contributions PAB and PBA (in which the first subscript 
refers to the judge and the second subscript refers to the object) were 
treated as outcome variables. The four paths represent accuracy and 
consensus effects in the predictions of the two persons: diagonal 
paths from DA to PBA and DB to PAB denote accuracy effects, whereas 
horizontal paths from DA to PAB and DB to PBA denote consensus ef-
fects as they refer to the extent to which the judge implicitly assumes 
that the object will make a dictator contribution like he himself did. 
Whether the consensus effect lowers or betters predictions depends 
on whether person A and person B are actually similar (correlation 
between DA and DB).  
 We estimated the paths of the APIM using multilevel modeling with 
SPSS. The dyad was treated as the unit. As person A and person B 
were indistinguishable (i.e. both were friends or both nominated each 
other as likable etc.) accuracy and consensus effects were assumed to 
be similar for both persons. 
Having calculated accuracy and consensus effects, regression coeffi-
cients were standardized. Subsequently overall accuracy rates (i.e. 
the correlation of actual behavior and predictions) could be split into 
true accuracy and the increment due to bias, with the latter being the 
product of actual similarity and the consensus effect. The equation 
reads as follows:  
overall accuracy  =  true accuracy  +  increment due to bias 
r (D, P)  =  accuracy effect  +  r (DA, DB) * consensus 
effect. 
